OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025

Regulations govern countless facets of our daily lives, from the food we eat and the water we drink to the air we breathe. Rules define people’s experiences as they access government services, or those of entrepreneurs and business owners as they undertake their daily operations. Given their ubiquity, getting rules right is critical to improving people’s lives. Similarly, getting rules wrong – or not making them good enough – risks lives and livelihoods.

Governments regulate for people by improving safety and reducing harm as well as by ensuring prosperity. Rules exist, for example, to ensure the safety of cars, roads, electrical appliances and buildings. Getting their design and implementation right is fundamental to achieving positive outcomes for people (Box 2.1). For instance, regulation to phase out the use of ozone-depleting substances has greatly contributed towards the recovery of the ozone layer, helping avoid global warming by 0.5°C and decreasing human exposure to harmful ultraviolet rays from the sun (UNEP, 2023[1]). At the same time, adverse examples abound, where burdensome rules, unclear roles and responsibilities, inadequate inspections and enforcement, or a general lack of education and awareness of applicable rules have led to negative outcomes. At times these come with disastrous results, as was the case with the tragic Grenfell Tower fire in 2017 (Hackitt, 2018[2]), or at a more systemic level, the 2008 financial crisis.

Regulatory policy looks at how rules are made and implemented. It is a transversal tool across government that can enhance impact across ministries and agencies by ensuring high-quality, evidence-based rules. People-centred regulatory policy also considers how rules impact people differently. This may affect whether and to what extent their behaviour changes in response to the policy, and impact the potential success or failure of rules. Poorly defined rules, or ones that have been developed without considering their distributional impacts, can also exacerbate existing inequalities. Designing rules that acknowledge differences in access and opportunity can lead to more informed decisions about the impacts rules have on people.

Governments also seek to regulate with people to increase the effectiveness of rules: when engagement works, rules are more likely to be accepted and followed. For instance, people’s lived experience with rules can help governments become more citizen-focused, helping governments meet their objectives. More responsive governments have developed ongoing feedback mechanisms that allow people to highlight issues where rules are not working as intended and aim to improve them. People experience rules’ real effects, and can provide essential data and information to help improve policy design and ensure that rules continue to deliver positive outcomes for the community into the future (see Chapter 5).

Regulating with people also helps build trust. There are concerns about a lack of opportunities to contribute to rule-making and government responsiveness to issues people face as well as low levels of government transparency and accountability (Smid, 2023[8]). People can experience pain-like feelings when they are excluded from rule-making (Lind and Arndt, 2016[9]). Combined, these factors – alongside other factors discussed in this and subsequent chapters, like satisfaction with administrative services, confidence in government’s ability to tackle complex policy issues, and confidence in the government’s use of evidence in decision making – contribute to trust in government (OECD, 2024[10]). Giving people a voice in the rules that govern them is crucial to fostering trust in government action (Brezzi et al., 2021[11]).

This chapter discusses how to place people at the centre of how the rules that govern their lives are designed and delivered. This includes:

• ensuring people have a say in rule-making

• understanding the impacts of rules on people

• removing unnecessary barriers that rules can create in people’s lives

• better communicating rule-making to the public.

Engaging people in rule-making is intrinsically linked to trust in government action. For instance, slightly less than one‑third of people surveyed think their government would adopt opinions expressed in a public consultation (OECD, 2024[10]). Thirty-nine per cent said that their government would improve a poorly performing service, implement an innovative idea or change a national policy in response to public demands (OECD, 2024[10]). When considering more overtly democratic political processes like elections and political priority‑setting, only 30% consider the political system in their country lets them have a say (OECD, 2024[10]). A person’s sense of having a say in government actions is one of the most powerful drivers of trust in government: 69% of those who feel they have a say in government actions trust national government while only 22% of those who feel they do not have a say (from 53% overall) express trust (OECD, 2024[10]).

Trust in governments has declined in recent years. The 2024 OECD Trust Survey¸ implemented across 30 countries, shows that the share of people with low or no trust in the national government (44%) outweighs the share of those with high or moderately high trust (39%). In the 18 countries with available data for 2021 and 2024, trust in the national government has registered a two percentage point drop since 2021, partly driven by reduced trust from women and people with a lower education (OECD, 2024[10]). Data show that people are also less satisfied with opportunities to engage meaningfully in policymaking and with government’s accountability to public feedback and needs (OECD, 2024[10]). Deteriorating levels of trust can also manifest more generally as a result of political scandals, integrity issues, and whether and the extent to which people use the media to inform themselves about current affairs (OECD, 2024[10]). Low trust is linked to high transaction costs in social, economic and political relationships; risk-averse behaviour among investors; and non-compliance with rules (Fukuyama, 1995[12]; Algan and Cahuc, 2010[13]).

A fundamental aspect of rule-making is engaging with those affected by the resulting rules; this is commonly known as stakeholder consultation. The persons or groups concerned with and affected by regulation include citizens, businesses, consumers, employees (including their representative organisations and associations), the public sector, non-governmental organisations, international trading partners and other stakeholders (OECD, 2012[14]). Providing opportunities to discuss, present and challenge ideas, and develop innovative solutions all emanate from giving people a say in the rules that affect them. Governments are responsible for informing people of consultations, inviting them to contribute and addressing feedback received. Some individuals and groups lack the resources of other larger entities in terms of their ability to have a say in rule‑making. Governments can support these groups to engage in consultations, avoid feelings of exclusion and improve policy development.

Consultations on regulatory proposals are beneficial in and of themselves. In addition to trust and improved compliance with any resultant rules, consultations have helped stakeholders to improve their understanding of the rationale for and process of regulating (OECD, 2023[15]).

Meaningful engagement can also lend legitimacy to and strengthen compliance with resultant rules (Lind and Arndt, 2016[9]). People’s views provide a more informed understanding of various issues and potential solutions, which helps strengthen the data and evidence put before decision makers (see Chapter 5). Taken together, this can improve rules’ implementation and their overall impact.

Having a say in rule-making should not be a one-time event. People have lived experiences that they can leverage to help improve the quality of rules. Continuous engagement with people helps to test ideas, elicit feedback, and create increased buy-in and acceptance for resulting policies. However, engagement is not without cost, neither for governments nor participants. Continual engagement can also bring about stakeholder fatigue, especially if policymakers do not provide feedback about how input has been considered. Hence, there is a need to not only make engagement straightforward, but that more intense and extensive consultations be reserved for policies with larger potential impacts and where there are greater levels of uncertainty (see below).

