Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2025

The risk of external public debt distress has increased.

Deteriorating global financial conditions have significantly increased the risk of external public debt distress in developing countries. In 2022, the total amount of defaulted sovereign debt, including non-marketable debt, reached USD 470 billion, up from an average of about USD 200 billion in 2015.

In heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC), sovereign debt in default reached a record high of USD 127 billion in 2023 due in part to the slow pace at which some non-Paris Club official creditors are implementing debt relief (Beers, Ndukwe and Charron, 2024[1])..

Sovereign restructuring has become more complex.

Sovereign debt restructuring has become more complex because of a rise in defaulted debt and a more diverse creditor base, with the private sector, China and Gulf states playing increasingly significant roles.

The composition of lenders to low-income countries (LICs) has changed significantly since 1996, when Paris Club creditors held 39% of their external debt and non-Paris Club and private creditors each held 8%. By the end of 2021, Paris Club creditors’ share of the total external debt of LICs had dropped to 11% while the shares held by non-Paris Club creditors and private creditors more than doubled to 20% and 19%, respectively . .

Increasing debt service limits the fiscal space and borrowing capacity of developing countries

Debt service consumes over a fifth of tax revenue in 25 developing countries (Beers, Ndukwe and Charron, 2024[1]). Projections are that 92 countries will have spent more on external public debt service than on Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) investments in 2024 (Merling et al., 2024[2]).

In many sub-Saharan African countries, fiscal consolidation is necessary to achieve prudent debt targets, with adjustments of 2%-3% of gross domestic product (GDP) required over 2022-27 (Comelli et al., 2023[3]).

Approximately 20 LICs and lower middle-income countries (LMICs) are solvent but face illiquidity issues (i.e. a high debt service-to-revenue ratio) as creditors are reluctant to roll over loans out of concern that others will exit and leave them with riskier claims.1

• Implementing an HIPC-like programme today would likely cost between USD 100 billion and USD 200 billion, considering inflation, current debt levels and the broader scope of economic challenges (Chuku et al., 2023[8]).

• Debt-for-nature swaps could help redirect USD 100 billion of debt in developing countries to nature restoration and climate adaptation.

• Up to USD 80 billion could be unlocked by rechanneling special drawing rights (SDRs) via multilateral development banks through the purchase of hybrid capital instruments.

By the end of 2020, the HIPC and related Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) programmes had relieved 37 participating countries, 31 of them in Africa, of more than USD 100 billion in debt. Implementing HIPC-like initiatives today would be more challenging due to hidden debt and a more diverse creditor landscape. Since the mid-1990s, private sector debt in LICs has more than doubled from 8% to 19%. Additionally, creditor co-ordination and geopolitical fragmentation might undermine the efficiency of these programmes (Chuku et al., 2023[8]).

The sovereign bond markets of emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) have expanded significantly since 2007, with particularly strong growth since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The annual gross issuance of bonds by EMDEs has nearly quadrupled from approximately USD 1 trillion in 2007 to almost USD 4 trillion by 2023. China's share of this borrowing also rose significantly from 15% in 2021 to 37% in 2023 (OECD, 2024[9]). LICs experienced the most significant growth in sovereign bond issuances, with their markets expanding more than tenfold, followed by LMICs with a nearly ninefold increase.

The substantial growth in sovereign gross issuances for LICs and LMICs is primarily driven by efforts to finance net borrowing needs through marketable debt instruments rather than an increase in overall borrowing requirements. Between 2009 and 2019, net borrowing for LICs and LMICs remained between 4% and 6% of GDP, without a consistent upward trend. Thus, the rise in gross issuances reflects the growing reliance on bond issuances to meet borrowing needs, indicating the development of sovereign bond markets in LICs and LMICs (OECD, 2024[9]).

The proportion of EMDEs' local currency fixed rate sovereign bonds increased from 57% in 2000 to 66% in 2023, and the increase was accompanied by longer average maturities. However, both the volume and maturity period of this debt are still lower for EMDEs than for OECD countries, and the gap is particularly pronounced in smaller economies (OECD, 2024[9]).

