Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2025

Tax-to-GDP ratios in a majority of countries worldwide rebounded despite the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on revenues.

From 2015 to 2022, tax revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 16.5% to 17.1% on average in developing countries (UN, 2024[1]). The tax-to-GDP ratio increased in both low-income countries (LICs) (+4%) and lower middle-income countries (LMICs) (+2%) or from 11% to 11.4% and from 15.4% to 15.7%, respectively, over the period. Despite this growth, the tax-to-GDP ratio in LICs remains below the effective 15% threshold (11.44% in 2022). The tax-to-GDP decreased (-3%) in upper middle-income countries (UMICs) or from 19.2% in 2015 to 18.3% in 2022 (Our World in Data, 2023[2]).

Between 2015 and 2021, tax-to-GDP ratios increased in three-fifths of the 130 economies included in the OECD Global Revenue Statistics database. However, in 86% of LICs and 43% of LMICs, revenues remain below the level required to finance critical social services and to invest in economic development (15% of GDP) (Benitez et al., 2023[3]; Choudhary, Ruch and Skrok, 2024[4]).

While tax revenues (excluding social security contributions) are the primary source of government revenue, non-tax revenues represent a significant share in all countries. According to International Monetary Fund (2024[5]) data, non-tax revenues make up one-third of government revenues in developed countries but nearly half of government revenues in developing countries.

Between 2015-22, total tax and non-tax government revenue in developing countries rose 20%, or 2% annually, from USD 3.15 trillion a record high of USD 3.79 trillion in 2022 (constant 2015 prices).

The tax structure, – or tax mix – varies significantly between countries and has evolved since 2015.

The tax mix, or share of tax revenues from various tax types, is different in developing and developed economies. Taxes on good and services account for about half of tax revenues in developing countries, while taxes on income and profits and social security contributions make up a much larger share of the tax mix in developed economies. In most regions and income groups, income taxes and social security contributions increased as a share of the tax mix between 2015 and 2021 while the share of taxes on goods and services declined. In Africa specifically, value added tax as a share of revenues decreased while the share of other consumption taxes increased by a similar proportion. On average, LICs experienced the largest shift in their tax mix between 2015 and 2021 with taxes on goods and services playing a smaller role and corporate income tax and social security contributions a larger one.

Other sources of public revenues beyond taxes can provide additional resources for development. Governments of countries with exploitable natural resources, for example, can raise revenues through non-tax instruments such as royalties or interest and dividends. The mandatory, privately managed social security arrangements in some countries offer another revenue source. In 2021, non-tax revenues from natural resources and private social security contributions amounted to 1.7% of GDP on average in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and in some economies, among them Chile and Mexico, these represented more than 5% of GDP (OECD et al., 2023[6]).

Total ODA in support of domestic revenue mobilisation has increased since 2015.

Total official development assistance (ODA) in support of domestic revenue mobilisation (DRM) has increased significantly since 2015, rising from USD 219.7 million in 2015 to USD 748.7 million in 2022 though this was a decline from the peak of USD 1.1 billion in 2020. Loans provided by the multilateral system accounted for much of the increase, with countries that are not least developed countries (LDCs) receiving a significant portion.

Development partners that are members of the Addis Tax Initiative collectively committed to doubling their assistance on tax to USD 441.1 million by 2020 and maintaining or surpassing this level thereafter. While this target has been missed, assistance on tax has increased significantly.

Launched in 2022, the OECD’s Tax Treatment of Official Development Assistance Hub is the first public resource to improve the transparency around the taxation of aid. The Hub presents approaches taken by 22 of 30 DAC members that participated in the survey, representing over 80% of total bilateral ODA in 2020. Of these 22, 13 donors on the Hub reported having reviewed their policy since 2015. Of these, four reported they never or rarely request exemptions; three sometimes request exemptions; nine generally request exemptions and six have no general policy on the issue.

The United Nations (UN) through the Subcommittee on the Tax Treatment of ODA Projects produced guidelines on the tax treatment of government-to-government aid projects. The UN Tax Committee also adopted a recommendation on the public disclosure of provisions concerning the tax treatment of government-to-government aid projects.

• By increasing the tax-to-GDP ratio to a level equivalent to that of other developing countries, LICs could mobilise an additional 4.3 percentage points of tax-to-GDP, equivalent to USD 27.8 billion per year in tax revenues.1

• Achieving this mobilisation would require an increase in revenues from a range of taxes, of which taxes on goods and services and personal income taxes offer the greatest potential. While there is scope for some increase in revenues from corporate income tax, the gain would be limited compared to the scale of resources needed.

