OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 2024

Antoine Goujard

Timo Leidecker

The Greek economy has weathered recent crises well. Greece’s GDP-per-capita growth has outpaced the euro area since early 2021 (Figure 1.1, Panel A). As headwinds are subsiding, the economy is emerging with significant gains in competitiveness, growing investment and more high-tech exports, and historically low levels of unemployment (Panel B). Temporary fiscal support helped cushion external shocks, while not standing in the way of substantial improvements in the fiscal balance. Helped by high inflation as well as fiscal consolidation, public debt levels dropped significantly, and Greece regained investment grade rating of its sovereign debt in 2023.

Beneath this strong performance lie significant challenges (Figure 1.2). Despite strong growth, labour productivity has stagnated at low levels over much of the past decade (Figure 1.1, Panel C), partly reflecting a collapse in investment during the economic crisis. Investment remains relatively low, particularly in intangibles and R&D intensity (Figure 1.2 and Chapter 2) (Greek National Productivity Board, 2023[1]; Hellenic Republic, 2022[2]). Competitiveness gains have been achieved largely on the back of declining real wages and may be lost if wages grow in excess of productivity. Moreover, at 163.9% of GDP in 2023, public debt remains among the highest in the OECD. This high debt level exposes Greece to vulnerabilities in the longer run and sustained primary surpluses remain essential to maintain debt on a prudent path.

Mobilising larger parts of the working-age population will be important to sustain strong and more inclusive growth. Labour shortages are growing amidst low employment rates, significant labour-market mismatches and unfavourable demographic trends (EC, 2024[3]). With some people still struggling to maintain a continuous attachment to the labour market, and elevated housing and heating costs, parts of the population are facing a heightened risk of poverty. Many firms are also facing challenges. While some firms manage to grow and innovate, many of Greece’s small firms – which employ about half of its workforce – still face large obstacles and fail to make full use of digital technologies and raise their performance.

Climate change poses a particular challenge for Greece (EC, 2023[4]). In recent years Greece has suffered unprecedented floods and forest fires, which endangered lives and damaged businesses and infrastructure. Fiscal space to protect against and rebuild after damages is limited. Contributing to global efforts to reach net zero requires large investments, adding to large pre-existing investment gaps and limited financial resources, while also offering opportunities for greater energy security and adopting new, cleaner and more productive business models.

Greece is approaching these challenges with an ambitious reform agenda (Box 1.1). The government reform programme and the revised National Recovery and Resilience Plan “Greece 2.0” (NRRP) – financed by Next Generation EU (NGEU) funds and totalling EUR 35.95 billion (16% of 2023 GDP), including EUR 18.22 billion of grants – will support private and public investment over the coming years (Hellenic Republic, 2023[5]) (Box 1.2). Measures contained in “Greece 2.0” focus on improving the business climate and advancing digitalisation and could substantially raise growth prospects (OECD, 2023[6]; Malliaropulos et al., 2021[7]). The most recent measures confirm Greece’s commitment to structural reforms to combat tax evasion, to speed up court procedures, to strengthen digital transitions, and to improve spatial planning (Hellenic Republic, 2023[8]). This comprehensive list of reforms holds the potential to transform Greece’s economy, including by increasing the effectiveness of the public administration.

Against this background, the key messages of this Survey are:

• Greece has made substantial progress in addressing long-standing imbalances but continuous policy action is needed to ensure strong growth and fiscal sustainability.

• Maintaining public debt on firmly declining path and increasing fiscal space for investment requires additional efforts to tackle tax evasion, combined with a gradual shift of spending towards infrastructure, education and health.

• Continuing the reform momentum and a swift implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Plan are essential to raise low productivity and employment.

• Further reforms to strengthen competition, reduce regulatory burdens, improve access to skills and financing would support firm growth and innovation.

• Achieving net zero emissions by 2050 and adapting to climate change requires further efforts, notably in the transport sector, through a mix of investment, regulations and emission pricing.

Greece’s economy held up well during recent crises and outpaced growth in the euro area and the OECD average in recent years (Figure 1.3, Panel A). Floods in September 2023 – temporarily disrupting transport links and affecting agricultural production – contributed to more moderate growth in 2023, but the economy recovered in early 2024, following a strong rebound since 2021.