Governments have progressively improved their engagement with stakeholders over the past decade. This is essential to effectively seizing the benefits of engagement when both citizens and policymakers are working with limited time and resources. Despite these improvements, avenues remain for governments to further engage with people in rules that affect them.

To understand how having a say in rule-making works, the OECD has tracked stakeholder engagement systems and practices through the indicators of Regulatory Performance and Governance (iREG) since 2014. Data show that countries’ systems and practices for stakeholder engagement have remained stable since 2021 (Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). Most OECD Members have requirements in place to conduct stakeholder engagement in the development of both primary laws and subordinate regulations.1 Over 97% of OECD Members require public participation in consultations on some primary laws and subordinate regulations, with 82% systematically requiring public participation.

Over the past decade, OECD Members have improved requirements, practices and institutions for citizen and stakeholder engagement in rule-making – an improvement that is marginally greater for engagement on primary laws than for subordinate regulations. This improvement can be largely attributed to newly established or significantly reformed oversight and quality control mechanisms. The sharpest period of growth was between 2015 and 2018; since then, most countries have either levelled out or continued to make steady, marginal improvements. Between 2018 and 2021, slight improvements in methodology could be explained by the increased use of virtual meetings for consultations (linked to the COVID-19 pandemic), and different documents being made available during consultations (OECD, 2021[16]).

A key trend since 2015 is the use of more modern platforms and innovative, more participative means to engage stakeholders worldwide. Relevant examples include:

• Austrian legislation in 2021 expanded public consultation requirements beyond initiatives developed by the executive. Stakeholders can now comment on legislative initiatives introduced directly in parliament.

• A new online platform for engaging on regulatory issues allows people in Canada to see and build off comments from other people and from consultation administrators. Citizens can also engage through tools like stories, virtual post-it notes, questions to administrators, polls and surveys.

• Denmark has used a variety of creative means for people to engage meaningfully and provide recommendations to decision makers on climate change issues – from a Citizens’ Assembly, composed of 99 randomly selected citizens, to the Youth Climate Council.

• Business and community stakeholders in France convene to discuss thematic and territorial challenges – such as the ecological transition – and propose solutions through the new Conseil National de la Refondation.

• In Korea, a consortium of industry, expert and government representatives conduct joint tests within a new conflict resolution-oriented sandbox and use the resulting data to identify and propose regulatory improvements.

• The “Unified Portal for the Development and Agreement of Draft Legal Acts”, an online portal launched by Latvia in 2021, allows stakeholders to find and comment on all regulatory proposals across ministries.

All people should have the opportunity to engage in the making of rules that impact their lives. Beyond democratic principles and other means of participation, all societal groups have valuable information to help enhance the quality of rules but are sometimes not given the opportunity because of ineffective or limited consultation means. A lack of access is exacerbated when governments only consult the “usual suspects”, that is interest groups with resources and capacities to engage. While approaching these groups may have substantive merit depending on the policy issue at hand, it should not be the default option or exclude other practices.

OECD Members are gradually diversifying how they engage, to reach people in more convenient ways. People should expect to receive timely notifications through various channels to engage in consultations. The use of traditional and social media platforms as well as direct communication through emails or newsletters can play a significant role in reaching a broader audience. Multi-channel approaches help engage stakeholders with different accessibility levels and communication preferences. But an increase in the number of communication channels does not necessarily result in improved communication. Governments need to systematically gather insights about stakeholders’ preferences and concerns, particularly by building capacity to conduct organisational listening at scale. Combined with other means of citizen and stakeholder participation, this could enable a feedback loop between government and citizens that builds trust (OECD, 2023[17]). Moreover, utilising networks, professional associations and other intermediary groups helps build community awareness of consultations, especially for those who might not directly engage with digital platforms. Diversifying communication channels, considering stakeholders’ digital literacy, preferences and resources, and ensuring accessibility are essential elements in promoting inclusivity.

Various consultation approaches should all aid people to easily contribute. As seen in the above examples, governments are leveraging online platforms to improve users’ consultation experiences, saving both the time and energy of people who want to have a say in rule-making. Currently across 19 OECD Members, the public can find all ongoing consultations listed on a single central website. Someone looking to engage in consultations for climate‑related proposals, for instance, can thus easily identify relevant proposals being advanced across the transportation, energy and agriculture ministries. This is the case for example in Brazil which launched “Participa + Brasil” in 2022, containing information on ongoing social participation processes across the federal administration related to rule making. The growing availability of interactive websites and social media platforms also helps to make consultations easier to access by reaching people online.

As technology continues to advance, online tools are increasingly used to make consultations easy to access and navigate for the widest possible audience. Platforms can be developed to support dialogue and collaboration beyond the independent submission of a comment. For instance, Estonia is developing an online platform that allows experts and other stakeholders to co-work on the same legislative text directly with civil servants across ministries. These tools not only make it easier for the public to participate in the regulatory process, but also provide people an avenue for more in‑depth, substantive engagement.

Communication via digital channels is not the sole means to engage people. Policymakers should tailor the forms of consultation to, for instance, reflect widespread industry standards (e.g. online, paper or a variety of forms), cognisant that not all affected stakeholders universally use the same communication forms. Inappropriate or underutilised forms of communication run the risk of excluding stakeholders from having a say, thereby undermining a sense of shared ownership, and potentially adversely affecting compliance and trust in eventual regulations (Lind and Arndt, 2016[9]).

Governments can also consider using other representative deliberative processes, such as citizen panels, to bring people closer to policymaking (Box 2.2). Deliberative approaches typically refer to a randomly selected group of people broadly representative of a community spending significant time learning and collaborating through facilitated deliberation to form collective recommendations for policymakers (OECD, 2020[18]). The OECD’s understanding of such approaches is based on three criteria: deliberation, representativeness and impact – which is measured by a clear link between the process and decision making (OECD, 2020[18]). Carefully choosing the number and issues covered is important given the resources involved in undertaking such approaches (OECD, 2020[18]), coupled with the fact that they may delay decision making. In some countries, broader engagement still is possible via referenda. In Switzerland, for example, the electorate decides on political issues up to four times a year. Public votes are held on popular initiatives and on certain parliamentary decisions (e.g. referendum on legislative amendments if either 50 000 persons or 8 cantons request it).

