OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025

Effectively solving complex policy challenges and achieving tangible and lasting impact – whether for people, the planet or the future – is a critical driver for trust in government. In effectively achieving benefits and preventing unintended consequences, governments must avoid “regulating on a hunch” or jumping to simplistic solutions. Instead, they must use the best possible evidence throughout the process of designing, delivering and evaluating rules that serve to implement policies. It requires using data and other evidence to focus government intervention on the most pressing issues and defining clear goals. Once a policy goal is identified, rigorous analysis can support decision making by shedding light on the expected impacts of different policy options and highlighting the trade-offs. Finally, monitoring and gathering evidence on how rules drive change based on real-life insights illustrates regulatory effectiveness. Using evidence – be it by analysing data before creating rules or throughout their implementation, or reviewing information ex post to learn from past experience – have been shown to improve the effectiveness of rules and the positive impact they can have on people’s lives (Box 5.1).

Evidence from implementation can make the difference between a rule that works on paper and a rule that works effectively in practice. Using data and other evidence facilitates tailoring rules to business realities; requiring permits and licences only where necessary, allowing low-risk activities to be carried out following a declaration or without any formalities; and focusing enforcement activities on areas where it is most needed from a risk-based perspective. Sharing evidence across jurisdictions can provide consistent implementation across and within borders. Collecting and holding data and other evidence does not suffice, though, if it is not accompanied with appropriate institutional capacity and skills to use it as the basis for taking predictable decisions that stand up to ethical standards and project reliability.

Making use of reliable and transparent evidence in rule-making is also critical to generating and retaining trust in government and underpinning the legitimacy of rules. In a context of fragile trust in government, evidence-based rule-making is more important than ever to ensure that rules are sound and seen as legitimate. OECD (2024[1]) data show the close link between the trust people have in their national governments and their perception of whether their government takes decisions that are based on evidence. However, only 41% of respondents from OECD Members believe their government uses the best available evidence in decision making, and only 39% think that communication about policy reforms is adequate. Basing rules on sound information and collecting evidence to show their impact can help build confidence in government’s ability to address complex policy challenges and support reforms for the future.

Conversely, neglecting or ignoring evidence in rule making can have serious real-world impacts. In Australia, a 2011 policy decision to suspend live cattle exports, taken without an impact assessment, has had significant and lasting negative economic impacts on the cattle industry (Office of Impact Analysis, 2011[2]; Fitzgerald, 2023[3]). In another case, France’s Conseil d’État – which plays a role in reviewing the quality of legal proposals – flagged that the impact assessment for proposed pension reforms had important shortcomings, in particular regarding financial projections; as the reforms continued to be advanced, there were significant public protests. Eventually, the reform proposal was significantly revised before advancing further (Conseil d’État, 2020[4]).

This chapter discusses how policymakers can deliver their desired impact by:

• defining objectives and tracking results through evidence and analysis;

• implementing rules in a way that is based on risk and consistent within and across borders;

• building institutions that effectively collect and use evidence to take sound, reliable decisions.

Pressing regulatory challenges like climate change and disruptive innovation put policymakers under more pressure than ever to rapidly deliver solutions with little margin for error. For rules to have the desired impact, they need to be based on sound evidence that anticipates real-world implications. For rules to continue having the desired impact in a changing world, they need to incorporate lessons from implementation and outcomes. Using the right information at the right time helps governments to get rules right from the start and course-correct as needed.

Assuming that the policy problem is not transitory and that government intervention is warranted (see Chapter 2), policymakers need to define the best way to achieve the identified high-level policy goals. Some may choose the most obvious one to them and press ahead; others may assess a range of options. Options can vary from not intervening at all to regulating, with a multitude of alternatives in between, such as letting the market run itself or co-designing rules with those affected. To be able to compare alternative options and identify the one that delivers the highest net benefit for society, the costs and benefits of all options should be assessed. Traditionally, these have been calculated narrowly from businesses’ or economic perspectives, but increasingly impacts in other areas, from social to environmental spheres, are included (see Chapters 2 and 3). All these considerations – from identifying feasible options to achieve a given goal and calculating all potential impacts – form the evidence base for decisions. The 2012 OECD Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Governance and Policy identifies the use of regulatory impact assessment as a cornerstone to ensure that proposed rules are based on thorough analysis and evidence. Although impact assessment among OECD Members has grown notably since 2015, data show that systems and practices have largely stabilised since 2021 (Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2).

Over the past decade, OECD Members have marginally improved their impact assessment systems – with most of the improvement taking place between 2015 and 2018. The most significant area of improvement has been establishing mechanisms to oversee and promote the quality of impact assessments. That said, regulatory oversight remains the area in which countries are relatively the weakest.

Several OECD Members have pursued recent reforms to improve their regulatory impact assessment (RIA) frameworks:

• Finland adopted renewed RIA guidelines in 2022, which include more comprehensive guidance and extend requirements to include the assessment of macroeconomic, financial and indirect costs. A government competence network for impact assessment, established in 2021 and recently renewed until 2027, supports law drafters in preparing RIAs.

• Israel established a new body, the Israeli Regulatory Authority, which policymakers must now consult when conducting RIA. The Authority reviews and provides a public opinion on the RIA quality.

• Lithuania, for the first time, set out a forward plan of legislative initiatives from 2021 to 2024, including major initiatives for which RIAs would be performed. It also strengthened legal requirements to use data to justify legislative initiatives and assess their anticipated impacts, including requiring that policymakers embed indicators for measuring future outcomes.