• Globally, carbon pricing scenarios could generate roughly USD 1.4 trillion annually by 2030, or 1.1% of global GDP (IMF, 2024[11]).

• Estimates of illicit financial flows vary widely due to the lack of a commonly agreed definition and statistical challenges (OECD, 2022[12]). However, progress is being made to harmonise and clarify approaches, particularly on a country-by-country basis.

Through the work of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (the Global Forum) and its 171 members, 55% of which are developing countries, bank secrecy has been effectively eliminated and over EUR 130 billion in additional revenues and penalties have been identified, including more than EUR 45 billion identified by developing countries. In addition, 147 jurisdictions participate in the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, which facilitates exchange of information between countries, Of these, 126 jurisdictions have committed to automatic exchange of financial account information. To date, 108 jurisdictions of them are already exchanging information automatically; 51 of these are developing countries including several LDCs.

International co-operation has also expanded in efforts to effectively tax multinational enterprises (MNEs). Laws are in place to allow tax authorities to share key country information in 102 jurisdictions, and as of November 2024, 104 jurisdictions signed the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) to modify their bilateral tax treaties and close loopholes (OECD, 2024[13]). The 147 members of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS, half of which are developing countries, have agreed on rules to establish a global minimum tax with a minimum effective tax rate of 15%, and implementation of the agreement has begun. The Inclusive Framework has also negotiated a simplified and streamlined approach to the application of the arm’s length principle for certain activities of MNEs. In a recent report, the OECD (2024[14]) predicted that this approach will reduce transfer pricing disputes and compliance costs; enhance tax certainty for both tax administrations and taxpayers; and benefit low-capacity jurisdictions facing limited resources and data availability in particular.

Despite the enhanced international tax co-operation, not all countries have yet been able to benefit, especially LDCs.

Increased international funding, technical support and training are boosting taxation capacity in developing countries, particularly with respect to international taxation. The joint OECD-UNDP Tax Inspectors Without Borders (TIWB) initiative, launched at the Third International Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa in 2015, deploys experts to work alongside tax administrators in developing countries on live audit cases and related international tax issues. To date, TIWB programmes, including those jointly delivered with the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF), have generated over USD 2.30 billion in additional tax revenues and USD 6.05 billion in additional tax assessments across 62 jurisdictions (OECD/UNDP, 2024[15]). The OECD and the Global Forum are expanding capacity-building support to meet increasing demand from developing countries that seek to implement the evolving international standards on taxation. The Global Forum, for instance, provided support to 91 jurisdictions in 2023 that ranged from induction programmes for new members and bilateral programmes as well as trainings, e-learning, toolkits and guidance, and much of the capacity-building activities were conducted in partnership with international and regional tax organisations (OECD, 2024[16]).

Collaboration with regional tax organisations has become increasingly important. The ATAF plays a leading role in building tax capacity across Africa, providing technical assistance missions to 35 countries in 2023. Thanks to these initiatives, ATAF members issued new tax assessments of USD 1.41 billion, of which USD 620 million was collected through audits. Since 2016, cumulative efforts by the ATAF and joint ATAF-TIWB programmes brought total tax collections to USD 1.92 billion (African Tax Administration Forum, 2024[17]). Another example is the Platform for Collaboration on Tax, established in 2016, that brings together the secretariats of the IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank Group to strengthen collaboration on DRM (Platform for Collaboration on Tax, 2024[18]). Separately, the OECD Academy for Tax and Financial Crime Investigation has provided training to more than 3 000 government officials from 167 jurisdictions to better detect and investigate tax and other financial crimes, helping countries in their efforts to stamp out illicit financial flows (IFFs).

PDBs are playing a crucial role in aligning investments with global goals such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Biodiversity Framework. Of the 127 PDBs and development finance institutions established since 2006, 72% were established in low- and middle-income countries, with 37.8% now domiciled in LMICs and 23.5% in UMICs but just 3.6% in LICs2 (Peking University and Agence Française de Développement, 2024[19]). PDBs are increasingly mobilising finance for climate adaptation, biodiversity and social investments and exploring the use of sustainability-linked bonds, debt swaps and other innovative financial tools. Many PDBs have adopted green goals but green assets account for a relatively small share of their portfolios of just 14% on average (OECD et al., 2023[6]). For instance, only 19% of the instruments offered by PDBs in the Latin America and Caribbean region address digital, gender or green goals (OECD et al., 2023[6]). Finance in Common supports PDBs by promoting research, dialogue and peer learning to enhance their strategies and operations. The network also works to foster global co-operation among stakeholders with the aim of streamlining financial frameworks to support sustainability goals, including recent efforts activities to strengthen alliances, enhance technical assistance and address currency mismatch challenges to boost cross-border capital flows.

