This chapter explores the mounting geopolitical tensions and escalating ecological crises of the early 2020s, along with their far-reaching implications for public spending, migration, energy security, trade dynamics, global health, and national policy priorities. Conflict and persecution continue to be key drivers of migration, and the impact of climate change will add to the number of displaced people. Increased labour migration could help advanced economies alleviate labour shortages, but rising anti-immigration sentiment complicates this political choice. International co-operation, although imperfect and increasingly under threat, has helped enhance our understanding of and responses to complex systemic challenges and interconnected global crises. The implications of these global issues for education play out in various ways, underscoring the role that education can play in fostering peace, solidarity and co-operation, but also the necessity of developing resilience and adaptability among learners and within education systems.
Trends Shaping Education 2025

2. Global conflict and co-operation
Copy link to 2. Global conflict and co-operationInfographic 2.1. Global Conflict and Co-operation – Chapter highlights
Copy link to Infographic 2.1. Global Conflict and Co-operation – Chapter highlights
The cost of global conflict
Copy link to The cost of global conflictThe rise in armed conflict and growing geopolitical tensions may spell the end of the ‘peace dividend’ that allowed many OECD countries to reduce defence spending after the Cold War. Direct conflicts between states are still rare but are becoming more frequent, and governments are increasingly providing military support in foreign conflicts. Education can promote the competencies needed to build a more peaceful world in the long-term and plays a vital role in fostering resilience among those affected by war. With increased defence spending putting pressure on public finances, however, there is a risk that funding for areas like education will be squeezed.
Figure 2.1. Global conflict on the rise
Copy link to Figure 2.1. Global conflict on the riseState-based armed conflict by type, worldwide (1946-2022)

Source: Davies, Pettersson, and Oberg (2023), Organized violence 1989-2022 and the return of conflicts between states?, https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231185169.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 sparked the first large-scale interstate war since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. While this type of state-on-state conflict remains rare, it is becoming more common; there were as many interstate conflicts in the first three years of the 2020s as in the entire first decade of the 2000s. Even if states are not ‘at war’ in the traditional sense, their militaries may still be fighting in foreign conflicts. This is reflected in the steep increase in internationalised intrastate conflict, where foreign governments support one side in a domestic conflict between a state and non-state actors.1
The rise in armed conflict and mounting geopolitical tensions have implications for public spending. After the Cold War, many governments reduced their share of spending on defence, creating space for spending on other priorities. Among OECD countries, average defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP fell from 3.07% in 1985 to 1.49% by 2021. There are already signs that the changing geopolitical climate is reversing this trend. Global military expenditure reached record levels in 2023 and several OECD countries have committed to further increases.2 If tensions continue to rise, countries will face the challenge of balancing security and defence spending with mounting pressures in other public policy areas, including education.
The costs of global conflict extend far beyond public spending. War not only results in the loss of lives and livelihoods but also has a profound and lasting impact on mental health and well-being, particularly for vulnerable groups like children. It also disrupts the delivery of public services such as education, damaging infrastructure and forcing people from their homes. The resulting gaps in young people’s learning can have a lasting impact on their personal and academic development. In today’s hyperconnected world, the repercussions of conflict often spread beyond the regions directly affected, fuelling tensions in diaspora communities across the globe. The wave of campus protests linked to the evolving conflict in the Middle East since 2023 illustrates how distant wars can indirectly impact education institutions and how tensions can be amplified through social media.
These challenges underscore the role of education in fostering resilience among learners and providing them with a sense of security. This includes those who have been directly affected by war, but also children growing up in an increasingly conflict-ridden world. Moreover, education can nurture the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values that support cross-cultural co-operation and contribute to a more peaceful future.
Figure 2.2. An end to the peace dividend?
Copy link to Figure 2.2. An end to the peace dividend?Average defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP, OECD countries (1988-2023)