Engagement inherently involves people – already busy in their day-to-day lives – lending their time and energy to help inform rule-making. As such, people should be able to simplify their involvement through clear and concise engagement strategies. Requiring people to navigate outdated or complex consultation systems potentially dissuades participation, particularly from time-poor stakeholders.

Individuals and small businesses lack the resources of organised interest groups. This lack of resources creates an imbalance between actors who can engage in consultations and those who are unable or unwilling to do so. As a result, individuals may utilise intermediaries as a proxy to have their voice heard.

The OECD Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying calls on Members to grant stakeholders equitable access to public policymaking. Lobbying (i.e. communication with a public official to influence policy or administrative decisions) is a democratic right and can be a positive force in ensuring that people’s voices are heard and important insights are shared with the government. However, lobbying groups with power and money can exert their influence at the expense of groups with fewer resources (OECD, 2021[19]) and abuse of lobbying practices can be a source of policy capture (OECD, 2017[20]).

Targeted consultation can facilitate meaningful engagement when carried out transparently and equitably. For instance, if a policy issue is highly technical or niche, there may only be a few stakeholders capable of providing informed input. Focusing resources on engaging these groups can help to ensure that the most relevant and impactful evidence is gathered. On the other hand, limited consultation may originate from a lack of political will to engage in public debate, coupled with apathy from policymakers. In these instances, because there is no commitment to genuine engagement, consultation is unlikely to have an impact. Currently, 25 OECD Members conduct formal and informal consultations with selected groups, for example relevant stakeholders, businesses, NGOs or citizen representatives. OECD Members tend to consult selectively more often once a regulatory draft has been prepared (where 15 do so systematically) than when policy problems first arise (13 do so systematically). In this context, in-depth discussion with select stakeholders may be a valuable tool at an early stage to help define a problem and options but should be followed by broad engagement to validate the input received.

Many countries are also taking steps to allow those traditionally excluded from decision-making processes to have a say. In Canada, people with disabilities stressed the importance of “nothing about us, without us” in the development of federal accessibility legislation. Accordingly, to ensure that people with a range of needs could participate, consultations took place in-person and online; with real-time captioning; sign language interpreters; intervenor services for participants with vision or hearing impairments; as well as information provision in plain language, Braille, large print, audio, sign language and e-text. Participants were also invited to share ideas by email, phone, teletypewriter, or by sending audio or video recordings (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2017[21]) (see Box 2.3 for more examples of how countries have undertaken targeted initiatives to reach traditionally under-represented groups in policymaking). These practices help to highlight the types of barriers to overcome to improve the participation of people with disabilities – and other traditionally excluded people – in consultations.

Engaging under-represented groups requires intentional efforts by policymakers: they must first identify which social group(s) are the most affected and how they are impacted, specifically on the nature, effects, magnitude and length of time. Such an approach not only helps to identify the various groups affected (e.g. young, elderly, socially disadvantaged, etc.), but also potential differences within the identified groups (OECD, 2023[15]). For instance, youth voices are key for policies with long-term environmental impacts, but indigenous youth may have unique perspectives that are especially important to consider. Inclusion of a wider group of stakeholders also contributes to enhanced transparency, and the buy-in for and trust of rules.

Even when all affected parties are identified, they may be disengaged or unable to participate. Beyond disabilities, challenges can also include cultural or language barriers, geographical distance, or socio-economic difficulties. Diversified consultation approaches can help to engage a broader group of people and reach under-represented groups (OECD, 2023[15]). They do, however, require additional resources and careful planning. It will require a degree of judgment about the potential value of the engagement – both the information received from participants and the opportunity to articulate the policy in more detail. Governments have begun to recognise the benefits of diversified consultation approaches to engage with disadvantaged stakeholders. For example, Health Canada conducted a successful targeted consultation with citizen groups. The consultation increased stakeholders’ trust by educating and explaining the rule‑making process to those involved. Finland’s experiences with separate consultations on integrating migrants and with prison inmates identified critical success factors to engage with under-represented groups. Elements such as providing interpretation services, addressing the issues in an accessible and understandable way, and designing workshops close to the relevant communities have been fundamental to build trust in the administration (OECD, 2023[15]).

People need time to organise themselves to meaningfully contribute to rule-making. Advance notice and visibility, as well as providing sufficient time for input, can assist stakeholders. Governments can also clearly denote the areas where input is requested. In the specific case of citizen engagement, the OECD has produced a ten-step path of planning and implementing citizen participation processes (OECD, 2022[22]). Providing people with feedback on their input helps to facilitate meaning in consultations, build acceptance of rules and foster trust in government action. Providing ongoing feedback channels can identify areas where rules are not working as intended and the possibility to suggest improvements.

On the contrary, governments can hinder people’s participation through rushed consultations or by providing insufficient time and direction to aid engagement. Consultations undertaken for the purposes of meeting internal obligations or as box-ticking exercises rather than to test ideas and elicit feedback create an adverse sentiment among stakeholders. In some instances, consultations are avoided altogether. The absence of consultation risks underinformed and ineffective policies. It also undermines transparent and open policy development and can erode trust in government action.

People’s input is essential to informing viable rules – but engagement can be a costly and time-consuming exercise for both people and policymakers. Asking the same people for input too frequently, asking for too much input, or asking for input and not showing meaningful results can all lead to consultation fatigue. Broad consultations can require resources that policymakers cannot afford to spare. Making consultations too long or too extensive can unnecessarily compromise the timely passing of measures.

To ensure that the public and the government use limited time and resources wisely, consultations should be proportionate to the significance and impact of the rules being discussed. Australia’s guidelines allow for targeted consultation through direct engagement or small-scale social media activities in cases where there is a small, well-defined group of affected stakeholders and where consultation efforts would be otherwise wasted involving unaffected parties. For more impactful regulatory changes, the default approach involves broader public consultations, including written submissions, public forums and workshops. In Canada, whole-of-government efforts to consolidate and co-ordinate consultations with indigenous communities aim to minimise risks of fatigue arising from repeated and extensive engagement (Government of Canada, 2024[23]).

Advanced notice is essential for both consultations on proposed rules and on reviewing existing ones. Stakeholders can sufficiently familiarise themselves with emerging issues and then contribute to shaping proposals once consultations commence. People are given the opportunity to collect data and provide information to support the development of new rules. At the same time, their experiences of existing rules, their successes or failures, can help policymakers determine appropriate courses of action. Advanced notice for the review of or modification to existing regulations enables stakeholders to offer their informed feedback. OECD Members have gradually improved standards on informing people of forthcoming consultations. The European Commission for example, outlines its consultation plans on specific initiatives. Depending on the initiative, the consultation plan may include a call for evidence, planned public consultation, targeted consultation, working groups and so on (OECD, forthcoming[24]). Governments tend to inform people less frequently for forthcoming review of rules, with only 42% of countries currently doing so.