By the end of 2023, the global outstanding value of official sector and corporate and sustainable bonds reached USD 4.3 trillion, a significant increase from USD 641 billion in 2018 (OECD, 2024[9]). Nonetheless and despite recent rapid growth, sovereign sustainable debt instruments still make up a small share of total sovereign bond issuances, averaging 2.2% for advanced economies and 8.1% for EMDEs in 2022. Green bonds dominate this market, representing over 75% of sovereign sustainable instruments, and are primarily issued by advanced economies (OECD, 2023[10]).

The IMF and World Bank, together with implementing partners, have been implementing a multi-pronged approach to address debt vulnerabilities including through the Debt Management Facility, which support more than 463 technical assistance initiatives across 78 countries and 20 subnational entities by December 2022 (World Bank, 2023[11]). The IMF spends about one-third of its resources on capacity-development activities, which include technical assistance and training programmes to strengthen debt management practices in developing countries (International Monetary Fund, 2024[12]). Regional multilateral development banks (MDBs) such as the African Development Bank are also actively engaged in capacity building for debt management, transparency and other activities.

The 2014 official development assistance (ODA) rules implemented a stricter measure of concessionality than previous guidelines, setting discount rates set at 9%, 7% and 6% and thresholds at 45%, 15% and 10% in contrast to the previous 10% discount rate and 25% threshold. Consequently, lenders are required to offer more concessional loans for these to qualify as ODA, which particularly affects LDCs. Additionally, the rules introduced new provisions in the ODA criteria concerning debt sustainability. Under these provisions, loans that do not adhere to the IMF Debt Limits Policy and/or the World Bank’s Non-Concessional Borrowing Policy and Sustainable Development Finance Policy cannot be reported as ODA.

Developing countries’ average interest cost on external borrowing is three times higher than that of developed countries (Spiegel and Schwank, 2022[13]). Every 1% increase in the interest rate represents an additional USD 35 billion in interest payments that LICs and middle-income countries must make to creditors (Walker et al., 2022[14]). LICs face significant debt repayments and need to refinance about USD 60 billion of external debt in 2024-26, which is triple the average over the ten-year period of 2010-20 (Holland and Pazarbasioglu, 2024[15]). Since 2016, Eurobonds and syndicated loans from private banks have surged while grace periods have become shorter and spreads have become more volatile (Chuku et al., 2023[8]).

High refinancing requirements in an environment of elevated interest rates could strain national budgets and jeopardise foreign market access for certain countries. Between 2024 and 2026, over USD 4.5 trillion in bond debt from EMDEs will mature The proportion of debt maturing in 2024 is particularly high, at approximately 20%, for LICs, and is nearly 25% for countries whose credit ratings indicate high credit risk or risk of default (i.e. a rating of single B or below) compared with an average of 15% in other income groups (OECD, 2024[9]).

Countries with low credit ratings are also more exposed to refinancing needs in foreign currency. For countries with credit ratings above single B, the average share of foreign currency debt maturing between 2024-26 is below 8%. In contrast, the average share exceeds 30% for countries with lower credit ratings. Among the 16 countries where more than 30% of foreign currency-denominated debt is due by end-2026, 10 have credit ratings of BB- (reflecting high risk) or lower. While defaults on local currency debt are rare, substantial refinancing needs in local currency during periods of high yields can significantly impact government budgets and reduce fiscal space for other priorities (OECD, 2024[9]).

Recent crises have increased risks of debt defaults as well as the cost of debt service. Currently, 13 countries – 7 of them LMICs or LICs – are in or nearly in default, according to credit rating agencies. This is the highest number in 24 years. As of 2023, these 13 countries collectively have about USD 1.4 trillion in GDP, or slightly over 1% of global GDP, and a combined population of nearly 400 million, or 5% of the world’s population. Another 13 countries with total GDP of USD 1.7 trillion and a combined population of more than 700 million are at significant risk of default. Taken together, these two groups of countries at either substantial risk of default or in default account for about 3% of global GDP but 15% of the world’s population (OECD, 2024[9]).