Source: OECD calculations based on SIPRI (2024), SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, https://doi.org/10.55163/CQGC9685.
And education?
Copy link to And education?How might an increase in armed conflict at home or aboard affect students’ health, well-being, sense of hope and aspirations for the future? How could it affect educational experiences and the use of buildings and infrastructure (e.g., frequent safety drills, online learning during conflict, use of schools as emergency shelters)?
How can education contribute to building and sustaining peace and supporting post-conflict recovery and reconciliation? What implications does this have for curriculum and teachers’ professional learning?
As defence spending grows, there may be increased investment in strategic areas like science, technology, and cyber security. What are the implications for disciplines that are not seen as strategic?
Demographics on the move
Copy link to Demographics on the moveMigration to OECD countries slowed during the COVID-19 pandemic, but has since rebounded, with asylum applications and labour migration on the rise. Conflict and persecution continue to be key drivers of humanitarian migration, and climate change threatens to displace larger numbers of people. Increased labour migration could help advanced economies alleviate labour shortages and demographic challenges, but rising anti-immigration sentiment complicates this political choice. If current migration flows continue, education and training policies will play a crucial role in ensuring that newcomers acquire the skills to participate fully in society. Education, alongside other public policies, also has a role to play in fostering social cohesion and respect for diversity.
Figure 2.3. Labour migration and asylum applications on the rise
Copy link to Figure 2.3. Labour migration and asylum applications on the riseA. Permanent-type labour migration; B. New asylum applications, OECD countries (2013-2022)

Note: Labour migrants is an OECD classification for permanent-type migrants entering under economic or employment categories, excluding their accompanying family members; Asylum refers to first applications for protection registered by UNHCR.
Source: OECD (2023), International Migration Outlook 2023, https://doi.org/10.1787/b0f40584-en.
The number of new asylum applications to OECD countries hit a record high in 2022, continuing the upward trend that began in the 2000s. On average, there were more than twice as many applications annually in the 2010s as in the 2000s – an increase of 134%. In the first three years of the 2020s (2020-2022), the number of applications was 39% higher than in the 2010s. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led to the largest displacement of people in Europe since World War II, while ongoing conflicts and political crises in countries such as Afghanistan, Sudan, Syria, and Venezuela also contribute to the rising numbers of displaced people.3 With natural disasters already forcing millions of people from their homes every year, climate change is likely to become a significant driver of future displacement.4
Permanent-type labour migration to OECD countries, which excludes workers on temporary and non-renewable arrangements, showed a similar pattern, increasing by 56% between 2019 and 2022. In countries such as Australia, Japan and Korea, the increase in labour migration between 2021 and 2022 meant a return to pre-pandemic levels. However, in most European and OECD countries and the United States, labour migration reached a 15-year record level in 2022. OECD countries such as Japan and Korea have increased targets for international migrants to address labour shortages and some have signed bilateral agreements to fill gaps in sectors like agriculture, care, and hospitality. Other countries, such as Canada, are starting to reduce their targets after accepting record inflows.5
Targeted labour migration policies could help alleviate demographic pressures in ageing societies. In OECD countries, the ratio of older dependents to the working-age population doubled from 14 dependents per 100 people in 1960 to 28 in 2022. Countries such as Japan and Italy have seen particularly sharp increases.6 Migrants, who are typically younger than the native-born population, could help slow this trend, easing pressure on pension systems and stimulating growth, even if migrants themselves obviously also age. Many countries with acute demographic pressures face rising anti-immigration sentiment, with some governments seeking to reduce overall immigration numbers.7 While not all OECD countries will see higher immigration, providing migrants and refugees of all ages with education and training that meets their needs will remain a priority for many. Education can also promote appreciation for diversity among the host population. This can support the inclusion of newcomers in national education systems and may also help to shift attitudes towards immigrants.
Figure 2.4. Diverging dependencies
Copy link to Figure 2.4. Diverging dependenciesAge-dependency ratios, OECD and selected countries (1960-2022)