Governments use different means to alert people to forthcoming consultations. Currently 44% of OECD Members inform people through announcements on websites and 32% inform people through a road map or similar type of early warning document. Estonia’s Information System for Legislative Drafts, for example, sends automatic alerts to notify registered people about upcoming consultations.

Governments typically launch consultations at two distinct moments. Early-stage consultation takes place when policymakers have identified a problem and are considering various ways to solve it. Late‑stage consultation occurs when a draft regulatory proposal exists (OECD, 2021[16]).

Early-stage consultation (when issues are first identified) is crucial. Input at this stage, before rules are drafted, informs how problems are defined and how solutions are designed. Early involvement fosters a sense of public ownership and commitment towards any solutions developed. When people feel their voices are heard and their concerns are taken into account from the outset, they are more likely to support and engage with the resulting policies (OECD, 2021[16]). Early engagement is fundamental in creating policies that are not only effective and targeted, but also enjoy a higher level of public acceptance and legitimacy. People bring first-hand experiences, often with unique insights, practical knowledge along with data and evidence, that can lead to a more accurate understanding of the problem (OECD, 2023[15]). Early engagement is, therefore, key to crafting viable policies, setting the foundation for discussions and decision making later in the policy cycle.

Once regulations are drafted, engaging people is key to gauge practicality, potential impact and areas for improvement. It allows those affected to critically assess draft rules. People can then highlight unforeseen consequences, suggest improvements and offer insights into how the regulation could be more effectively implemented. Governments have tended to consult more broadly on draft regulations in OECD Members in the past decade; that is, through late-stage consultations.

Participation in rule-making does not work when governments use consultations to inform stakeholders of decisions already taken. Consultations generally take place under this guise to meet requirements rather to provide people with genuine opportunities to help improve policies. Such “consultation for compliance” should be avoided, as it adds little value to rule-making and, moreover, can breed cynicism among both policymakers and the broader public (OECD, 2023[15]). Evidence suggests that people want to be involved in decisions that affect them. For example, more than 90% of people involved in a public consultation process in Finland reported that they would like to participate in future policy development (OECD, 2023[15]).

People lose the ability to meaningfully participate when consultations are rushed. While consultations during genuinely unforeseen emergencies may warrant very limited time frames, these should be the exception (OECD, 2020[25]). Governments have partially addressed this issue through the introduction of minimum periods during which consultations must be open to allow stakeholders sufficient time to provide their feedback, though the extent of this practice varies widely. In 47% of OECD Members, the minimum consultation period is at least 30 days or 4 weeks. Prescribed minimums still provide flexibility for governments to extend consultations beyond these time limits, which may be appropriate when regulatory impacts are expected to be significantly large and/or uncertain.

People’s ability to participate meaningfully can be hampered when government shares information that is too complex. Information needs to be understandable. Rules should be articulated clearly to the public, in plain language that avoids technical jargon so that people can understand what the rule means for them (OECD, 2012[14]). Many countries – including Denmark, Korea, New Zealand, Norway and the United States – have requirements, guidance or training initiatives for drafting rules using plain language (see Box 2.4 for examples from Norway). An effective mix of requirements and training can be especially important to help policymakers and drafters navigate concerns of plain language creating legal ambiguity, inconsistency or imprecision.

Despite the substantive benefits, consultations are sometimes avoided altogether. In times of unforeseen crises this may be initially justified, but it also justifies embedding review clauses to ensure that rules made under such circumstances are checked and people are given an opportunity to comment on their continued need (OECD, 2021[16]). Governments are also unlikely to report the reasons for avoiding consultations. Only 29% of OECD Members provide published reasons about avoided consultations. Bypassing consultation processes can erode trust in government (OECD, 2024[10]).

A lack of engagement on proposed rules risks their efficacy. Resultant policies may miss information that stakeholders could have provided to improve the quality of decision making. People have been shown to be less compliant with rules made without engagement, with concomitant increases in enforcement costs as more resources need to be devoted to ensure compliance (OECD, 2020[25]). Rules made under such circumstances support neither open nor responsive government.

For stakeholders to view resultant rules as fairer and more transparent, communication and information between citizens and the government should flow both ways (Lind and Arndt, 2016[9]). Stakeholders should not only be able to provide feedback, they should also be given feedback on how their input has, or has not, been considered in shaping rules. Giving stakeholders an opportunity to have their voice heard then showing that their input was taken into consideration signals to them that their voice is seen as having sufficient value as a member of the community and their views matter to the design and implementation of rules (Lind and Arndt, 2016[9]).

People are more likely to contribute to rule-making if they believe their input helps shape decisions (OECD, 2021[16]). Conversely, people who invest the effort to participate once may be dissuaded from future engagement if it is not clear whether or not their input was even used. To address this potential barrier, governments should create a feedback loop acknowledging and responding to comments, actively demonstrating the role and value of public input in policymaking.

For example, it is common among OECD Members that the views of participants expressed through a consultation process are made public, usually by making comments available on line. However, practices that demonstrate a high-level consideration of comments, like a summary or formal report, are slightly less common. Some countries like Australia include a section in their regulatory impact assessment template for describing feedback and explaining how it was used. New Zealand has previously published a “Summary of Submissions” document after consultations, outlining key points raised by stakeholders and how they informed the final proposed rule. Since 2021, marginally more countries have started responding more actively to people – whether by publishing a response to consultation comments on line or by responding in writing to the authors or comments. On Canada’s Let’s Talk Federal Regulations platform, for example, policymakers have responded directly to specific comments to seek clarification or encourage commenters to expand further on their thoughts, which ultimately helps enhance the quality of the input received. Though most countries have not yet adopted this practice, it can play an important role in helping to bolster peoples’ perception of government responsiveness and value of participation in government processes.

Enabling continual feedback on rules helps to maintain trust in them. During implementation and evaluation, continued public engagement ensures that policies remain relevant and effective, and facilitates necessary adjustments based on feedback and changing circumstances. Ongoing involvement of the public not only enhances the quality and efficacy of policies but also builds trust and accountability in rule-making (OECD, 2019[26]).