The outlook remains positive. Business expectations are above their long-term average (Figure 1.3, Panel B). The manufacturing purchasing manager’s index eased but continues to point toward expansion. Growth is projected at 2.3% in 2024 before picking up to 2.5% in 2026 (Table 1.2). A recovery of external demand and continued growth in tourism will support exports. Ongoing employment gains and recovering real wages will raise consumption. The disbursement of Recovery and Resilience Funds and improving bank health will boost investment.

Since September 2023, four major rating agencies upgraded Greece’s sovereign debt to investment grade rating, which it had lost during the economic crisis in 2010 (ECB, 2024[9]). Besides improving fiscal outcomes, this upgrade reflects sustained structural reforms and enhanced banking-sector resilience (ESM, 2023[10]) (Box 1.1). Improvements in the business environment are supporting employment growth and a recovery of private investment, contributing to the positive outlook (Chapter 2). Accompanying these improvements, net inflows of foreign direct investment have risen in recent years, of which a growing share is directed towards manufacturing (Figure 1.4, Panel A). Regaining investment grade additionally broadens access to funding for the banking sector, supporting business lending and investment as monetary policy in the euro area remains tight.

The Recovery and Resilience Plan “Greece 2.0” (Box 1.2) is supporting investment growth, which is projected to pick up further to 9% in 2026. The growing disbursements of Recovery and Resilience Funds are expected to continue to outweigh the effects of tight monetary policy in the euro area, which has led to a doubling of interest rates for non-financial corporations since July 2022, but new business lending remains high (Figure 1.4, Panel B). Greece revised its Recovery and Resilience Plan in November 2023, raising additional funds of EUR 795 million (0.3% of 2023 GDP) for the energy transition and energy-improving renovations and expanding the loan component to businesses by EUR 5 billion, to a total of EUR 17.7 billion (7.9% of 2023 GDP) (Hellenic Republic, 2023[5]). Reflecting these revisions, the government projects grant disbursements to rise from 0.9% of GDP in 2023 to 1.5% of GDP in 2024 to 2.0% in 2025 and 2.7% in 2026. Additional impetus for private investment growth will be provided by the on-lending of funds, mostly through banks, with EUR 13.8 billion of loans (6.1% of 2023 GDP) having been contracted in early 2024.

The effective implementation and disbursement of Recovery and Resilience Funds will be crucial to realise the plan’s full potential to boost economic growth. Greece ranks first in the EU in absorbing Next Generation EU funds (IMF, 2024[11]). Meanwhile, disbursements to businesses were delayed in 2023 due to bottlenecks at local and regional administrations and Greece’s elections in May and June 2023 (Bank of Greece, 2023[12]). From 2027 onwards, after the plan ends, more of the increased public investment will need to be financed through the national budget.

Greece’s export performance has also improved, building on higher goods exports and a strong tourism sector. Goods exports grew faster than service exports over the past five years and accounted for more than half of Greece’s total exports over 2020-23. An increasing share of goods exports are high-tech, according to 2022 data (MoF, 2024[13]), though tourism and shipping services still account each for about one fifth of exports (Figure 1.5). Tourism remains on a strong upward trend: travel receipts over the first half of 2024 were 12% higher compared to the same period in 2023 (27% higher compared to the same period in 2019), mostly reflecting an increase in inbound travelers (Bank of Greece, 2024[14]).

Strong employment gains pushed the employment rate close to its pre-crisis peak (Figure 1.6, Panel A). The increased employment also reflects sizeable gains among women and the youth, narrowing gaps to the OECD average (Panel A). Employment gains are occurring against the backdrop of ongoing population ageing that subtracts from the labour force (Panel B). The unemployment rate fell to 9.3% in September 2024, the lowest level since the beginning of the economic crisis in 2009 – though remaining high compared to other OECD countries (Panel C). Labour shortages have been rising and are high especially in construction and tourism (Bank of Greece, 2023[12]). Greece experienced the sharpest drop in labour market slack among EU countries since the start of the pandemic in early 2020 (Panel D).