• The Netherlands adopted a new RIA framework that requires policymakers to complete a scan questionnaire covering impacts related to people, society and the environment. The questionnaire helps policymakers consider proportionality by identifying mandatory and suggested assessment modules based on the scale of anticipated impacts.

Any new rule is an experiment that aims to meet policy goals. Rules are not made in a vacuum, but rather interact with existing frameworks, change people’s behaviours, and are themselves impacted by external changes or shocks. Sometimes set goals are achieved, sometimes they are not. Understanding the success (and failure) factors is crucial to ensuring that rules continue to deliver for society. In this sense, evaluating rules enables policymakers to learn what has worked, whether things can be improved, avoid repeated mistakes and use this information to improve other policy areas. It involves noting the actual costs to government of policy implementation, along with collecting data on real-world outcomes, comparing them to the intended goals, establishing the extent to which rules and other policy measures have been successful, and if they led to any unintended consequences. Despite several OECD Members continuing to take steps to advance their ex post evaluation practices (Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4), it remains less advanced than stakeholder engagement and RIA. Beyond the OECD, Brazil determined under Decree 10,411, 2020 that its federal bodies should implement an ex post evaluation agenda, and established criteria for choosing the normative acts that should be subject to it.

Over the past decade, OECD Members were most likely to make improvements by establishing or building on review methodologies, setting out aspects like the impacts and considerations that reviews should cover. Reflecting the fact that these changes remain foundational, systemic adoption (i.e. the existence of legal requirements to conduct evaluations and their frequency in practice) showed the least level of improvement. That said, some Members have undertaken more substantive reforms since 2021:

• Colombia has begun engaging stakeholders in ex post evaluations, along with publishing reviews and associated government responses.

• Finland adopted its first policy document on evaluation of rules in 2023, outlining common principles for monitoring and evaluating national legislation, state treaties and European Union (EU) rules. The document also includes case studies to help policymakers understand how the principles can be implemented.

• Korea significantly strengthened its ex post evaluation system with formalised guidelines on conducting reviews, along with improved regulatory oversight of the evaluations undertaken.

• In 2022, the Slovak Republic updated its Unified Methodology for ministries to use when evaluating existing rules. It also introduced requirements to consult with the public on ex post evaluations.

• Spain adopted legislation on evaluation in December 2022. Aligning with the implementation of this legislation, Spain will be establishing a dedicated state agency for the evaluation of public policies.

Decision makers do not always have all the relevant information when choosing whether and how to regulate (OECD, 2021[5]). A comprehensive evidence base positions decision makers to take sound policy choices by weighing different options, as well as their risks and other implications. It necessitates policymakers understanding the regulatory environment and identifying relevant data and information. It also includes acknowledging information gaps and seeking solutions to minimise them – such as engaging stakeholders who can provide relevant material as to both the status quo and to past reform experiences.

As a best practice, impact assessments should identify and assess all feasible alternative options for addressing the policy problem at hand; however, this analysis may either not be undertaken or be conducted too late to truly support decision making. Policymakers need to be given the freedom to consider a range of genuine alternative solutions, rather than a more limited choice based on pre-determined preferences from decision makers to regulate. There remains a tendency to use evidence to justify a decision that has already been taken, instead of using evidence to inform the decision itself (OECD, 2020[6]). This risks overlooking alternative, potentially more effective ways of achieving the desired impact or imposing unnecessary rules and burdens that can compromise the desired impact. To avoid this, decision makers need to be able to consider the implications of multiple options – including the option not to regulate – when selecting a path forward (OECD, 2012[7]) (Box 5.2). “Doing nothing” also has costs and benefits for the population, like the inaction to address climate change or the unchecked deployment of new technologies, as discussed in previous chapters.

Most OECD Members systematically assess multiple alternative options to inform their decision making and approximately three-quarters are systematically required to assess the “do nothing” option when making rules (a slight increase since 2021). However, few countries assess multiple non-regulatory options. Countries would benefit from a more systematic consideration of various feasible approaches – both regulatory and non-regulatory – early in their policymaking to ensure that the approach ultimately identified is, in fact, best suited to achieving the desired impact within the given context (OECD, 2022[8]).

Policymakers have often focused on assessing economic evidence and implications when making rules. However, as governments have become increasingly conscious of the importance of effective rules in, for instance, the fight against climate change and social inequity, OECD Members have added a growing suite of social and environmental – alongside economic – considerations to their impact analysis requirements (Figure 5.5). As shown in Figure 5.5, impact assessment has grown in two ways: 1) more Members are adopting assessment of different considerations; 2) there is more systematic assessment of considerations in 2024 (Chapters 2 and 3 further discuss how assessing social and environmental impacts, respectively, can contribute to rules that support a more equitable and sustainable society).

Each policy option will carry its own considerations regarding potential costs, benefits and risks that will determine its suitability and feasibility. Policymakers may find themselves weighing immediate costs against long-term benefits or weighing the risk of different unintended consequences associated with different policy options. For instance, in response to perceived high housing prices, policymakers may consider the following options: rent control measures, zoning reforms or simply doing nothing. Potential benefits of rent control measures may include stabilising housing prices for tenants, but potential unintended consequences may include reduced rental housing supply due to decreased revenue for landlords. Alternatively, reforming zoning rules that require building single-family homes to allow for higher density housing could entail higher immediate costs to update infrastructure (e.g. the city may need to expand roads and public services in the area to accommodate a higher density community) and encounter community resistance. However, the reforms could also significantly lower housing prices and meet long‑term demand by boosting availability. Meanwhile, the “do nothing” option may involve no additional (direct) costs or (immediate) changes but risk continuing affordability issues.