People and businesses have direct experience with the consequences of regulations. Their real‑world insights are particularly germane for existing regulations. Those affected by regulation can help establish whether rules are working as intended, the existence and extent of unintended consequences, and note regulatory gaps in response to changing circumstances or new information. Engaging with those directly affected ensures that these concerns are heard and place the onus on governments to continue to deliver for people (OECD, 2021[27]). Around 85% of OECD Members actively engage stakeholders in ex post evaluation of existing regulation, a number that has remained stable over the years.

Laws and regulations have a powerful impact on human welfare and can affect different groups in different ways, e.g. how we access or buy medicines, heat our homes, or access transportation services. Delivering rules for all people requires governments to take concrete steps to better understand their impacts on people’s lives and environment. This is especially important as governments respond to increasingly complex policy crises, including climate change and the cost-of-living. In addition to giving people a voice in the process, policymakers should evolve how they gather and analyse evidence to inform decisions. In particular, ex ante impact assessments need to go beyond assessing economic factors to anticipate broader social impacts, including their distributional impacts of regulations. Despite some progress across OECD Members, more remains to be done, as assessments of various social impacts and distributional analysis remain less developed and less widely implemented than those for economic impacts.

With inequality worsening in OECD Members (OECD, 2021[28]), social impacts are steadily growing. Policymakers need to understand how different groups (e.g. unemployed and impoverished citizens, SMEs, regional and local governments) bear the costs and share in the benefits of rules. For instance, low-income households and workers have been shown to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of regulatory interventions (Thomas, 2019[29]). Across age groups, policies with longer term impacts (for example, on competitiveness (Davidson, Kauffmann and de Liedekerke, 2021[30])) often have an inherent trade-off – particularly impacts associated with irreversible effects such as climate change (OECD, 2018[31]).

Governments are recognising the need to go beyond assessing economic factors and embrace a holistic approach to assessing impacts, in particular by integrating broader social impacts, e.g. on employment, poverty and health (OECD, 2020[32]). Currently, 35 OECD Members require an assessment on social goals and 33 require an assessment of the impacts on poverty, making these two of the most commonly assessed social impacts (OECD, 2020[32]; forthcoming[33]). However, social impacts can materialise in a variety of ways and analysing them remains both less developed and implemented than those for economic or budgetary impacts, across the OECD. Distributional impacts have even been shown to affect people’s attitudes towards policies, at least as far as climate change is concerned (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2022[34]).

Governments need to evolve and further complement traditional cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to better capture impacts on people and their environment. Distributional, environmental, social and economic impacts are often examined with separate tests (e.g. through environmental impact assessments, social impact assessments), often focusing only on macro groups (e.g. government, firms/business, citizens) in the majority of cases, with few addressing the effects on specific population subgroups (Deighton-Smith, Erbacci and Kauffmann, 2016[35]). Assessing the costs and benefits of a rule while accounting for the different realities of diverse people can be a technically demanding task, particularly when it comes to measuring intangible aspects. Thirty-three OECD Members explicitly and systematically require identifying and quantifying the costs of regulation. On the other hand, requirements to quantify benefits are less commonplace. One reason for this might be that intangible benefits tend to be harder to quantify or monetise than costs. However, while the full value of certain goods can be challenging to quantify, the European Commission’s Better Regulation Toolbox proposes different techniques to assign a market value and monetise these benefits. These include, for example, revealed or stated preference techniques to arrive at an estimate of the total economic value (European Commission, 2023[36]).

Accordingly, policymakers can use the distributional impacts assessed to ensure that the regulation does not adversely impact vulnerable groups or marginalised communities and so that they can enjoy the benefits. For instance, the European Commission’s Better Regulation Toolbox underscores the importance of considering how the regulatory option can affect people’s income or risk of poverty as well as the income distribution and wealth. In addition, OECD Members have widely acknowledged the importance of assessing distributional impacts, e.g. in Australia’s, Canada’s, the United Kingdom’s and the United States’ regulatory impact assessment (RIA) guidelines, for example (Box 2.5). However, the scope and quality of distributional analyses vary across countries and ministries and agencies (Zimmermann and Pye, 2018[37]; Robinson, Hammitt and Zeckhauser, 2014[38]; Revesz and Unel, 2023[39]).

Intersectionality can create an additional layer of complexity for policymakers. For instance, the impact of a regulation on women can be very different if they suffer additional discrimination based on race, identity, religion, etc. (La Barbera, Espinosa-Fajardo and Caravantes, 2023[42]). Paying attention to how different characteristics of a group or individuals interplay to shape their regulatory outcomes can help inform decision makers about who bears the costs and benefits of rules. For example, Canada has instituted the Gender-based Analysis Plus (GBA Plus) analytical tool to support the development of responsive and inclusive policies, programmes and other initiatives. GBA Plus is an intersectional analysis that goes beyond biological (sex) and socio-cultural (gender) differences to consider other factors, such as age, disability, education, ethnicity, economic status, geography (including rurality), language, race, religion and sexual orientation (Government of Canada, 2023[43]).

Addressing the impact of rule-making on human welfare is a complex task. It requires governments to possess and allocate adequate resources, time and data to inform decision making. Developing and disseminating appropriate methodologies to assess impacts on (different) people can support policymakers in this endeavour but comes with its own political challenges, e.g. when attempting to attach values to different costs and benefits for different groups. Additionally, policymakers face the challenge of analysing and appropriately presenting a myriad of potential impacts and (unintended) side effects for different policy options to objectively inform what are inherently political decisions on trade-offs.

Some critics have argued that traditional methodologies of the better regulation toolbox, such as CBA, are too focused on economic efficiency, and fail to take account of how impacts fall upon different societal groups (Goodwin, 2020[44]). For instance, traditional CBA methodologies to estimate potential losses from flooding of beachfront properties might lead to mitigation policies that are more favourable to wealthier households, whose losses involve more expensive houses. Yet damage to beachfront residences of wealthier households (which may be their secondary residence) might affect those households relatively less than damages to the primary (and likely only) residence of poorer households. Assessing losses purely on monetary terms might hence underplay social vulnerability (Kind, Botzen and Aerts, 2020[45]).