Note: Age-dependency refers to the ratio of older dependents to the working-age population.
Source: World Bank (2024), “Age dependency ratio, old”, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND.OL.
And education?
Copy link to And education?What can education systems do to meet the needs of migrant children? How can they recognise adult migrants’ aspirations and prior experiences while meeting local labour demands and offering relevant reskilling and upskilling opportunities?
What role can education play in promoting respect for diversity and challenging stereotypes? How can education institutions foster inclusive attitudes and address prejudice?
International migration is increasingly multi-directional, with many people moving between multiple countries. How can governments collaborate to support education for people on the move (e.g., by improving alignment between systems, using digital technologies)?
Changing dynamics of global trade
Copy link to Changing dynamics of global tradeIn the era of ‘hyper-globalisation’ that began in the 1990s, global trade grew rapidly, driven by the rise of global value chains. This momentum has slowed since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, leading to talk of a 'de-globalisation’ trend. Recent years have also seen an increase in trade restrictions due to geopolitical tensions, while the rise of populist and nationalist movements reflects growing discontent with the consequences of globalisation. At the same time, trade in services continues to thrive, with digitalisation boosting trade. How can education help shape and implement a global economic order that benefits individuals and communities worldwide?
Figure 2.5. Global trade slowing, restrictions rising
Copy link to Figure 2.5. Global trade slowing, restrictions risingAverage global trade as a share of GDP; global trade restrictions (2009-2022)

Note: Harmful trade interventions, as defined by the Global Trade Alert, disadvantage foreign commercial interests compared to domestic ones.
Source: World Bank (2024), World Development Indicators, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS; Global Trade Alert (2024), Global Trade Alert, https://www.globaltradealert.org/global_dynamics/day-to_0515/flow_all.
Following a period of ‘hyper-globalisation’ that began in the 1990s, international trade has slowed since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Global trade as a share of GDP grew rapidly from 1990 to 2008. This reflects the rise of global value chains (GVCs), which involve breaking the production process into different stages, with each stage carried out in different countries.8 Since 2009, however, trade growth has stalled, and restrictions have increased. The number of policies disadvantaging foreign commercial interests compared to domestic ones rose from 136 in 2010 to 364 in 2023, partly driven by geopolitical tensions.9
At the same time, some aspects of trade globalisation continue to expand. Trade in services has grown during recent crises and GVC activity remains high. Digitalisation has reduced trade costs and connected businesses and customers worldwide. One of the fastest-growing sectors is digital trade, including digitally delivered goods and services (e.g., music and movie streaming, online learning), as well as physical goods and services ordered online. Digitally delivered services grew by an average of 8.1% annually from 2005 to 2022, now comprising 54% of all services exports.10
While international trade has driven prosperity and lowered consumer prices, it has also disrupted industries and displaced jobs, fuelling anti-globalisation sentiment (often exploited by nationalist and populist movements) and raising significant questions about the future of international trade.11 The need to mitigate climate change and reduce carbon footprints may also lead some countries to focus on local production and more regionalised trade.
The shifting dynamics of global of trade are affecting the demand for labour and skills, challenging education and training systems to reflect these shifts in their curricula, qualifications and pathways. Increased connectivity can drive the benefits of digital trade, but consumers need digital literacy to get online and businesses need technical and entrepreneurial skills to innovate. Ensuring equitable access to quality education can equip people of all ages and backgrounds with the knowledge and skills they need to engage with changes in the labour market. Beyond this, education has a crucial role to play in equipping people to challenge inequalities and imagine a global economic order that benefits everyone.
Figure 2.6. The digital dynamics of trade
Copy link to Figure 2.6. The digital dynamics of tradeGrowth in digital and non-digital trade (1995-2020)