While such assessment of costs and benefits is a prevalent requirement among OECD Members, it is notably less common for OECD Members to require this assessment for multiple policy options. The corresponding lack of information makes it difficult to compare the pros and cons of different policy options, potentially undermining the value of RIA as an iterative tool to elicit policy choices (OECD, 2020[6]).

Risk assessment is a less common requirement than cost and benefit analysis in the development of rules, though risk is an equally key consideration when determining the suitability of policy responses. Regulations aim to address various potential harms to people, the environment, public interest and more; risk is generally considered as the combination of both the probability of an event or harm happening and its impact should it happen. Early in the policy cycle, risk assessment – i.e. “estimating the relative level of different risks in terms of combined probability and severity of harm” (OECD, 2021[5]) – allows for designing, evaluating and prioritising policy approaches based on the mitigation of identified risks (OECD, 2010[9]). This is easier said than done, with challenging obstacles like the availability of limited evidence on risk or the complexity of considering the combined risk flowing from the interplay between different threats, across sectors and jurisdictions (see also OECD (2021[5]) for a more detailed discussion).

Beyond the specific risks that could be mitigated through a given policy option, policymakers must also consider that decreasing one particular risk in one area can lead to another risk appearing elsewhere. For instance, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the United States has acknowledged that it is safer for infants to have separate seats on an airplane than to travel on the lap of an adult; however, the FAA has chosen not to ban lap infants because its risk assessment indicates that the price increase would lead more families to drive instead of flying, and the risk to human life associated with driving is significantly higher. The FAA cites that the diversion to highways would risk a net increase in transportation deaths, with 60 additional lives lost on highways for every one child saved by a ban on lap infants (Claussen, 2010[10]; National Transportation Safety Board, 2010[11]).

Accepting a degree of risk may be a sound decision to avoid riskier courses. Hydrogen technologies, for example as discussed in Chapter 3, entail certain environmental and safety risks but can be key to the energy transition and helping to mitigate risks associated with climate change. The precautionary principle can be a tool to help policymakers identify all key potential risks associated with a new product, ranging from environmental to health and safety. Applying the principle can then be a way of guiding policymakers in identifying a course of action that reconciles the new risks that a product introduces with the existing risks that the product reduces (see OECD (2023[12])). Risk is not only key in the design phase, but also through to the delivery of rules, as discussed in the section “Maximising effectiveness based on risk”.

As the range of considerations to be taken into account in impact assessment has grown, policymakers have become increasingly conscious of the need to balance the necessity for comprehensive evidence with keeping burden in the rule-making process manageable. Proportionality means requiring more evidence for rules with bigger impacts, as these have higher risks. For example, a new law affecting all healthcare providers would require thorough research and data while a bill to make minor amendments to the wording of an existing law to keep it up to date might need less detailed evidence. This helps policymakers and those supporting them across the administration use their limited time and resources effectively.

OECD Members have increasingly moved towards adopting more proportionate approaches, in part acknowledging the scarcity of resources available to policymakers. Since 2021, Colombia, the Netherlands and Türkiye have introduced proportionality requirements for conducting impact assessments.

A threshold for triggering more extensive evidence requirements can be based on quantitative impacts, a mix of qualitative and quantitative criteria (e.g. the number of affected businesses or a subjective determination of the significance of identified impacts on key sectors), impacts on specific stakeholder groups, or the determination of a regulatory oversight body following initial analysis by the policymaker (OECD, 2020[13]). In the United States, for instance, proposals with an anticipated impact of over USD 200 million annually require a more in-depth assessment (including a detailed description of the need for regulatory action and how the proposal will meet that need). The European Union, by contrast, uses a qualitative determination of whether initiatives are expected to have “significant” social, economic or environmental impacts. Among OECD Members, the use of preliminary studies for initial analysis of proposals has increased since 2021 for subordinate regulations, with more than 50% of countries undertaking this practice, while 45% of countries use them for primary laws. The Netherlands has developed a web-based tool to make this process more adaptive to different proposals; an online questionnaire helps policymakers determine the applicability of relevant impacts and tests to then include in impact assessments for their proposal.

Using relevant evidence is critical in demonstrating the effectiveness of government interventions and to strengthen accountability. Policymakers should monitor new or changed rules by drawing on reliable data and other information to gauge real-life impacts (OECD, 2012[7]). Observing and publishing performance against measurable targets enables officials to understand what works and what does not and allows people to scrutinise government action. Ongoing monitoring also affords a valuable evidence base to review rules more substantially.

Setting up effective monitoring and evaluation for after a rule has been put in place starts when the rule is being designed. The data and evidence in designing rules can later serve as a basis for evaluation, i.e whether rules are working as intended and to assess their effectiveness (“does it achieve its objective?”) and efficiency (“does it use more resources than is necessary?”) (OECD, 2020[14]). In Poland, for example, the template used to conduct impact assessment in the design of rules requires policymakers to identify a date and measures for evaluating the rule. Similarly, Hungary’s revised RIA methodology emphasises the importance of post-implementation review, including tracking emerging impacts as policies are implemented. An encouraging development was adding ex post assessment as the final step in the policy cycle to ensure that policies remain fit-for-purpose.

Some OECD Members have taken steps to incorporate early consideration of ex post evaluation by systematically requiring policymakers, when developing a regulation, to identify a process for assessing progress in achieving the desired goals. This process can include requiring policymakers to specify the methodology for measuring progress, whether in achieving immediate or long‑term policy goals. With less than half of OECD Members requiring methodologies for measuring progress or requiring indicators to measure progress toward immediate policy goals, and approximately a quarter of OECD Members requiring indicators to measure the contribution toward long-term goals, Members would benefit from stronger planning upstream to monitor the impact of rules and measure success downstream.