Countries eligible for the HIPC Initiative and the MDRI experienced the largest relative increases in sovereign debt default following the COVID-19 crisis of 62.70% and 52.56%, respectively.2 In 2022, developing countries paid USD 49 billion more to their external creditors than they received in fresh disbursements, resulting in a negative net resource transfer. Developing countries also pay the highest price: Debt service on external public debt reached USD 365 billion in 2022, equivalent to 6.3% of export revenues. Over USD 4.4 trillion of EMDE bond debt matures between 2024 and 2026 (OECD, 2024[9]). The number of low-graded EMDEs accessing international markets fell from 20 on average in 2015-21 to approximately 10 in 2022-23.3

The Group of Twenty (G20) Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) provided temporary relief by pausing USD 12.9 billion in debt service payments for LICs from May 2020 to December 2021. In 2020, the G20 introduced the Common Framework for Debt Treatment, aimed at providing more structured debt relief for these countries. So far, only four countries – Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana and Zambia – have requested assistance under this framework. While Chad and Zambia have reached agreements with their creditors, the negotiations took well over a year to finalise​ (Alayza, Laxton and Neunuebel, 2023[16]). While public debt of developing countries in the Asia Pacific region increased sharply during the COVID-19 pandemic, opportunities for restructuring are often limited because a large portion of the debt is owed to MDBs that do not participate in the DSSI and the Common Framework in order to maintain their credit ratings and low funding costs. As a result, countries with significant MDB debt have fewer options to access relief.

While there is still room for improvement on the Common Framework progress, it remains an important innovation in the global financial infrastructure, and there has been considerable improvement in the process and timing for each subsequent restructuring. The Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, established in 2023, aims to improve debt restructuring processes, but private creditor participation remains a challenge.

From 2020 to the first quarter of 2024, there were 224 downgrades but only 105 upgrades for EMDEs. There were more upgrades than downgrades in high-income and upper middle-income countries in 2023 and the first quarter of 2024, while LICs and LMICs experienced more than twice as many downgrades as upgrades. By the first quarter of 2024, nearly 60% of the approximately 100 rated EMDEs were classified as low grade, and more than 10 countries were either near default or in default. The number of countries rated C or in default has reached a historic high, including the number of LICs and LMICs among this group, while the share of investment-grade countries globally fell to its lowest point in the first quarter of 2024 (OECD, 2024[9]). (Chapter 7 on addressing systemic issues presents additional information on credit rating agencies and the financial architecture.)

Fiscal transparency is a critical element of effective public financial management as it can help build market confidence and reinforce economic sustainability. It also fosters greater government accountability and facilitates better-informed public debate regarding debt quality and sustainability. Opaque debt agreements, on the other hand, cause delays in debt restructurings. Hidden debt due to under-reporting accumulates during economic booms and tends to become evident in recessions and times of distress. In debt restructurings, higher hidden debt also is associated with larger credit losses (Horn et al., 2024[17]).

In 2020-21, 40% of low-income developing countries did not publish any sovereign debt data, and public debt data show discrepancies of up to 30% of GDP across different sources (Rivetti, 2021[18]). IMF analysis finds that of the 60 developing countries surveyed, just half have laws that require debt management and fiscal reports and fewer than a quarter require disclosure of loan-level information that is crucial for transparency (Ashcroft, Vasquez and Weeks-Brown, 2024[19]). Recent international efforts, including initiatives by the G20, IMF and Institute of International Finance (IIF), aim to enhance debt data reporting and disclosure practices. G20 countries endorsed principles of information sharing and transparency among creditors in their Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing agreed in 2017 (World Bank, 2023[20]). The World Bank's Debtor Reporting System and the IIF's voluntary principles for debt transparency are crucial for standardising and monitoring debt data, promoting accountability, and supporting sustainable economic development (World Bank, 2023[6]). Other initiatives such as the Joint Debt Hub (by the OECD, IMF, World Bank Group and Bank for International Settlements) also aim to improve statistics on the overall external debt of countries (World Bank, 2024[21]).

Several countries are working to strengthen the legal framework to support the litigation efforts of developing countries (UK Parliament, 2023[22]). Relatedly, there is an increased focus on regulating collateralised lending practices to ensure fairer terms and prevent excessive debt burdens on developing nations. However, a recent IMF study found that key vulnerabilities in domestic laws allow debt concealment, among them a limited definition of public debt, insufficient disclosure requirements, confidentiality clauses in public debt contracts and weak oversight (Ashcroft, Vasquez and Weeks-Brown, 2024[19]).