To prevent this, policymakers can use weighted analysis, where benefits for lower income households are given a higher social value than the equivalent benefits for higher income households. For example, the United Kingdom’s methodology for assessing costs and benefits of different regulatory options notes that it may be desirable to “weigh” costs and benefits, depending on their incidence across various groups (in addition to estimating the “unweighted” costs and benefits) (HM Treasury, 2022[41]). The recent update of Circular No. A-4 on Regulatory Analysis in the United States also suggests that regulatory agencies may apply weights to benefits and costs accruing to different groups, in particular to reflect differences in income, consumption or other measures of economic status, either as a primary or supplemental estimate (The White House, 2023[46]).

However, attempts to address these perceived deficiencies in CBA have proven contentious. Some academics contend that applying distributional weights reflects subjective values and may encourage factional fights for favourable treatment (Dudley, 2023[47]). The ranking of various aspects of inequalities when performing a distributional analysis can risk moving the rule-making process from the policy realm to the political one. Therefore, and to ensure transparency, weighted estimates should be presented alongside unweighted estimates to demonstrate the impact of the chosen methodology and the trade-offs of different alternatives should be clearly stated.

Another key challenge for policymakers is to anticipate how regulatory impacts unfold and impact people differently over time, potentially involving intergenerational trade-offs. For instance, tighter environmental regulation is likely to result in short-term costs but will yield a positive impact on climate change and the quality of life of future generations in the long run. To account for such issues before taking decisions, governments are employing the discounting method in their CBA. This allows them to ascertain how much the value of a cost or benefit declines when it is experienced in the future. Determining the exact discount rate is critical, as a higher rate will decrease the expected long-term future values of costs and benefits (and vice versa) and hence “move the dial”. OECD Members have adopted different approaches to determining discount rates. The European Union and the United Kingdom focus on normative welfare methodologies whereas in the Netherlands, Norway and the United States discount rates are linked to observable market rates of return, e.g. in the United States to the real (inflation-adjusted) return on long-term government debt (OECD, 2018[31]) (Box 2.6). The choice of discount rates should be clearly established, along with guidelines and manuals to conduct sensitivity analysis.

Integrating distributional analysis and being transparent about potential “winners and losers” from rule-making creates risks. Policymakers may worry that reporting expected distributional impacts will raise issues they lack the legal authority to address (e.g. the distributional analysis could cause new groups to coalesce in opposition to proposed rules); they may also lack needed data, technical guidance, time or resources to actually develop the analysis (Robinson, Hammitt and Zeckhauser, 2014[38]). A lack of political commitment has been advanced as the main reason for the limited assessment of distributional impacts (Nykvist and Nilsson, 2009[48]). Distributional analysis can be problematic under strict compensation principles where winners need to compensate losers. For instance, the government ended discussions to broaden and increase Australia’s value-added tax (Goods and Services Tax) in exchange for reducing personal and business taxes after it became apparent that the compensation costs for lower income households were significant, and thereby reduced much of the anticipated economic gains (Australian Treasury, 2016[49]; 2015[50]). As inequality continues to worsen in OECD Members (OECD, 2015[51]), proposals that offer economic gains can become politically difficult to adopt due to the substantial payments (potentially) required to offset adverse effects on lower income households.

The provision of guidelines, clear methodologies and data is critical to foster high‑quality distributional analysis. Recently updated guidance in the United States, for instance, provides that policymakers “should not assume that average incidence of a regulatory benefit or cost is equally applicable to particular groups, or that incidence for only one population group is equally applicable to other groups, without justification” (The White House, 2023[46]). OECD Members have adjusted rule-making processes to reflect the need for more robust and granular analyses. Data from OECD Members and the European Union show that 19 jurisdictions require assessing distributional impacts, with several outlining methodologies for doing so. Clear, accessible and robust materials can support ministries, agencies and departments in the development of distributional assessments by providing guidance on methodological issues and defining criteria for the scope of analysis.

While clear guidance and methodologies are essential, they can still be subject to an implementation gap. A way to bridge this gap is to create communities of practice, where policymakers can discuss and exchange experiences on the use of specific methodologies, lessons learnt and common challenges in the measurement of non-monetised impacts. In March 2023, the United States’ National Science and Technology Council established a new Subcommittee on Frontiers of Benefit-Cost Analysis as a technical community of practice where federal agencies can share knowledge and expertise on advancing CBA; aid each other in accessing new data, methods and expertise; and identify areas where additional research, including by non-governmental actors, could meaningfully advance agencies’ capacity to quantify or monetise costs and benefits (The White House, 2023[52]).

Interactions with government services often occur at busy or stressful times in peoples’ lives, such as when applying for healthcare, a driver’s license, registering a birth or death, and so on. People reasonably expect that these activities should require the minimum effort necessary. People should not have to wade through government information and advice that is unclear, incomprehensible and inconsistent. A starting point for governments is to abandon the philosophy of regulating people (i.e. treating them like subjects), and to instead regulate for people, adopting a human-centric approach.

The OECD Recommendation on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services defines a human-centred approach as one that focuses on the needs, experiences, expectations and perspectives of the people and communities that use public services. One of its pillars is the design, development and delivery services to ensure a seamless user journey from the initial need to access a service to achieving the desired outcome. This includes prioritising design and delivery of services on frequent interaction points, preventing unnecessary burdens and removing unjustified barriers for users, from tangible financial costs to intangible stresses and anxieties (OECD, 2024[53]).

Reducing unduly cumbersome administrative and compliance procedures in people’s lives is critical to driving equal opportunities for all and enabling them to develop to the best of their abilities in their private and professional lives. Making it easier for people to interact with governments reduces the time and effort required for all. Modernising and simplifying existing rules can result in reduced psychological impacts (OECD, 2024[54]) and frustrations with avoided delays, and increased certainty and transparency, improving trust in government. Removing unnecessary barriers empowers people and economic actors via increased regulatory certainty, potentially boosting investment, employment and production.

People’s interactions with government requirements can tangibly impact their quality of life. Unnecessarily complex rules and processes force people to invest significant time and energy (Herd and Monyihan, 2019[55]). People can feel angry and frustrated after experiencing the costs of collecting and deciphering complex information, as well as the psychological costs of stress and a perceived loss of power or autonomy from the state (Moynihan, Herd and Harvey, 2014[56]). Vulnerable populations, like people with a low income or with disabilities, can feel further stigmatised as they are more greatly impacted by the costs of these barriers (Sunstein, 2020[57]) and are likely to be further excluded. Behavioural science offers sludge audits, a method to assess equity and psychological costs as well as financial costs and time inefficiency to help advance government priorities and programmes aimed at making processes more accessible, easier to use and fairer (OECD, 2024[54]).