In practice, there is no guarantee that rules will be effective and achieve the intended impacts. They may be simply ineffective or they may have unintended impacts that were not foreseen in the design process. For instance, a review of traffic laws could show that new speed limits have successfully reduced accidents in one area but increased traffic congestion in another. Although some additional OECD Members have started comparing actual and predicted impacts and identifying unintended consequences of at least some regulations since 2021, there remain significant opportunities to better collect and leverage this evidence (Box 5.3).

People directly impacted by rules can provide more complete information about how rules are working in practice, including unintended or unnecessary challenges. In addition to public feedback helping identify and address issues and data gaps, incorporating consultation processes that are perceived as fair can help to enhance public trust (Lind and Arndt, 2016[21]). In the United States, for example, stakeholders submitted petitions to the government highlighting that policies allowing voluntary “Product of USA” or “Made in USA” food labels on animal products processed in the United States were leading to consumer confusion. After receiving the petitions and surveying consumers, the regulatory agency identified that consumers commonly understood the label on meat products to mean that animals were born, raised, slaughtered and processed in the United States; accordingly, rule changes were finalised in 2024 to align product labelling policies with the common consumer understanding (Food Safety and Inspection Service, 2024[22]). Chapter 2 further discusses the value of feedback processes in allowing people to voice when rules are not working for them and in enhancing trust.

The example of the United States also highlights how evidence and lessons gathered from implementation can feed back into a redesign of rules, creating a loop for evidence-based improvement to drive effectiveness. This crucial part of translating evidence into impact remains a gap among OECD Members. Despite most Members reporting some kind of mechanism for dealing with findings, ranging from departmental to parliamentary responses, just under half of Members report an evaluation leading to tangible improvement.

Within the last five years, five OECD Members have assessed the effectiveness of their evaluation processes in improving the regulatory stock. Their findings may be relevant for others looking to identify gaps in their own processes and close the feedback loop of evidence-based improvement. Mexico, for example, identified compliance with regulatory improvement obligations in 2019-20 as a challenge; recognising capacity constraints associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, the body responsible for monitoring compliance with these requirements catalogued all specific instances of non‑compliance and committed to following up with ministries on any commitments left outstanding the following year (CONAMER, 2021[23]).

However well-designed, the effectiveness of a rule in achieving the desired impact hinges on how it is delivered and implemented on the ground. As such, effectiveness ultimately depends on the ability of governments and regulators to foster compliance with rules. For instance, product regulation may be based on the best possible evidence to strike a balance between risks and opportunities; however, if regulators are overstretched and unable to verify safety, unsafe products may enter the market regardless, exposing people to harm. For example, a “smart” baby monitor may fail to pick up on important clues to alert parents that their attention is needed. If regulators are unable to remove them from the market, they will put infants’ lives at risk. To maximise impact, rules should be “outcome-based” and supported by guidance, making it easy to comply (Blanc and Cola, 2019[24]).

To pass this “reality test” and achieve impact through regulation, governments and regulatory agencies must allocate their limited resources in a manner that maximises impact. Taking a risk-based approach enables regulators to focus efforts where they are needed most and in a way that achieves the intended outcomes. Effective and smooth implementation also requires rules to be coherent and consistent within and across borders. Ensuring processes for co-ordinating with other jurisdictions and across levels of government maximises positive impacts, especially when policy challenges transcend borders.

To maximise the effectiveness of rules in keeping people safe and limiting burdens on businesses, governments need to be “smart” in how they implement rules. Testing and inspecting every individual product and business on an ongoing basis is neither achievable (limited resources) nor desirable (unnecessary burdens). This involves focusing compliance and enforcement activities on the level of risk the government seeks to mitigate and targeting its interventions and actions, such as inspections, accordingly.

In this landscape, regulators’ approaches should generally focus on the positive promotion of compliance and be less punitive. To do so, inspectors should rely on a wide range of tools towards regulated entities that allow both the adoption of severe punitive measures against businesses for the most severe cases of infringement where there is no chance to do otherwise and where businesses actively and knowingly engage in criminal activities, and providing guidance to those who are not yet fully aware of complex requirements or do not understand them (Ayres and Braithwaite, 2016[25]). Helping businesses comply and rewarding those who do so voluntarily and spontaneously can help nurture a common interest towards the protection of public goods (e.g. health, safety, environment) and, thereby, help solve and strengthen trust between the public and private sectors.

Including regulated entities, including businesses, in broader risk management can greatly enhance the impact of regulation. Involving them in the pursuit of a common risk assessment methodology can enable better concerted action across the public and private sectors, and consequently enhance the levels of compliance. It also facilitates understanding and communication for companies striving to be more aware and compliant. One way for regulators to involve businesses is risk management is by setting incentives to use self-assessment systems to improve their performance and the overall safety of the sector.

Public authorities can use risk assessment to target the most pressing challenges. More targeted enforcement can help focus on those areas where rule breaches are the most likely and/or have the gravest consequences. Doing so not only helps to upkeep vital protections for citizens and the environment, it also saves public resources. For instance, data analysis, mathematical models and information systems can be used to predict where non-compliance is most likely to occur. This enables regulators to tailor their inspection regime to target those businesses the most likely to be non-compliant (Box 5.4).