Governments, multilateral organisations and civil society have begun advocating for reform of the international debt architecture, with a focus on increasing low-cost public finance through reforms of MDBs and the IMF. Their focus is on improving governance and representation within these institutions, and enhancing the agility and flexibility of lending mechanisms, particularly for countries vulnerable to climate change. Proposals also emphasise improving risk assessments to attract investment, reforming debt governance to better manage crises, and fostering coalitions to drive advocacy and policy implementation. Key initiatives such as the Bridgetown Initiative; the United Nations SDG Stimulus; the High-level Working Group of African ministers of finance, planning and economic development: the Vulnerable Twenty Group (V20); and the Paris Pact for People and Planet, among others, collectively aim to address global financial inequalities and support sustainable development. (Chapter 7 on systemic issues provides more information on reform of the global financial architecture more broadly.)

Climate change has increased the debt cost for the V20 countries by USD 62 billion over 2007-16, and the climate premium is expected to more than double from 2019-28 (Alayza, Laxton and Neunuebel, 2023[16]). Most of the public climate finance provided by developing countries – USD 63.6 billion or 69% – in the form of loans (OECD, 2024[23]).

While no single instrument can solve a country’s debt situation, several climate-related financial instruments can help address both the climate finance needs and debt challenges of developing countries. These include debt-for-climate and debt-for-nature swaps, climate resilient debt clauses (CRDCs), and special drawing rights (SDRs). All of these have been used increasingly in recent years, though they come with trade-offs, and careful consideration is needed in applying these instruments. Another example is sustainability-linked bonds, forward-looking, performance-based debt instruments that can be linked to existing sustainability targets such as nationally determined contributions – and help incentivise action towards these.

In debt swaps for climate and nature, applicable to both sovereign and commercial debt, a portion of a country's debt is forgiven or restructured in exchange for the country's commitment to invest in climate-related projects, which ensures that the fiscal cost to the debtor does not exceed the value of the debt relief (Chamon et al., 2022[24]). Such agreements could help redirect USD 100 billion of debt in developing countries, including USD 33.7 billion for LDCs4, to nature restoration and climate adaptation. Reducing transaction-related costs, which currently consume 40% or more of financial benefits, could make debt swaps a more viable opportunity for nearly 15% of developing countries. However, their relatively small scale compared to a country’s debt burden, the conditionality of arrangements, and adequate governance and enforcement are among the matters that should be considered in contemplating such swaps.

CRDCs enable the temporary suspension, deferment or restructuring of debt payments when a country faces climate-related events such as a hurricane or flood. Several bilateral and multilateral lenders offer these clauses in contracts, and the International Capital Market Association has also announced that LICs would be able to include CRDCs in bonds. However, even with a CRDC, interest continues to accrue while debt is suspended, and a country must be able to fulfil repayment requirements. With these instruments, the parameters for trigger events and thresholds could be better harmonised.

SDR allocations have provided approximately USD 275 billion to developing countries, and 80 countries use them. By March 2024, the IMF gathered about USD 8.4 billion in commitments for its Resilience and Sustainability Trust to support climate activities in developing countries (International Monetary Fund, 2024[25]). By end-February 2024, commitments totalling USD 7.0 billion were approved, yet only USD 1.4 billion had been disbursed to 9 countries, with a further USD 3.4 billion scheduled for 2024 to be disbursed to another 17 countries scheduled (Hicklin, 2024[26]). SDR rechanneling through MDBs has been part of the MDB Capital Adequacy Framework agenda, and the G20 Independent Experts Group has called for MDBs to take steps to boost their lending capacity, including by exploring hybrid capital structures.

[16] Alayza, N., V. Laxton and C. Neunuebel (2023), “Commentary: Developing countries won’t beat the climate crisis without tackling rising debt”, World Resources Institute, https://www.wri.org/insights/debt-climate-action-developing-countries.

[19] Ashcroft, A., K. Vasquez and R. Weeks-Brown (2024), “Hidden debt hurts economies. better disclosure laws can help ease the pain”, IMF blog, https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2024/04/02/Hidden-Debt-Hurts-Economies-Better-Disclosure-Laws-Can-Help-Ease-the-Pain.

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