Real wages have seen several years of decline. From the onset of the pandemic until the year of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine real wages dropped as inflation outpaced nominal wage growth in the total economy, driven by public-sector wage restraint (Figure 1.7, Panel A). However, private sector wages have recorded modest real increases. Despite these developments in real wages, unit labour costs have been increasing – though less so than in other OECD countries – reflecting weak productivity growth (Figure 1.7, Panel B). Moderation in nominal wage growth therefore contributed to Greece’s competitiveness.

Since 2022, real wages picked up again. Nominal wages grew by 13.8% from the second quarter in 2022 to the second quarter in 2024, while prices rose by 6.6%. Minimum wage increases, the latest in April 2023 and April 2024, and a tightening labour market are supporting wage growth. The minimum wage has increased by 41.6% since late 2018 (Bank of Greece, 2024[18]). Greece also re-introduced a mandatory seniority allowance for minimum wages in April 2024, meaning that minimum wages are higher for those with more years of experience, which includes the bulk of Greece’s workforce. The statutory minimum wage now stands at EUR 830 per month or EUR 968 per month accounting for the Christmas, Easter, and holiday bonuses. Going forward, high and growing labour shortages and labour force upskilling and reskilling are projected to support stronger wage growth, which will improve households’ purchasing power.

Inflation is proving persistent. After a swift decline driven by the reversal of energy prices, inflation levelled off in the second half of 2023 and reached 3.1% in October (Figure 1.8, Panel A). Energy prices decreased by 1.6% in the year to October 2024, while food prices rose by 1.0%. Core inflation remains sticky at 4.3% in October 2024, mostly reflecting increases in prices for services, which rose by 5.6% the year into October 2024, and a tight labour market. Expectations for further price rises have eased across many sectors, including retail and manufacturing, while proving more persistent in services and construction (Figure 1.8, Panel B). Headline and core inflation are projected to decline slowly amidst modest wage pressures, returning close to target by end 2026 (Table 1.2).

Fiscal support in response to the inflation peak is gradually being reduced. The primary surplus reached 1.5% of GDP in 2023 and is estimated at 2.4% from 2024 to 2026. Emergency energy measures, which amounted to 1% of GDP in 2023, are set to be phased out in 2024. Government compensation for damages from forest fires and floods is estimated at 0.3% of GDP in 2023. A growing economy and further progress in combatting tax evasion (discussed below) will bolster revenues, which will create some fiscal space for priority measures, while increasing primary surpluses. Additional measures for 2024 amount to 0.4% of GDP and include a public sector wage reform, discounts for taxpayers with children, and increases in the guaranteed minimum income. A one-off tax on refineries (0.1% of GDP) will also finance pension top-ups. In 2025, a reduction in social security contributions (0.2% of GDP) and the indexation of pensions (0.2% of GDP) will support incomes. Public sector wages, previously frozen, will also be raised to align with minimum wage increases.

Significant uncertainty about economic prospects remains, with major risks being on the downside. Like in other OECD countries, businesses have been hit by two shocks in a row, as the pandemic was immediately followed by the war in Ukraine and imported price pressures. High input costs, including for energy, have stretched thin financial buffers and some firms will face liquidity and solvency challenges that could potentially lead them into bankruptcy. Households are facing higher debt-servicing costs that may become difficult to meet. Meanwhile, direct macroeconomic risks from Russia’s war against Ukraine are limited, as Greece’s goods trade with Russia and Ukraine is modest. The implementation of reforms and investments of Greece’s Recovery and Resilience Plan “Greece 2.0”, including the disbursement of loans funds to businesses, is currently on track, but potential delays could pose risks for investment and potential growth. New extreme weather events, such as last year’s floods in Thessaly, are becoming more likely with a warming climate and could disrupt production and reduce domestic demand. A possible need for the public sector to bear part of the private sector’s damages from climate change might entail additional fiscal costs (see below). Finally, major potential shocks could also alter the outlook (Table 1.3).