Regulatory enforcement and inspection activities are typically delegated to arm’s-length bodies but central governments in OECD Members can play an important role in setting expectations and enabling these entities to adopt risk-based approaches. Evidence suggests that OECD Members can make better use of risk-based approaches for inspections and enforcement, as 17 countries indicate allowing but not mandating their inspection and enforcement authorities to base their activities on risk criteria. This reflects a discretionary use of data, and consequently of risk, in regulatory decisions. Only 12 countries require the use of such approaches. Similarly, a minority of OECD Members (14) report having a regulation or policy document that explicitly allows for differentiated responsive enforcement (i.e. depending on the profile, compliance history and behaviour of specific businesses).

Risk-based regulatory delivery is an ongoing endeavour that requires public authorities to establish and sustain appropriate mechanisms to monitor how risks evolve in real life and act where needed. Continuous monitoring is especially important as new products and services (from e-cigarettes to e‑commerce platforms and connected Internet of Things devices) mean that consumer habits and expectations evolve over time, and so will the associated risks, leaving regulators to chase a constantly moving target. Market surveillance is a key tool that can support regulators’ ongoing risk management (Box 5.5). It typically consists of activities conducted by governmental authorities or delegated bodies to ensure that products available on the market comply with relevant regulations and standards, and to take action as appropriate to remove products that pose a threat, e.g. through recalls. In doing so, market surveillance plays an important role in ensuring a well-functioning market with fair and open competition that does not unduly hamper innovation all the while protecting consumers.

The practical implementation of rules on the ground can often reveal gaps, duplication and inconsistencies in obligations, making them hard to understand and comply with. For instance, a small business might struggle to comply with varying requirements to export its products, while people who live and work in different countries are subject to a web of complex administrative procedures. At the same time, gaps and inconsistencies in rules across national borders make it impossible for policymakers to deal with the challenges of a global and interconnected world. Inconsistencies across borders potentially incentivise globally operating businesses to locate operations in whichever jurisdiction provides more lenient rules, thereby raising the spectre of a race to the bottom. To drive global public goods and ensure a level playing field, countries must collaborate, as they are doing, for instance, through the Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches or through the inclusive OECD/G20 Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting to end tax avoidance. Even within national borders, rules and requirements are often issued and enforced at different levels of government, creating potential conflict or overlap. To ensure rules have tangible real-life impact, policymakers must collaborate across and within borders to expand their evidence base, share best practices, and ensure that rules are coherent and consistent.

Today’s globalised world with integrated value chains and the movement of goods, services and capital across borders makes it impossible for any single country to manage risks and protect citizens effectively. Recognising these practical difficulties, the OECD devised the Recommendation of the Council on International Regulatory Co-operation to Tackle Global Challenges for countries to take international knowledge and expertise into account, consider existing international instruments when developing regulation, assessing international costs and benefits of domestic rule-making and the impacts of international regulatory divergence from existing international rules (OECD, 2022[27]). International regulatory co-operation can help improve regulatory coherence through aligned terminology or definitions, shared experiences, and common guidance or benchmarks.

Governments need to collaborate with each other to shape and implement rules to successfully tackle challenges that transcend borders. Therefore, and as set out in the OECD’s Best Practice Principles on International Regulatory Co-operation (OECD, 2021[28]), “co-operation is also a cornerstone of effective market surveillance and regulatory enforcement.” Pressing global challenges such as climate change, threats to public health and tax evasion can only be met through a concerted policy response that avoids loopholes and inconsistencies. (OECD, 2021[28]). Co-operation on the delivery of regulation, enforcement of regulation or conformity assessment processes are also increasingly used to help reduce complexity and save both businesses and government time and resources and to help improve logistics. Such co‑operation has proved particularly important for securing time‑critical equipment as was the case during the COVID‑19 pandemic (OECD, 2020[29]), ensuring human health and safety without undue burdens for companies in chemicals testing, and in competition and anti-trust cases spanning across borders (OECD, 2022[30]). In particular, mutually recognising testing and certification in another country can limit the need for compliance assurance domestically and reduce international trade costs. For example, the OECD’s Environment, Health and Safety Programme, through its Mutual Acceptance of Data system, helps avoid repeat testing for industrial chemicals, pesticides and biocides and reduces testing through the use of computational approaches for predicting chemical properties. The programme’s annual net benefits were estimated at over EUR 309 million (APEC-OECD, n.d.[31]). In addition, over 32 000 fewer animals were needed annually for testing new industrial chemicals.

To meet common challenges and positively impact people’s lives, governments need to collaborate with each other, including by sharing data and other relevant information and considering appropriate compliance and enforcement across borders. Doing so enables governments and enforcement authorities to expand their evidence base to detect potential risks and better encourage compliance with rules, for example by checking the provenance of goods, travellers’ identity or the source of financial flows. International collaboration and information exchange is particularly relevant for preventing threats from criminal activity or terrorist plots (Box 5.6).

Countries also have an opportunity to pool information to improve their market surveillance activities and withdraw dangerous products from the market more quickly. For instance, joint alert systems and common platforms can be used to flag products that have been found to be unsafe. The European Information and Communication System for Market Surveillance, for example, enables market surveillance authorities from EU and European Free Trade Association countries to share information on non-compliant (non-food) products. The platform can also be used to co-ordinate activities and inspections, aiding consistency across the Single Market by avoiding duplication of investigations. In addition, Safety Gate acts as a rapid alert system for dangerous non-food products across the European Union. However, there is further potential to use other data sources, such as firefighting and healthcare institutions, which could signal to the market surveillance authority that a fire or an injury was linked to a specific dangerous product.

In other cases, countries have formalised their collaboration by establishing recurring or standing mechanisms to drive regulatory coherence. These can go beyond information sharing to common evidence gathering and efforts to address regulatory barriers for businesses and citizens. The Franco-German area illustrates how such mechanisms can greatly improve rules affecting businesses and citizens in cross‑border regions (Box 5.7).