No single revenue type can generate the amount of revenue needed to achieve the SDGs. Yet, efforts to increase DRM are often narrowly focused on international corporate income tax, which is important, including for ensuring a level playing field and maintaining trust in the tax system, but cannot provide the level of domestic public revenues that many countries require. It is therefore important to look across the tax system as a whole to identify revenue-generating opportunities. Developing Medium-term revenue strategies can be a useful approach to align revenue goals with tax system reform (Platform for Collaboration on Tax, 2021[20]; Platform for Collaboration on Tax, 2023[21])More than 25 countries are already exploring this. When developed in consultation with and support from society as a whole, such strategies can be a useful complement to integrated national financing frameworks. The revenue strategy approach can also build durable political momentum for tax reform. This is critical since political economy constraints are frequently cited as a major challenge to achieving and maintaining DRM reforms (Independent Evaluation Group, 2023[22]).

Low- and middle-income countries require economic growth in order to develop a well-functioning state that provides good quality public services, an education system and a social protection system. The tax system should contribute to an environment that is conducive to economic growth. However, economic growth must also produce higher tax revenues. When tax revenues increase in parallel with economic growth, countries can avoid having to increase statutory tax rates that would result in economic distortions. Broad tax bases, the avoidance of generous income-based tax incentives, and progressive tax systems can amplify the contribution of growth to higher revenues.

Tax incentives are increasing popular and generous in much of the world (OECD, 2022[23]). While tax incentives can play a valuable role in development, the foregone revenues can be significant. Corporate income tax (CIT) incentives cost on average 0.2% and 0.3% of GDP in Africa and Asia and almost double that in a quarter of countries in each region (OECD, 2022[23]). Almost 90% of developing countries have an income-based tax incentive that means in-scope firms pay zero CIT rates on their profits. The evidence on the effectiveness of tax incentives is mixed as most lack effective monitoring and analysis to determine value for money. A more comprehensive review of tax expenditures, including and beyond tax incentives for the largest multinational enterprises, is needed in many countries. Such reforms should ensure that incentives are well designed, well targeted and based on clear eligibility criteria and are transparent in granting, administration and evaluation (IMF, OECD, UN, WBG, 2015[24]).

Fossil fuel subsidies, which remain widespread globally, significantly hinder environmental sustainability and economic efficiency by encouraging the overconsumption of carbon-intensive energy sources. The fiscal cost of such subsidies, including those provided through tax expenditures, is substantial; in 2022, government support for fossil fuels surged to over USD 1.4 trillion across 48 OECD and partner countries, nearly doubling from the 2021 level as a result of initiatives aimed at mitigating high energy costs (OECD, 2023[25]). The trend shows an alarming increase in these subsidies despite growing awareness of their adverse impacts and complicating efforts to meet climate commitments and increasing fiscal costs. Phasing out fossil fuel subsidies can alleviate fiscal burdens, freeing up resources for more productive investments in renewable energy, education and healthcare while also aligning market signals with climate policy objectives. It is important to offset the potential regressive pricing of fossil fuels by ensuring that savings are redirected to targeted programmes for vulnerable populations, though this may be challenging in some countries.

IFFs can be defined as activities such as money laundering, bribery, tax fraud and evasion and trade invoice mispricing, which aim to move resources from one country to another infringing the law (OECD, 2014[26]). These illicit flows contribute to the weakening of public institutions, foreign bribery and corruption, which inflict widespread harm and financial losses.

IFFs threaten the strategic, political and economic interests of countries and undermine public trust in governments and the financial system. IFFs can nullify legitimate financial inflows and reduce domestic investment capacity. Illicit financial outflows in some countries may exceed both ODA and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, making the fight against IFFs a key issue for policy coherence for sustainable development (Global Financial Integrity, 2015[27]; OECD, 2024[28]).