Some people are required to navigate regulatory frameworks and are confronted with barriers as part of their work. Across OECD Members, 99% of all firms are SMEs (OECD, 2023[58]). As more than one in eight people are self-employed with no employees, a lot of people stand to substantially benefit from administrative burden reforms (OECD, 2024[59]). In one‑person operations, working days dedicated to navigating regulatory processes mean time that they cannot spend managing their business or undertaking, for example, leisure activities. For these people, bureaucratic hurdles can challenge both the existence of their firm and their personal well-being. Whereas large companies may have dedicated departments to navigate regulatory compliance, the ease of compliance with regulations for smaller entities may be a question of survival.

The extent to which people are confident with administrative services is a significant driver of their trust in the civil service. According to the 2024 OECD Trust Survey, 66% of respondents are satisfied with administrative services and approximately half say they trust the civil service. Higher satisfaction with administrative services is associated with a 4.7 percentage point greater likelihood that a person will have high or moderately high trust in the civil service (OECD, 2024[10]). Conversely, if people feel treated unfairly by the administration, they emerge from those experiences less willing to comply with regulations and with less trust in government (Lind and Arndt, 2017[60]).

People increasingly expect accessible and user-friendly government interactions, leveraging opportunities created by digital transformation of the public sector. Recognising this, OECD Members are increasingly leveraging user-centric tools and approaches to prioritise their consideration of how people experience and navigate the rules around them when designing and delivering public services. The Netherlands, for example, has developed an “Ability to Act” test to assess and ensure that rules and processes are feasible to navigate and comply with (Box 2.7).

Journey mapping is a particular design tool that can be used to showcase the steps a person takes from end-to-end in navigating a regulatory process. Through mapping, governments can identify specific successes and challenges in the touchpoints between people and administrative services. Relatedly, life‑event approaches support organising public services around common interactions people have with governments – from childbirth, employment, marriage and old age to the death of a relative – rather than by the bureaucracy and mandates of different government entities (Box 2.8).

The establishment – and the associated sharing of responsibilities between governments and regulated entities such as citizens or business – of both administrative and compliance procedures have wide‑reaching impacts. Apart from the clear burdens imposed (in both monetary cost and time, along with associated opportunity costs), they can reduce certainty, with concomitant reductions to investment and employment. Administrative and compliance procedures place additional difficulties on business entry, expansion and even exit, which combined can have implications for competition and growth.

While people will always experience some level of burden in navigating administrative procedures, governments need to be able to identify when burdens are unavoidable and when they are unnecessary. For instance, it may be a necessary burden for people to renew their driver’s license every five years. However, there may be unnecessary burden within this process if a form must be submitted in-person or if the applicant must fill out excessive information that the government should already have on file. Box 2.9 illustrates how some countries have identified and addressed unnecessary administrative complexities.

Governments have recognised the existence of potential unnecessary barriers and have tried to improve their interactions with people. Primarily, this has been due to technological advancements through the establishment of one-stop shops, which bring together information requirements, approvals and payment in a single physical and/or virtual location, along with interoperability to meet the “once-only” principle of giving administrative details to government one time (Box 2.10). To some extent, these improvements are a consequence of moving beyond e-government towards a more holistic digital governance model (OECD, 2021[65]; 2022[66]). In the context of one-stop shops, this was the case for Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom, where people and businesses alike can access a wide range of digital government services. For people who require in-person support, whether as a preference or for accessibility needs, physical one-stop shops remain an important offering allowing people to access several public services under one roof (OECD, 2020[61]).

There are gains for governments too from streamlining administrative and compliance procedures. Submitted information is generally more accurate and complete, meaning fewer resources devoted to follow up actions or rejection of services. In turn, this reduces the intensity of people’s interactions with government service providers, meaning resources can be allocated elsewhere to further improve service delivery (OECD, 2020[61]). There is unrealised potential for interoperable data to help improve the estimation of impacts on users and to better identify specific groups that stand to be more acutely impacted by new regulatory proposals. Shared data governance frameworks are an important best practice in the context of regulatory impact assessment (OECD, 2020[32]).

People experience the effects of rules well after governments have finished making them and can identify when rules are no longer working as originally intended. People experience a real psychological cost of frustration associated with navigating convoluted rules (Sunstein, 2020[57]). Giving people access to highlight issues for further action is important for improving the regulatory environment for all.

The European Commission, for instance, has an online portal where people can submit suggestions to simplify existing rules and to reduce regulatory burdens. An additional 30 OECD Members have similar standing mechanisms by which people can provide feedback. Relatedly, 17 countries and the European Commission have used mechanisms like regular reviews of submitted complaints or internal reviews to help identify issues and irritants in the past five years.

Italy is one of 23 countries to take a more targeted approach by undertaking an administrative burden-based regulatory review in the last five years. Through a 2022 public consultation, people identified aspects of rules that were unnecessarily complex or burdensome, with many highlighting requirements associated with paper-based processes.

In 2023, Canada invited input from stakeholders to help identify rules seen as overly restrictive, unnecessary or as barriers to efficiency. This consultation was part of an ongoing initiative to simplify rules through a recurring omnibus legislative vehicle known as the Annual Regulatory Modernization Bill. The 2019 edition of this Bill, for example, included changes intended to clarify requirements for industry under the Food and Drugs Act and to remove a duplicative review requirement under the Pest Controls Act.2

Monitoring the impacts and efficacy of rules helps ensure that barriers and complexities can be identified as they emerge. Chapter 5 further discusses the use of post-implementation reviews or ex post evaluation as a mechanism to monitor and manage unnecessary barriers in existing rules.

The final building block of “regulating for people” is about ensuring good communication in rule‑making. Some of that could stem from, for example, ensuring that information on rule-making is available and accessible in a timely manner. Publishing information on participation and how rules were shaped helps communicate the impact of engagement. Publishing the reasons for decisions helps provide people with information on why certain decisions were taken. However, it also involves reaching the target audience with relevant information. For example, focusing on plain English drafting, making information available in relevant languages and formats for the affected population, and using formats that stakeholders are more familiar and comfortable with, even if those may not be the default or preferred communication methods of governments.

Governments also have a role to improve people’s awareness when deciding not to regulate. Although people may call for governments “to do something” about perceived policy problems, there may sometimes be reasons why introducing new rules would be disproportionate. For instance, after closer investigation, it may emerge that a problem is transitory, or not as large as first thought, which may, in turn, mean alternative policy actions lead to better community outcomes.