The power to make and enforce rules is typically spread across different levels of government – national, regional and local. In many countries, regional and local governments are charged with implementing regulations issued by national authorities. To implement national rules, regional or local authorities often issue subordinate regulation in the form of bylaws, directives, manuals, guidelines, handbooks, templates or other binding legal instruments. They also often play a prominent role in delivering rules, including through licensing, permitting, and inspections and enforcement. Furthermore, in federal jurisdictions, subnational governments often have the responsibility to regulate specific areas. These may include the provision of public services such as sanitation, health services and waste management and, in some cases, energy generation and distribution.

This intricate system of shared responsibility means different bodies entrusted with regulatory authority on different levels need to co-ordinate. The exercise of regulatory authority by multiple levels of government should, in principle, operate in concert for greater impact, i.e. to achieve economic and social policy goals, such as protecting citizens and the environment. However, the complexity of these relationships creates the potential for horizontal and vertical gaps, overlaps, and contradictions. This regulatory jigsaw can create unnecessary burdens on businesses and citizens and, at the same time, lead to potential loopholes arising from gaps in regulation and their delivery that undermine the real-life impact of rules.

Evidence shows that actions taken by OECD Members to promote regulatory coherence through rules that avoid gaps, duplications and inconsistencies across levels of government are not consistently used across the whole membership yet. Since 2021, 26 of 38 OECD Members have at least one type of co-ordination mechanism across national and subnational governments or municipalities to promote regulatory coherence in regulatory approaches and avoid duplication or conflict of regulations. The most common mechanism is a standing co-ordination mechanism. Box 5.8 provides an example of Italy that, despite being a unitary country, has several instances facilitating policy co-ordination, including strengthening collective regulation capacity and improving regulatory coherence.

In addition to specific co-ordination mechanisms, the systematic use of recognised good practices in the development, delivery and review of rules at all levels of government can help foster coherence throughout the policy cycle. This means that regulatory authorities at the local and regional levels should be encouraged to embed such practices, including the use of evidence, risk analysis and effective engagement with stakeholders, just like the national level, into their rule-making process. In 2024, Brazil approved a national regulatory improvement strategy, which aims to develop institutional capacities, and encourage cooperation between regulators at federal levels and other relevant actors in the regulatory process at local, national and international levels (Ministry of Development, Industry, Commerce and Services, 2024[32]).

OECD Members have developed and deployed different approaches to encourage the adoption of good regulatory practices at subnational levels. They range from establishing binding legal provisions that oblige regional and local governments to develop and implement regulatory management tools to more voluntary approaches, promotion and capacity building. For instance, in 2018, Mexico modified the federal Constitution to include provisions that oblige regional and local governments to develop and adopt their own regulatory policies, which must include guidelines and directives set by the federal government. In other cases, the central or federal governments may establish programmes that invite subnational entities to participate in projects or initiatives that seek to establish an overarching regulatory policy or the development of a single or a set of specific regulatory management tools, such as RIA, stakeholder engagement or ex post evaluation of regulations.

Evidence suggests that there is ample scope for OECD governments at all levels to strengthen their collective rule-making capacity by sharing best practices, regulatory management tools and procedures. Less than half (17) of OECD Members actively support the implementation of regulatory policy at the subnational level, which is only a marginal increase from 16 in 2021. Also, only a minority of countries have assigned institutional responsibilities at the regional (15) and local (13) level to promote good regulatory practices. Establishing mechanisms and institutions to promote regulatory policy and thereby fostering regulatory quality at the subnational level can be an effective strategy to boost the capacity of regulation to effect more significant impacts for citizens and society.

In addition to ensuring coherence of rules on paper, regulatory authorities also have an opportunity to improve efficiency and consistency in how they enforce them. In particular, data sharing enables regulators to better target their activities to bolster compliance. The data held by one regulatory authority can afford useful insights for another. For example, a business that is in breach of food standard regulations may also be more likely to be non-compliant in other areas. Therefore, sharing information about non‑compliant businesses and their characteristics can help regulators create synergies and maximise efficiency in how they enforce rules. However, different ways of collecting the data and their format, as well as administrative procedures and justified concerns regarding privacy, can hinder smooth information sharing.

Governments can positively influence and set expectations of arm’s-length bodies to collaborate and share data. For example, adopting strategic policies or binding requirements on regulators can set important signals to compel regulators to share data. However, evidence suggests that OECD Members are not fully exploiting the potential of sharing information systematically, with only 9 countries requiring their inspection and enforcement authorities to share information and participate in joint alert systems, while 16 countries allow it but do not require it (and 13 do not allow it).

Countries need sound institutional foundations to develop and implement rules that deliver effectively on people’s expectations to keep them safe and boost prosperity. Only institutions that have the internal capacity will be able to design rules that are based on the best possible evidence and deliver them with lasting impact. Similarly, institutions that have established a track record of reliability by operating in a way that is seen by those who are subject to regulation as ethical, consistent and accountable will be more effective at fostering compliance. Conversely, regulators that receive news coverage for being wasteful with public resources or failing to deliver on their mandates will lose trust. For example, regulators have attracted the public’s ire for failing to protect rivers and coastal waters effectively when record sewage spills came to light (The Guardian, 2024[33]).

Shaping and enforcing the rules to address the challenges of an ever-more interconnected world requires a highly diverse skillset. Officials in government departments in charge of developing regulation need to be able to analyse and evaluate evidence that is highly complex and technical, and present it in an accessible way to decision makers. Similarly, independent regulators delivering regulation need to be able to gather and make sense of evidence from a wide range of sources and use that to take informed decisions. This requires a wide range of analytical and behavioural competences, such as critical reasoning, adaptive thinking, stakeholder management and communication skills.