Note: Trade data in the figure cover exports of the 66 economies in the 2021 Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) database revision (38 OECD countries and 28 economies outside the OECD area, mainly high and upper-middle income economies).
Source: López, Sorescu and Kaynak (2023), "Of bytes and trade: Quantifying the impact of digitalisation on trade", OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 273, https://doi.org/10.1787/11889f2a-en.
And education?
Copy link to And education?How might a continued slowdown in goods trade and a shift to services and digital trade affect the demand for labour and skills? How can education adapt to ensure people of all ages and backgrounds have the necessary skills?
What do young people learn about trade and globalisation in a context where both are increasingly contested? How could education help them imagine a global economic order that works for all?
While talk of ‘de-globalisation’ may be premature, trade shifts and emissions reduction measures may localise production and consumption. How can education equip communities with the skills and resources to manage and sustain essential needs like energy and food? What might a more locally focused professional education look like?
Energy security
Copy link to Energy securityGlobal shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have affected energy supply. Prices rose sharply between 2021 and 2022 and remain above those seen in the early 2000s, meaning that households, businesses, and public services including education may face higher energy costs for years to come. These crises have highlighted the need for resilient energy systems, prompting countries to increase investment in clean energy as they seek to protect themselves from future shocks and meet climate goals. Education is key to achieving this energy transition, supplying the right skills, fostering technological innovation, and creating new opportunities for people transitioning out of the fossil fuel industry.
Figure 2.7. An energy shock
Copy link to Figure 2.7. An energy shockGlobal Price of Energy Index (1992-2024)

Note: July 2016 = 100. Values are for each month between January 1992 and December 2023.
Source: IMF (2024), All Commodity Price Index, https://data.imf.org/?sk=471dddf8-d8a7-499a-81ba-5b332c01f8b9.
The early 2020s were marked by a significant spike in energy prices. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic led to persistent supply-chain disruptions, while the lifting of lockdown restrictions was followed by a surge in demand. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered further limitations on energy supply, notably supplies of oil and gas. Gas and electricity prices in Europe and Asia reached historic highs in 2022, and gas prices in the US tripled at their peak. This energy shock has driven inflation and contributed a cost-of-living crisis that weighs heaviest on lower earners12. Although energy prices have declined since their 2022 peak, they remain higher than before the pandemic and higher than before the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.13 This raises the question of whether the lower prices seen in the 1990s and early 2000s are a thing of the past.
Recent crises have highlighted vulnerabilities in countries’ energy supply chains and accelerated efforts to diversify energy sources. Investment in clean energy was already increasing before 2020 and overtook fossil fuel investment in 2016. This shift reflects growing awareness of the need for action on climate change, but also factors like the increasing competitiveness of renewables compared to fossil fuels. Government support has also played a key role, with COVID-19 recovery packages and green growth initiatives in economies such as the United States, the European Union (EU), China and Japan providing a further boost to investment. Global clean energy investment increased by almost 30% between 2020 and 2022. However, this growth has been led by advanced economies and China, and fossil fuel investment still outstrips clean energy investment in some world regions.14
If the era of cheap energy is over, schools and other places of learning will face increasing demands on their budgets, with energy bills draining resources that could be used on staff or learning materials. While several governments provided short-term support to help schools absorb the recent energy shock, improving the energy efficiency of education buildings will help to reduce spending in the long-term and improve sustainability. Education also has a key role to play in achieving a fast and fair energy transition by supplying the skills and innovations for a diverse energy sector while giving workers in the fossil fuel industry opportunities to upskill or reskill.
Figure 2.8. The energy transition
Copy link to Figure 2.8. The energy transitionGlobal investment in clean energy and fossil fuels (2015-2023)