Several risks – including a flaring up of geopolitical tensions, slower growth among Greece’s main trading partners, or a deterioration of Greece’s competitiveness due to wage growth exceeding productivity gains – could weaken export growth and widen the large current account deficit (Figure 1.9). The current account deficit had first widened since 2019 amid a growing trade deficit – first due to a halt in tourism during the pandemic and the rising prices for energy imports after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Despite declining substantially in 2023, with the decrease in energy prices and further growth in tourism, the current account deficit remained at 6.5% of GDP in 2023.

The resilience of Greece’s financial system has improved significantly since 2007 (Figure 1.10). Financial soundness indicators show a recovery since the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 and the credit ratings of major Greek banks have improved over recent years (Figure 1.11) (HFSF, 2023[19]; Bank of Greece, 2024[20]). The securitisation of banks’ non-performing loan (NPL) portfolios under the Hellenic Asset Protection Scheme (“Hercules”) allowed the NPL ratio to decline to 6.9% by June 2024 – down from their peak at 49.1% in March 2017 (Bank of Greece, 2024[20]) (Figure 1.11, Panels A and B). Still, current NPL levels remain well above the OECD and euro area averages. The Hercules scheme has been renewed in 2024, but additional policy action could further improve loan restructuring and insolvency procedures, as well as the handling of NPLs that are now managed by credit servicing firms (CSFs) (see Chapter 2) (IMF, 2024[21]; EC, 2024[22]).

Banks’ profitability and capital ratios have also improved, although capital ratios remain below the OECD average (Figure 1.11, Panels C and D). Returns on assets and equity increased further in 2023, owing to the fast repricing of loans with adjustable interest rates and accompanied by widening net interest margins and rising deposits (IMF, 2024[21]; EC, 2024[22]). Despite the high interest rate environment, the return to investment grade in the second half of 2023 contributed to a further decline in sovereign and bank bond yields and facilitated the access of Greek banks to capital markets (Bank of Greece, 2024[20]).

However, long-term profitability and capital adequacy remain potential sources of concern. The quality of Greek banks’ prudential own capital remains low, weakening the loss absorption capacity of the banking system: in June 2024 deferred tax credits (DTCs), special deferred tax assets guaranteed by the state in case of reported losses, represented 41% of total prudential own funds (down from 52% in December 2022). DTCs result from the offsetting of past losses against tax liabilities, for losses resulting from the restructuration of the Greek sovereign bonds or past bad loans. However, in an adverse scenario where bank health were to deteriorate, DTCs could discourage banks from disposing of non-performing loans, as this would lead to additional net accounting losses, which could lead banks to issue equity in favour of the government and dilute existing private shareholders. Moreover, other deferred tax assets are included in Greek banking groups’ prudential own funds, accounting for around 9% of their total prudential own funds (Bank of Greece, 2024[20]).

The exposure of Greek banks to sovereign debt remains high. Greek sovereign debt securities accounted for 10% of the banking system’s assets in early 2024, higher than the 2.8% euro area average (ECB, 2024[23]). Prudence with respect to dividend distributions and the activation of a countercyclical capital buffer would help to further increase banks’ resilience (IMF, 2024[21]).

Developments in non-performing loans, including the unlikely-to-pay segment, should be closely monitored. Going forward, the positive effect of elevated interest rates on net interest margins and capital is likely to diminish in light of the recent gradual shift in monetary policy and the maturing of TLTRO III operations that allowed banks to benefit from low cost of funding and increased liquidity. The net inflow of new NPLs was slightly positive in 2023 and, for smaller banks (less significant institutions or LSIs), the NPL ratio, although declining, remained particularly high, standing at 36.4% in June 2024 (Bank of Greece, 2024[20]). The authorities should also continue to carefully monitor the performance of securitised NPLs. The recovery performance of distressed debt by credit servicers stands below expectations (IMF, 2024[21]), and pressures on borrowers are rising as financial conditions have tightened and the economy has slowed.