Around 40% of citizens from 30 OECD countries believe that their government clearly communicates how reforms would impact people. Clear communication is among the factors closely linked to trust in the national government (OECD, 2024[10]). Being transparent about the information used in rule-making and making information about rule-making easily accessible may help to improve perceptions of government trustworthiness (Argyrous, 2012[67]; OECD, 2024[10]). OECD data show that government transparency in rule‑making has, on average, increased by approximately 8 percentage points over the past decade (Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4). The levels of transparency are similar across stakeholder engagement and RIA. Meanwhile, scores have consistently been the weakest on ex post evaluation, although this indicator has seen the largest growth in the past decade. Transparency levels for primary laws are marginally greater than for subordinate regulations across the OECD overall. However, there are significant variations within countries as seven countries have transparency scores greater for subordinate regulations than for primary laws.

For many countries, embracing digitalisation to make information and engagement on rule-making more readily accessible has been central to improving transparency over the past decade. Specific areas of improvement vary across countries, but some general trends have been listing consultations on a central website, requiring RIAs to be released for consultation and establishing a standing electronic mailbox to receive feedback on existing rules. Key supporting initiatives include searchable databases of existing rules and more advanced reforms have included the development of interactive online consultation platforms. Reforms to the transparency of ex post evaluation systems have included establishing online regulatory appeal systems; publishing evaluations and in some instances, government responses; and informing stakeholders in advance of planned evaluations.

Legislative frameworks in 24 OECD Members require regulators to publish decisions, resolutions and agreements and conduct public consultations (OECD, 2019[68]). In the case of energy regulators, for example, regulators in the majority of OECD Members publish draft decisions and collect feedback from stakeholders (OECD, 2019[68]).

People better understand how decisions are ultimately taken when the underlying data, information and assumptions are published. OECD Members have increasingly consulted on and published impact assessments. Twenty-three OECD Members now consult on impact assessments, up from 18 a decade ago, with 36 now publishing impact assessments. Governments have also gradually broadened the types of impacts required to be assessed, although a stronger focus on economic and financial impacts remains over both social and environmental ones (for more information on impact assessments see Chapter 5).

While the breadth of information may be increasing, it is neither perfect nor complete. All decisions are taken under a degree of uncertainty. Some uncertainty is irreducible, so clearly communicating the information limitations and assumptions helps the community to understand that mistakes may be made. In part, this reinforces the need for regulatory policy to reduce the risks of policy failure. Regulatory policy presents an objective view about the likely impacts of policy decisions, based on the available data and information (see Chapter 5).

Publishing the following information can assist people in understanding who participated: statistics on the types of stakeholders included, their representativeness and their location to capture regional dynamics (OECD, 2023[15]). Participation information is rare across the OECD, with only nine Members currently collecting statistics and even less publishing them. The publication of not receiving comments still provides relevant information to people. Policymakers should aim to identify why they were unable to engage people in consultations (OECD, 2023[15]). Reasons could include, for instance, because the issue had previously been recently exhaustively discussed; because consultation was rushed, selectively undertaken and/or poorly advertised, be it geographically, the mediums used or in terms of timing (e.g. consultations were undertaken at an already busy time for the industry).

Publishing the information that formed the basis for decision making helps to improve government accountability. For example, the relative absence of assessments of potential social impacts may be due to a lack of general information available. However, coupled with published consultation information, people can ascertain whether the lack of assessment was due to a lack of consultation with those affected where estimates could have originated from.

Publishing information about instances when standard rule-making processes were not observed similarly assists in improving government accountability. For instance, publishing information about why consultations were abridged or avoided altogether assists in ensuring that such occurrences are rare and for genuinely unforeseen events. Eighteen OECD Members publish instances where consultations were avoided; 13 of them provide reasons. Currently, eight OECD Members publish information about instances where impact assessments were avoided.

Ensuring that participation is soundly undertaken by governments is a key aspect of its effectiveness. OECD Guidelines for Citizen Participation Processes highlight that ultimately governments should transition from ad hoc participation methods towards a more participatory culture (OECD, 2022[22]). Nevertheless, tracing participatory impact helps to identify the factors taken into account during rule‑making. Publishing information throughout the participatory cycle (see above) helps to illustrate how decisions were reached. The publication, in turn, helps to increase public awareness of both rule-making processes and how governments treat the input received. The publication can help to build support for rules, even if some people were not directly involved but are able to see that their views (or similar ones) were advanced by others in the community and were taken into account in reaching a final decision.

Today 36 OECD Members publish the views of consultation participants, compared with 29 a decade ago. Most countries either publish individual consultation comments online or in the form of a consultation summary. Currently 24 OECD Members publish formal reports on individual consultations conducted and 16 publish consultation comments alongside RIAs. Publishing consultation comments helps to transparently indicate those who were engaged in rule-making.

While governments have made improvements in their engagement strategies with people – using multi-channel approaches, adopting different consultation means on specific issues (e.g. using citizen panels, etc. (see above)), they can still appear odd to people. Simply explaining consultation processes to people to help them understand what they can contribute, when and how has helped to reduce stakeholder angst (OECD, 2023[15]). It can also help foster participation in future consultations. If people have a positive experience of engagement, they are likely to want to be involved again (OECD, 2023[15]). Public insights gathered from diverse communication channels have recently been found to improve policy design (OECD, 2023[17]).

People want to receive feedback. Feedback encompasses more than acknowledgement of input, although that is important to people (Lind and Arndt, 2016[9]). Feedback includes providing information to people about how their input helped shape policies. Decision makers in 14 countries are required to respond in writing to comments received, which is linked to government responsiveness, something that people believe could be improved. Less than 40% of respondents from the 2024 OECD Trust Survey considered that their government would improve a poorly performing service, implement an innovative idea to improve a public service or change a national policy in response to popular demands (OECD, 2024[10]).

Publishing participatory impacts improves accountability and trust in government action. It demonstrates the extent to which policies were changed, and shows which input was influential in instigating the change. However, without clear explanations, it also highlights instances where governments have either avoided or ignored evidence provided by people.

While not mapping the entire participatory cycle (and being only online), the use of interactive consultation websites has the potential to illustrate this tracing for consultations where people can directly comment on draft regulatory proposals and policymakers and other people can directly respond. Both feedback and impact are integrated in the one place. Currently, however, only 21 OECD Members utilise interactive consultation websites.

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