Note: Prices in 2023 market exchange rates.
Source: IEA (2024), World Energy Investment 2024, https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2024.
And education?
Copy link to And education?How can educational infrastructure be made resilient against rising energy costs and future supply-chain shocks? What mechanisms could ensure adequate funding to modernise education facilities, improve energy efficiency, and ensure sustainability?
The cost-of-living crisis affects educators as well as students. What measures could mitigate the impact of future shocks on their quality of life?
What education and training programmes are necessary to equip learners with the skills needed for the energy transition? What targeted measures could support the reskilling and upskilling of people transitioning out of the fossil fuel industry?
Co-operation on climate change
Copy link to Co-operation on climate changeAs heatwaves, floods, wildfires and other extreme weather events become more frequent and severe, the impacts of climate change are increasingly disrupting lives and draining resources. Addressing this global challenge requires international co-operation, and countries have increasingly joined forces through multilateral treaties like the Paris Agreement. However, current policies and commitments fall far short of what is needed to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. Additionally, some climate impact is already inevitable, meaning the education sector must adapt to a world where extreme weather is the new normal.
Figure 2.9. Burning up
Copy link to Figure 2.9. Burning upPercentage of population exposed to maximum temperatures exceeding 35°C annually, OECD and OECD partner countries (1979-2022)

Note: Over- or under-estimations of the estimated exposure to extreme temperature are possible due to the spatial resolution of gridded data, particularly for smaller countries or regions. A variety of indicators has been developed that estimate exposure to extreme temperatures; these should be consulted for more detailed analysis of individual countries.
Source: OECD (2023), The Climate Action Monitor 2023, https://doi.org/10.1787/60e338a2-en.
Climate change is already shaping the way we live, with extreme weather events being more frequent and devastating. In OECD and partner countries, the share of people experiencing over two weeks of hot days annually was some 45% higher in the period 2013- 2022 than in 1983-1992.15 In early 2024, each month over the past year had set a new temperature record, with heatwaves, floods, and hurricanes causing widespread disruptions.16 The costs of climate change are escalating, with average daily economic losses from weather, climate and water extremes almost eight times higher in the 2010s than in the 1970s.17
Climate change poses a global threat to lives, livelihoods, and social and economic stability. Although it affects countries differently, all countries contribute to it, albeit in different ways. Addressing the climate crisis therefore requires coordinated international action, and there are signs that climate co-operation is increasing. The number of international climate policies adopted by OECD and partner countries grew between 2013 and 2022, with many becoming more stringent. This includes treaties like the Paris Agreement – which create a shared understanding of the problem and identify concrete solutions – as well as international public climate finance and common data and reporting frameworks to measure progress.18
However, climate action is diverging across countries. Geopolitical and economic shocks have led some governments to step back from their environmental commitments, while some with stronger climate policies have accelerated their efforts.19 Meanwhile, public debate on climate change is becoming more politicised, with climate-sceptic movements complicating the path to net-zero emissions. Despite receiving considerable media attention, these movements remain however significantly smaller than pro-climate protests: over 70% of adults in G20 countries now believe that the world must take major action to reduce emissions immediately within the next decade.20
With some climate impact now unavoidable, governments, households, and public services like education must adapt to extreme weather and other hazards. Floods, wildfires, and storms can damage education buildings and force closures, while higher temperatures make it harder to learn. Assessing the specific climate risks in different regions, and ensuring education infrastructure and communities are prepared, can help to limit further damage and disruption.
Figure 2.10. Joining forces
Copy link to Figure 2.10. Joining forcesImplementation of international climate policies, OECD and OECD partner countries (2010-2022)

Note: The OECD Climate Actions and Policies Measurement Framework (CAPMF) measures whether countries are being Party to major international climate agreements related to: Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions data and reporting, international climate co-operation, and international public climate finance. The CAPMF rates the stringency of policies on a scale of 0 (least stringent) to 10 (most stringent) based on the extent to which they incentivise or enable GHG emissions mitigation at home or abroad.
Source: Nachtigall et al (2022), "Climate actions and policies measurement framework”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 203, https://doi.org/10.1787/2caa60ce-en.
And education?
Copy link to And education?How is the role of education addressed in national and international climate policies? How are these policies aligned with education goals and curricula?
What role can learners and education staff play in climate adaptation and resilience? What training and other resources could support them in this role?
What infrastructure investments are needed to ensure that education institutions are resilient to climate impacts and can support the resilience of the communities around them? How can governments prioritise funding to education institutions in areas most vulnerable to extreme weather events?
Global science collaboration and technological innovation
Copy link to Global science collaboration and technological innovationScientific and technological breakthroughs can contribute to addressing a range of global social, economic, and environmental challenges, but they rely on international exchange of knowledge, resources, and talent. While scientific collaboration has grown, geopolitical tensions and trade dependencies on critical raw materials pose risks to innovation and sustainability. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the value of global science partnerships, but concerns over research security are rising. Education plays a crucial role in building ethical frameworks, shared goals, and skills to ensure scientific and technological progress benefits humanity and the planet while safeguarding collaboration and security.
Figure 2.11. Rising research collaboration
Copy link to Figure 2.11. Rising research collaborationPercentage of scientific publications involving international co-authorships, OECD (2008 and 2022)