Risks associated with higher debt service costs for mortgage loans are mitigated by the improved financial situation of households over the past decade and the historically low unemployment rate (Figure 1.12 and Figure 1.6). Gross household debt as a share of gross disposable income has fallen to 76% in 2022, a decline of around 38 percentage points since 2012. Loan portfolios are mostly healthy, with loan-to-value (LTV) ratios at or below 80% for 88% of loans collateralised by residential real estate in the first half of 2024 (Bank of Greece, 2024[20]). Yet, banks should continue to identify and present solutions to prevent household credit default. This could include the renegotiation and restructuring of credit contracts to adapt loan conditions to borrowers’ ability to service their debt.

House prices have increased by 69% since the 2017 trough to the second quarter of 2024 and have reached high levels compared to incomes and rents, creating affordability issues (Figure 1.12). In 2022, 27% of the country's population shouldered housing costs that accounted for over 40% of their disposable income, compared with 9.4% of the euro area population (Bank of Greece, 2023[24]). The fast increase in housing prices is concentrated in the largest cities and is in part due to the increasing share of non-resident buyers in the Greek real estate market, notably in the Attica region that includes the Athens metropolitan region and in tourists areas (EC, 2024[22]). While in the short term, the risk of a sharp decline in house prices and the associated financial stability risks is limited (ESRB, 2024[25]), the housing market requires careful monitoring. The government tightened the eligibility conditions of its golden visa programme in April 2024, which may reduce demand for properties by foreign buyers, and launched the “Renovate-Rent” programme to increase housing supply through renovation subsidies of up to EUR 50 million. In a welcome move, the Bank of Greece introduced limits on loan-to-value and debt-service-to-income ratios effective from January 2025, with more lenient caps for first time buyers, which will reduce the risk profile of new borrowers (Bank of Greece, 2024[26]).

The financial situation of non-financial corporations, which account for around 57.4% of banks’ loan portfolio (Bank of Greece, 2024[27]), has improved over the past decade (IMF, 2021[28]). After a temporary increase in 2020, corporate debt declined to its pre-crisis level in early 2023 (Figure 1.13, Panel A). Though interest rates on new loans of non-financial corporations have increased sharply from 2.5% in September 2021 to 5.3% in September 2024, adding to the financial challenges resulting from the pandemic and the rise in energy and other input costs, insolvencies remained well below their 2019 level in 2022 (ELSTAT, 2023[29]). Firms’ profit margins have declined since 2021, but they remained above the level observed prior to the COVID-19 crisis (Figure 1.13, Panel B). However, profit margins could decline further, particularly for those firms most exposed to wage increases, or reflecting damages from the recent disasters caused by extreme weather. To better identify and monitor vulnerable firms, regular micro data-driven approaches of corporate balance sheets could be deployed, as in France and Portugal (Bank of Portugal, 2022[30]; Bénassy-Quéré, 2022[31]). Such approaches could also help improve the targeting of measures to support viable firms that face temporary liquidity problems (Chapter 2).

Like in all OECD countries, the COVID-19 crisis triggered a deterioration of public finances in Greece, widening the fiscal deficit to 9.6% of GDP in 2020. Since then, the deficit progressively declined to 2.5% of GDP 2022 and 1.3% in 2023, significantly exceeding the 2023 budget target of -2.1% of GDP (Figure 1.14, Panel A). Public debt declined to 163.9% of GDP in 2023 (Maastricht definition), the lowest ratio since 2010 (Figure 1.14, Panel B). The strength of the economy, inflation and the reduced budget deficit contributed to the decline in the debt ratio in 2023, together with a partial phasing-out of the significant support measures linked to surging inflation and the better-than-expected performance of tax revenues, in particular from value added tax and social security contributions (HFF, 2023[32]; Hellenic Republic, 2023[33]). After more than a decade, Greece’s credit rating returned to investment grade in late 2023, making Greek sovereign bonds eligible for the ECB’s monetary policy operations in the standard collateral framework. Markets have already priced down Greek sovereign bond risks significantly (Figure 1.14, Panels C and D).

Current fiscal plans are projected to result in a continuous improvement in headline and primary fiscal results, leading to a continuous decline of the debt-to-GDP ratio over 2024-25. Refinancing risks are limited in the medium term. Though public debt will remain at very high levels (Figure 1.14, Panel B), it is set to decline from 163.9% of GDP in 2023 to 148.1% in 2026, ensuring compliance with the recently adopted EU fiscal rules (Council of the EU, 2024[34]).