In addition, the digital transition and other forms of technological innovation bring new policy and delivery challenges as well as analytical opportunities. To fully understand their implications and unlock the potential of new or enhanced forms of evidence like big data analytics and machine learning, governments rely on specialists in information and communications technologies and data, as well as broader science, technology, engineering and mathematics professionals. However, public administrations in OECD Members report difficulties in hiring such experts, especially in the context of competition from the private sector (OECD, 2023[34]). Box 5.9 sets out how the French administration has taken steps to address these challenges by pooling specialised resources within a centre of technical expertise.

Governments have an opportunity to evolve how they recruit public servants, including in regulatory functions, to respond to the evolving need of specialist skills and talent. Officials in charge of developing or enforcing regulation, from policy advisors in central government departments to inspection officers who directly engage with regulated businesses, are first and foremost public servants. As such, their recruitment and retention are subject to many of the same challenges of the wider public sector. Evidence suggests that OECD Members have started to adjust how they recruit public servants to attract the skills they need in a changing environment (OECD, 2023[34]). This includes adopting a more forward-looking approach to anticipate future needs and respond through appropriate remuneration packages; being more flexible in how skills are being deployed according to changing priorities; and rewarding motivation and achievements.

While strategies to attract and recruit talent are critical, providing continuous learning and career development opportunities is just as important to ensure that officials have the right skills to design and deliver regulation. Putting in place learning opportunities and providing a career pathway can make civil servant roles more attractive and help upgrade the skills of existing staff to ensure it keeps pace with evolving challenges (OECD, 2023[34]). Some countries have developed specific frameworks to aid career progression and development. For example, the UK Civil Service has developed several “professions” and expert networks to support the development of officials: the “Policy Profession Standards” (UK Civil Service, 2021[35]) describe the different skills and expectations for officials in policy roles at different stages of their career across three pillars: strategy democracy and delivery. This can also help guide their development, through appropriate training modules, postgraduate learning and an executive master’s in public policy. In addition, the UK Government Economic Service champions the use of sound evidence and analysis in government by providing a technical framework and professional standards, learning opportunities and support for the professional development of economists across departments (UK Government Economic Service, n.d.[36]).

In addition to more general analytical and behavioural competencies, regulatory officials at all levels of government also need to be upskilled in the use of specific tools and best practices to design, implement and enforce high-quality regulations. One way to achieve this is to build regulatory management capacities, including through relevant training opportunities. For example, in Canada, the Community of Federal Regulators has developed a Professional Development Certificate programme as well as guidance for departments and agencies on the recruitment and development of skills in cost-benefit analysis to better implement the Cabinet Directive on Regulation requirements (Centre for Regulatory Innovation, 2022[37]).

Given their prominent role in delivering and/or developing rules in many OECD Members, building capacity in using good practices is equally important across different levels of government, including subnational ones. To that effect, OECD Members have established various mechanisms to share best practices in regulatory management tools across subnational governments (Figure 5.6).

Currently, 20 countries report having at least one mechanism to share or promote best practices in regulatory management across subnational governments, up from 17 countries in 2021. The most commonly used mechanism is workshops, seminars and conferences. Peer learning is an important mechanism for government officials to learn and adopt best practices on regulatory management and in this way ensure that regulations have a positive impact on citizens’ lives. Box 5.10 describes the example of Colombia for promoting best practices on better regulations across government agencies, including subnational governments.

To deliver rules in a way that is based on risk and proportionate to the issue at hand, those in charge of taking individual case decisions, e.g. inspection officers, need to be empowered to make use of appropriate levels of discretion within reasonable boundaries. This (framed) discretion allows enforcement officers to be responsive and apply “common sense” by taking into account the characteristics, compliance history and behaviour of the inspected entity while maintaining uniformity in the decision-making process to foster compliance without undue severity (Blanc and Cola, 2019[24]). In other words, the aim is to ensure that discretion is exercised in a reasonable manner and protected from regulatory capture (Blanc, 2020[42]). This makes it possible for regulators and inspectors to opt for non-punitive measures, or guidance, whenever possible and supported by evidence, e.g. when infractions are minor and inadvertent, instead of immediately resorting to fines or sanctions. This approach is key not only to support compliance and risk management, but also to foster legitimacy from regulated subjects.

To make the best possible use of discretion, officials need to be equipped with appropriate guidance. In the United Kingdom, the Health and Safety Executive’s Enforcement Management Model (EMM) assists inspectors in using their discretion to take enforcement decisions based on an appropriate response to risks (Health and Safety Executive, 2013[43]). The EMM has been implemented in Greece and Italy in different regulatory domains with OECD support, where a tailor-made model guides inspectors through a decision tree, providing them with clear criteria and parameters for determining appropriate actions in cases of non-compliance. Figure 5.7 illustrates how the EMM decision tree guides regulators to make enforcement actions in proportion to the business’ compliance behaviour and the associated risk level.

In addition to guidance, regulators also require the necessary powers and incentives that enable discretionary decision making. However, some legal frameworks put a limit on effective use of discretion. For example, in Italy, the Criminal Code makes civil servants’ omission or refusal to perform official acts a criminal offence. This also extends to cases where a regulator might opt for providing guidance rather than sanctioning. As a result, members of the public administration are more reluctant to adopt approaches that are risk-based, responsive and collaborative (D’Alberti, 1989[44]), resulting instead in a defensive bureaucracy approach (Lorenzoni, 2023[45]) where civil servants are afraid to take decisions in fear of punishment. Thus, they might deliberately choose a second-best option and build up even more procedural steps to protect themselves from negative consequences (Artinger, Artinger and Gigerenzer, 2019[46]). This generates inefficiencies and mistrust between the public and the private sectors.