Note: OECD calculations based on Scopus Custom Data, Elsevier, Version 1.2024, April 2024
Source: OECD (2024), Science, Technology and Innovation Scoreboard (Database), https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/science-technology-and-innovation-scoreboard.html.
Scientific and technological discoveries needed to tackle global challenges like climate change, public health, and food security depend on the global exchange of knowledge, talent, resources and infrastructure. This became clear during the COVID-19 pandemic, when open data-sharing platforms and research partnerships accelerated progress in diagnosis, treatment, and vaccinations. Between 2008 and 2022, the percentage of scientific publications involving international collaboration increased in most OECD countries, underling the key role that global co-operation plays in advancing human knowledge.21
In addition, many OECD economies depend on imports to achieve strategic goals in areas like security, health, and the digital and green transitions. For example, raw materials essential for green technologies are concentrated in specific regions. China supplies some 60% of global graphite, crucial for electric vehicle batteries, and is also dominant in the processing of many critical materials. The Democratic Republic of Congo provides around 70% of the world’s cobalt, critical for batteries, fuel cells, and wind energy. Export restrictions on these materials have risen sharply since 2009, driving up costs and limiting access, while geopolitical tensions exacerbate these risks.22
Shifting geopolitical dynamics also have implications for international research collaboration. During the COVID-19 crisis, researchers from different countries collaborated regardless of the geopolitical and ideological stances of their respective governments. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, several research institutions in OECD countries have cut ties with Russian counterparts while seeking to accommodate Ukrainian refugee scientists.23
Concerns are growing about risks from foreign governments or non-state actors interfering in research in ways that threaten economic or national security. Such risks include international property theft, confidentiality breeches in peer review, and the coercion of overseas researchers. This raises the challenge of ensuring research security - with measures that protect research ecosystems and national interests - while also allowing open scientific collaboration and academic freedom to thrive.24 Education also has a critical role to play in fostering the ethical frameworks, shared goals, and skills necessary to ensure scientific and technological advances benefit both humanity and the planet.
Figure 2.12. Export restrictions on critical raw materials are increasing
Copy link to Figure 2.12. Export restrictions on critical raw materials are increasingGlobal export restrictions on raw materials critical to the green transition (2009-2020)