The structure of public debt is dominated by loans from official institutions. Its weighted average maturity is close to 19 years in 2024 (Hellenic Republic, 2023[33]). Nearly all these loans are at fixed interest rates and denominated in euros, limiting the exposure of Greece’s public debt to currency or interest rate risks. The government has repaid more expensive credits, including all of its borrowings from the IMF in April 2022. In December 2023 it held cash reserves of EUR 33.5 billion (15% of GDP) as protection against potential interest rate rises or market disruptions. Fiscal authorities intend to use some of these cash reserves to repay in advance nearly EUR 8 billion of debt to the Greek Loan Facility (GLF) in late 2024, which would help to accelerate debt reduction.

Off-balance-sheet liabilities could imply risks for fiscal accounts if executed. Government support, notably to the financial system (IMF, 2019[35]) and corporations (Chapter 2), has led to government guarantees amounting to 12.2% of GDP in 2022, and liabilities linked to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) reached to 144.1% of GDP in 2022, though on a declining trend since 2020, while liabilities from off-balance sheet Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are low, at 0.2% of GDP (Eurostat, 2024[36]). Climate change and the related extreme weather events could also have a significant negative fiscal impact, although mitigated by the ongoing build-up of fiscal buffers (see below).

The government plans to achieve primary budget surpluses of 2.4% of GDP in 2024, 2.5% in 2025, and 2.4% in 2026 and to lower the headline deficit further to 0.6% of GDP in 2025 and 0.8% in 2026. This is to be achieved on the back of robust economic growth and through the phase-out of emergency support measures and the containment of public spending, despite a planned increase in defence expenditures (Hellenic Republic, 2024[37]). At the same time, grants from the Recovery and Resilience Facility are set to provide yearly funding of 1.5% of GDP in 2024, 2.0% in 2025 and 2.7% in 2026, which will support the economy (Box 1.2). Reaching these targets would help Greece to maintain fiscal credibility and lower its funding costs. However, this strategy needs to contain escape clauses and allow the work of automatic stabilisers to avoid that maintaining targets despite slower growth leads to a pro-cyclical fiscal stance. This would be in line with the new EU fiscal rules which aim to provide more scope for countercyclical fiscal policy.

Both sustained strong growth and sustained primary surpluses are needed to continue to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio over the long term. From the late 2020s, an ageing workforce and the effects of the green transition will act as a drag on growth and on public finances (OECD, 2023[6]). However, ongoing policy efforts are set to limit the impact of demographic changes on public finances. Recent 2016 and 2020 reforms have raised the minimum and statutory retirement ages, reduced early retirement options, and established an automatic one-to-one link between them and life expectancy, as discussed in the 2023 Economic Survey of Greece (de Tavernier and Boulhol, 2021[38]; NAA, 2023[39]). The effective retirement age is set to increase by a full year over the coming decade and more than three years until 2060, while gross replacement rates would remain among the highest in the European Union (EC, 2024[3]). This is expected to lead to a large decrease in public pension expenditure by approximately 2.5% of GDP. Since 2022, new labour market entrants have also been enrolled in a new defined-contribution scheme, the Hellenic Auxiliary Pensions Defined Contributions Fund (TEKA), replacing the existing notional defined-contribution scheme for mandatory auxiliary pensions. This will reduce the impact of long-term demographic pressures, despite transitional costs.

According to the baseline scenario of the European Commission’s Ageing report, ageing-related expenditures are set to decline by 0.8% of GDP by 2030 in contrast to the European average country (Table 1.5) (EC, 2024[3]). This projected long-term decline of ageing-related costs is subject to significant risks and ageing costs may well turn out higher than expected (Table 1.5). The foreseen decrease in pension expenditures will need to be supported by improving employment opportunities for older workers so that workers can actually remain active for longer. Although rising and supported by improved tax incentives for pensioners who chose to continue to work in January 2024, the employment rate of the 55–64-year-olds remains 9 percentage points below the OECD average in early 2024, reducing contribution periods and pension rights.