While there has been some success with the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, a partnership by the World Bank and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime that facilitated the recovery of about USD 1.9 billion in stolen assets, it is estimated that only 1% of crime proceeds are typically recovered. Detecting risks and emerging trends in tax criminality can improve performance as can improved inter-agency co-ordination and national strategies to tackle tax crime and foster a whole-of-government approach to combat IFFs.3

International co-operation is essential, and ODA can support by targeting non-tax revenue sectors such as energy and transport, strengthening key domestic institutions such as central banks and revenue collection authorities, and engaging with the private sector to enhance risk management, due diligence and responsible FDI. All this entails building technical expertise on IFFs. Efforts should focus on supporting developing countries in implementing Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards to strengthen market and investor confidence, deter de-risking, and ensure sustained access to financial markets and cross-border payment systems.4

Knowledge of beneficial ownership information is the cornerstone of the fight against tax evasion and other IFFs. Building on the work of the Global Forum and the synergies with the FATF process, jurisdictions took concrete steps in recent years to boost transparency of beneficial ownership information and foster compliance of domestic and foreign stakeholders. These steps included enacting legislation and creating tools to bridge information gaps, investigate tax and financial crimes effectively, and increase DRM. However, only 53% of the 118 jurisdictions reviewed by the Global Forum as of June 2024 have received a satisfactory rating on beneficial ownership, mostly because of implementation issues. Further progress is needed regarding practical administration of the adopted reforms and in terms of the resources that administrations must devote to this. Strategies to combat IFFs should centre on establishing beneficial ownership registers, whose set-up, administration and supervision are complex for both developed and developing countries.

Some 65% of the 169 SDG targets cannot be achieved without involving subnational governments, including city governments. In a recent survey jointly conducted by the OECD, the Sustainable Development Solutions Network and the European Committee of the Regions, two-thirds of subnational governments cited the lack of financial resources as their main challenge in achieving the SDGs (OECD, 2024[29]). Their responses highlight the need for decentralisation, especially in some African countries, to allow local governments to raise their own revenues, for instance via property (Cities Alliance, 2021[30]). Regional and local governments play a key role in achieving climate and environmental objectives and are responsible for most of the public spending on climate change adaptation and mitigation. Yet, at current levels of investment, there is an annual financing shortfall of USD 350 billion in cities to meet climate targets in emerging economies per year (Birch, Rodas and Drumm, 2023[31]). International co-operation can play a critical role in bolstering subnational governments and urban finance. Guarantees, for instance, have potential to mobilise financing for sustainable development, as highlighted in discussions around multilateral development bank reform and by the G20 Independent Experts Group (2023[32]); harnessing this potential for cities can provide them with greater access to finance to address the impacts of climate change. As of 2024, The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency has issued USD 84.5 billion in guarantees since 1988, with only 11 claims paid (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 2024[33]). Most of its activities have focused on UMICs, though insurance in LICs accounted for more than 10% of new issuance volume for the first time in FY2022 (Mathiasen and Aboneaaj, 2023[34]).

Adequate and effective financing is essential to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. Gender-responsive budgeting can help address gender biases from government processes and tools and ensure that they are advancing gender equality efforts in areas such as equal pay and equal access to labour markets. Gender budgeting is increasingly practiced in OECD countries (OECD, 2024[35]). Partner countries are currently assessing whether they have systems in place to track budget allocations to gender equality as part of the 2023-26 monitoring round of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2024[36]).

The digitalisation of tax administration is linked with multiple benefits including improved revenues – for instance, increasing e-filing adoption by half of total tax filing could increase revenues by 1.6% of GDP (Nose and Mengistu, 2023[37]). It also is associated with greater public trust of tax officials and a lower perception of corruption (IMF, 2022[38]). While developing countries have been making progress, there remains significant scope for action. A combination of policies and complementary human resources are key to successful digitalisation (Nose and Mengistu, 2023[37]). There is a growing range of support available from different actors including TIWB programmes and self-assessment maturity models (OECD, 2022[39]).

The global minimum tax ensures that large MNEs pay a minimum level of tax (at an effective rate of 15%) on their income in each jurisdiction where they operate, thereby reducing the incentive for profit shifting, placing a floor under tax competition and bringing an end to the race to the bottom on corporate tax rates. To date, roughly 45 jurisdictions have already implemented or are planning to implement the global minimum tax in their domestic law. The revenue gains are estimated at between USD 155 and USD192 billion a year, or 6.5%-8.1% of global CIT revenues (OECD, 2024[40]). While gains would potentially be shared widely among jurisdictions, they would be higher for jurisdictions that implement some component of the global minimum tax. Those that do not implement the minimum level of tax risk foregoing revenues they could otherwise collect. The minimum tax will also provide an opportunity for jurisdictions to reassess their tax incentives and move towards incentive designs that offer better value for money in terms of investment generated per US dollar of revenue foregone.