Note: The count of all types of measures in place across all covered raw materials and all implementing countries taking into account the stock of measures in place at the beginning of the period as well as new additions and eliminations.
Source: Kowalski and Legendre (2023), "Raw materials critical for the green transition: Production, international trade and export restrictions", OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 269, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6bb598b-en.
And education?
Copy link to And education?Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics fields are vital for addressing the climate crisis and other global challenges, but they can’t drive the necessary social and economic transformations alone. What other skills and knowledge are needed, and how can education across all disciplines support these transformations?
Geopolitical tensions increase pressure on higher education institutions to limit research collaborations and international student entry. How does this affect institutional finances? How can governments balance open collaboration with protective but restrictive regulations?
How can education foster critical thinking and ethics to address the environmental and social trade-offs of technological advancements, such as e-waste and resource dependency?
Global conflict and co-operation – in the future
Copy link to Global conflict and co-operation – in the futureGlobal conflict is on the rise, while the dynamics of international trade, mobility, and collaboration are shifting. Meanwhile, the impacts of climate change and the need to avert and withstand future catastrophes are already shaping our world. How might these trends influence the future of education? This section presents three scenarios exploring alternative futures for 2040, paired with stories that highlight the opportunities, challenges, and tensions faced by education stakeholders.
The futures below are not predictions but are designed to inspire reflection and guide action in the present.
Turning insights into action
Notes and sources
Copy link to Notes and sources← 1. Davies, S., T. Pettersson and M. Öberg (2023), “Organized violence 1989–2022, and the return of conflict between states”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 60/4, pp. 691-708, https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433231185169.
← 2. SIPRI (2024), SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://doi.org/10.55163/cqgc9685.
← 3. OECD (2023), International Migration Outlook 2023, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b0f40584-en/.
← 4. IDMC (2024), Global Internal Displacement Database, https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data/.
← 5. OECD (2023), International Migration Outlook 2023, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b0f40584-en/.
← 6. World Bank (2024), “Age dependency ratio, old” (indicator), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND.OL?locations=OE-XM-EU-US-JP-XP.
← 7. Peri, G. (2020), Immigrant Swan Song, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2020/03/can-immigration-solve-the-demographic-dilemma-peri.
← 8. World Bank (2024), “Trade (% of GDP, indicator)”, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS (accessed 27 September 2024).
← 9. Global Trade Alert (2024), Global Trade Alert (database), https://www.globaltradealert.org/global_dynamics/day-to_0515/flow_all (accessed 15 October 2024).
← 10. IMF et al. (2023), Digital Trade for Development, WTO Publications, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/dtd2023_e.pdf.
← 11. Mansfield, E. and J. Pevehouse (2022), “Nationalism, Populism, and Trade Agreements”, International Studies Review, Vol. 24/2, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viac016.
← 12. Hemmerlé, Y. et al. (2023), “Aiming better: Government support for households and firms during the energy crisis”, OECD Economic Policy Papers, No. 32, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/839e3ae1-en.
← 13. IMF (2024), All Commodity Price Index (indicator), https://data.imf.org/?sk=471dddf8-d8a7-499a-81ba-5b332c01f8b9 (accessed 30 September 2024).
← 14. IEA (2024), World Energy Investment 2024, IEA, https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2024.
← 15. OECD (2023), The Climate Action Monitor 2023: Providing Information to Monitor Progress Towards Net-Zero, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/60e338a2-en.
← 16. Copernicus (2024), May 2024 marks 12 months of record-breaking global temperatures, https://climate.copernicus.eu/may-2024-marks-12-months-record-breaking-global-temperatures.
← 17. WMO (2021), WMO Atlas of Mortality and Economic Losses from Weather, Climate, and Water Extremes, WMO, Gevena, https://library.wmo.int/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=21930#.YS9CMNMzZBx.
← 18. Nachtigall, D. et al. (2022), “The climate actions and policies measurement framework: A structured and harmonised climate policy database to monitor countries’ mitigation action”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 203, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2caa60ce-en.
← 19. OECD (2023), The Climate Action Monitor 2023: Providing Information to Monitor Progress Towards Net-Zero, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/60e338a2-en.
← 20. OECD (forthcoming), Empowered Citizens, Informed Consumers and Skilled Workers: Designing Education and Skills Policies for a Sustainable Future, OECD Publishing, Paris.
← 21. OECD (2022), "Integrity and security in the global research ecosystem", OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No. 130, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1c416f43-en; OECD (2024), Science, Technology and Innovation Scoreboard (Database), https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/science-technology-and-innovation-scoreboard.html.
← 22. Kowalski, P. and C. Legendre (2023), “Raw materials critical for the green transition: Production, international trade and export restrictions”, OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 269, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6bb598b-en.
← 23. OECD (2022), "Integrity and security in the global research ecosystem", OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No. 130, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1c416f43-en.
← 24. OECD (2022), "Integrity and security in the global research ecosystem", OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No. 130, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1c416f43-en.