When institutions can demonstrate their reliability through positive impact, this will reinforce people’s trust in them. To nurture and grow this virtuous circle of trust and impact, regulators need to build a reputation of reliability. They must ensure that their decisions are taken in a transparent, consistent and ethical way so that those affected understand both the outcome and are also able to follow its rationale. In addition to individual decisions, being seen as reliable also requires regulators to be able to demonstrate that they are high-performing public bodies that can be trusted to deliver value-for-money.

Part of regulating reliably is acting ethically. When people perceive that the decisions affecting them are in line with broader ethical principles that are shared across society, they will be more likely to accept and comply, improving overall policy outcomes. However, if the regulator’s reputation is no longer solid, there is a low probability that businesses will take the regulating authority and/or the ethical conduct seriously (European Commission, 2017[47]). The importance of ethics in regulation has recently been brought into the spotlight in the context of regulatory failures that led to aviation accidents where oversight responsibility was, to a large degree, delegated to industry, raising questions about potential conflicts of interest (Box 5.11).

Regulators are increasingly emphasising ethical considerations in rule-making and taking steps to ensure that decisions are objective, impartial, rational and aligned with values shared across society, which contributes to delivering regulations better (Whitton, 2001[50]). However, ethical behaviour is different from simply obeying laws and procedures. There are practical steps regulators must take to ensure their actions are ethical (Ashby, 2020[51]). This includes: ethics expressed as unambiguously prioritised rules, i.e. the regulator must have a clearly established set of objectives that guide its overall strategy; integrity of all subsystems, i.e. the regulator must avoid undue external interference in its decision making and establish mechanisms to monitor and correct any breaches; and transparency of behaviour, i.e. the regulator must be able to demonstrate retrospectively how decisions have been taken and on what basis.

A consistent track record of ethical and reliable behaviour will also open doors for regulators to use more co-operative and impactful forms of regulatory delivery. To drive behavioural change and improved outcomes, deterrence and punitive responses to non-compliance are generally neither the most effective (save for clearly unethical cases) nor proportionate approach (unintended effects could exceed the nature and scale of the breach). For example, “naming and shaming” small businesses for minor non‑compliance issues could ruin their reputation and customer base, and eventually force closure – a disproportionate outcome compared to the business’s breach.

Enforcement should be based on a culture of “learning to improve”, helping regulated entities to comply, and on co-operative mechanisms. The outcomes-based co-operative regulation approach builds on scientific research on how people behave and suggests that stakeholders’ co-operation allows the regulator to achieve common purposes and shared goals. The key assumption of this model is that co‑operation is based on trust, which in turn is based on evidence of ethical behaviour (Hodges, 2022[52]). Stakeholders are thus incentivised to co-operate in a trusted and respectful environment, identifying risks and problems, proposing shared solutions, and increasing overall performance.

The use of accurate data is another critical element to ensure consistency in regulatory decisions and engender a sense of reliability. Regulators have an opportunity to use data both to inform the general policy direction as well as individual case decisions. This data-driven approach (OECD, 2021[26]) enables an “intelligent” and effective regulatory response and enhances its “predictability”. However, to unlock this potential, the data must be of sufficiently high quality, appropriately sourced and comparable as relevant. Therefore, regulators require robust data collection mechanisms that respect relevant privacy and commercial confidentiality rules, as well as examination and interpretation methods. They also need to accessibly explain how data were used to ensure traceability of information and decisions.

While the use of data and other forms of evidence can greatly enhance the consistency and predictability of regulatory decisions, they are still subject to human judgement, leading to potential inconsistencies. For instance, inspection officers may come to different conclusions when assessing similar situations. The resulting inconsistencies can undermine the effectiveness of individual decisions and reduce the regulator’s (perceived) reliability. Regulators have recognised this and some have taken steps to measure and address the degree of “noise” in decision making (Box 5.12).

Finally, reliability also rests upon appropriate institutional foundations that empower regulators to deliver on expectations and meet their objectives efficiently. In many cases, rules are delivered and implemented by regulatory agencies that are separate from central government, with (varying degrees of) independence to shield individual decisions from political influence. The specific arrangements that govern these bodies, such as their (statutory) objectives and other duties, powers, functions, and funding, all have a bearing on how efficient and effective they will be in serving the public. While all regulators are different, it is possible to identify a series of governance principles that underpin the efficient and effective delivery of regulatory outcomes, including: role clarity; an effective decision-making and governance structure that preserves regulatory integrity; preventing undue influence and maintaining trust; accountability and transparency; stakeholder engagement; suitable funding arrangements; and performance evaluation (OECD, 2014[54]).

Regular performance reviews and accountability mechanisms are critical to ensuring regulators remain fit-for-purpose and enabling them to communicate reliably. This is especially important at a time when regulators have to balance an ever-growing list of expectations (and in some cases duties), such as contributing to the transition to net zero, with the achievement of their core objectives. External review can point to those areas of relative strength and where improvements can be made. Transparent reviews help facilitate accountability in terms of the regulator’s performance and in more general public administration terms. Effective review can be achieved through a variety of mechanisms tailored to the specific institutional setting, including parliamentary oversight by select committees or review by independent audit institutions. The OECD Performance Assessment Framework for Economic Regulators provides a consistent framework for review based on international best practice to support regulatory performance (Box 5.13).

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