While tax is primarily seen as a tool to raise revenues to deliver development goals, tax policy can also be used more directly to influence development outcomes. This potential has not been fully utilised to date. The development potential is especially substantial in the areas of inequality reduction, the environment and health.

Global wealth concentration has increased at the top of the distribution. The estimated share of wealth held by the wealthiest 0.001% of the world population more than doubled between 1995 and 2022 from 3.3% to 6.9% (OECD, 2024[41]). Effective tax rates on high net worth individuals are often substantially lower than rates on persons with lower incomes5 (OECD, 2024[41]).In terms of DRM, the primary limitation of individual income tax is the ability of wealthy individuals to minimise taxable income through deferred capital gains and strategic use of holding companies.

Policies can help broaden tax bases and achieve greater neutrality between taxation of different types of income and assets. In countries where level of tax expenditures is high, reforming regressive tax expenditures would increase the progressivity of the tax system. Countries need annual tax expenditure reports that not only measure the tax revenue foregone but also analyse the distributional impact. There is also a need to develop coherent strategies to strengthen the formal economy and bring informal businesses and their workers within the tax net. This will require tax and benefits reform. Many countries have informal sector businesses and workers that do have the capacity to make tax and social security contributions. A well-designed presumptive tax regime incentivises formalisation and does not constrain business growth.

Revenues from carbon taxes and emissions trading systems increased to a record high of USD 104 billion in 2023 (World Bank Group, 2023[42]). The global coverage of explicit carbon pricing policies is expanding, with nearly a quarter of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions now subject to a carbon tax or emissions trading system. When implicit carbon pricing via fuel excise taxes is included, coverage of explicit and implicit carbon pricing policies increases to 42% of global GHG emissions (OECD, 2023[43]). These taxes can generate significant revenue that can be allocated to essential public services and help dampen adverse distributional impacts. Their primary role is to incentivise the reduction of environmental damage, promote innovation in green technologies and improve public health outcomes by lowering pollution-related risks. Though environmental taxes may have regressive effects, they can be designed to incorporate compensatory measures such as tax credits or social transfers to mitigate impacts on vulnerable households and ensure an equitable distribution of benefits. Such an approach fosters both environmental and economic resilience, contributing to long-term sustainable development.

A recent declaration by the G20 on implementing a 2% minimum tax on the wealth of the world’s billionaires as well as the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force advocate introducing levies on high-emission and resource-intensive sectors. Proposals include a fossil fuel extraction levy and a financial transaction tax, with significant portions of the revenues to be allocated to developing countries.

Despite initial progress in expanding essential health services coverage since 2000, the pace of improvements has stagnated globally since 2015, and 4.5 billion people lacked coverage in 2021. Financial hardship due to out-of-pocket health spending affected 2 billion people in 2019, with 1 billion people facing catastrophic costs and 344 million pushed into extreme poverty. The proportion of people spending over 10% of their household budget on health increased from 12.6% in 2015 to 13.5% in 2019 (UN, 2024[44]).

The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the financing gap for social protection and essential health care in many countries. In addition, many developing countries with large informal economies especially struggle to fund critical services. LICs would need to invest an additional 15.9% and LIMICs 5.1% of their GDP to finance a social protection floor. Put another way, many LICs would have to spend more than 75% of their tax revenues on social protection to close the gap – more than the expenditures of OECD member countries with a much larger tax revenue base (OECD, 2024[45]). In sub-Saharan Africa, public spending on health was only about 5.2% of GDP in 2019 compared with the global average of 9.8% of GDP (Piatti-Fünfkirchen, Lindelow and Yoo, 2018[46]).

Creating fiscal space – increasing tax revenues, expanding social security coverage, managing debt and reallocating public expenditures, among other approaches – would narrow the financing gap. But in most countries, health taxes are underutilised: According to the World Health Organization (2021[47]), the total number of countries that raised tobacco taxes to a level at or above 75% of the price of the most sold brand of cigarettes was 40 as of 2020. Taxes on tobacco and alcohol, and to a lesser extent taxes on sugar and sugar-sweetened beverages, have significant tax revenue potential and the added benefit of incentivising people to live a healthier lifestyle, which would significantly reduce the health, economic and social costs for society. Countries have opportunities to levy social security payments to finance social protection in ways that are aligned with the productivity of the workforce and lessen the possibility that the tax and social security system will push workers into informality.

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