Moreover, health spending could also increase faster than expected with population ageing, as Greece spends less than half the EU average on health. Unmet needs and out-of-pocket expenditures are high (OECD, 2023[40]). In addition, the EU Ageing report projections foresee a stable and very low level of public spending on long-term care at 0.1% of GDP, while the average public spending on long-term care reached close to 1.8% of GDP in OECD countries in 2021 (OECD, 2023[41]). The current publicly funded long-term care programmes are a good distance away from providing high-quality care to all those in need, and the main burden of care continues to fall on family carers, a disproportionate share of whom are women (OECD, 2024[42]; 2023[41]). Greece’s forthcoming Action Plan, supported by the OECD, will have to improve access to affordable and high-quality long-term care, which may lead to further spending needs.

Public debt is projected to decline further relative to GDP over the next decades, provided that none of these or other risks materialise and that current policies are pursued as planned, including the ongoing reform programme. In the baseline scenario, the debt-to-GDP ratio will fall below 90% by 2060 (Figure 1.15, Panel A, Scenario A). This baseline scenario assumes a primary surplus of 2.0% of GDP in 2027 and that the primary surplus then evolves in line with ageing-related spending in Table 1.5, as well as a continuation of the current low debt service costs linked to the high share of official lending and Greece’s recent rating upgrade to investment grade.

Stronger growth could support further declines in the public debt-to-GDP ratio, for example if the planned Greece 2.0 reforms are fully implemented (Figure 1.15, Panel A, Scenario B). In this case, debt would decline below 75% of GDP by 2060. If these reforms were combined with a full implementation of this Survey’s policy recommendations to boost investment and growth beyond the Greece 2.0 reforms (Box 1.3 and Table 1.10), debt could decline to as low as 57% of GDP by 2060 (Figure 1.15,Panel A, Scenario C).

The public debt trajectory could be subject to significant deviations from the baseline scenario in the case that some of the aforementioned fiscal risks materialise. If ageing-related spending on health and long-term care were to increase by more than currently projected (Table 1.5), public debt would fall more slowly and could start to increase again after 2040, exceeding 120% of GDP by 2060 (Figure 1.15, Panel B, Risk scenario D). If on top of that, spreads on Greek government debt were to increase again, the rebound in debt levels would be even stronger (Figure 1.15, Panel B, Risk scenario E).

Only strong structural reform momentum would be able to prevent a resurgence of public debt in the case of these fiscal risks. Implementing this Survey’s policy recommendations to boost investment and growth beyond the Greece 2.0 (Table 1.10), as depicted in Figure 1.15, Panel A, Scenario C, would keep public debt on a firmly declining path even in the case of higher ageing-related spending and higher spreads (Figure 1.15,Panel B, Scenario F). Although clouded by significant uncertainty, these debt simulations appear broadly in line with recent analyses by the European Commission and the IMF (EC, 2024[22]; IMF, 2024[11]).

Public spending as a share of GDP has declined in recent years, approaching the OECD average (Figure 1.16, Panel A). It remains elevated reflecting a comparatively high public sector wage bill, high spending on public pensions, and the still high debt burden (Panels B and C). Spending on pensions and debt is expected to diminish significantly over time (see above), which will create some fiscal space. However, high spending needs will persist in areas that support growth and well-being such as public investment, education, and health (Panel C).

Public investment as a share of GDP has been increasing since 2019, following a sharp decline with the onset of the Great Recession and now supported by projects funded by the Recovery and Resilience Plan (Figure 1.16, Panel B). As the Recovery and Resilience plan will end in 2026, more domestic resources will be needed to maintain high rates of public investment. Increasing spending on education towards the OECD average and ensuring an effective use of these resources can improve relatively weak educational outcomes (see below). Many health outcomes are solid, despite rapidly declining public spending on health during the crisis. Part of this decline in public healthcare spending rests on high out-of-pocket payments which restrict access to healthcare for lower-income households (OECD, 2023[43]; Pissarides et al., 2023[44]; OECD, 2023[6]). As the population ages in the longer term, there may be a need to raise public health expenditures.

Using public resources more effectively would help to raise public expenditures with a high-growth payoff. Potential to reallocate spending include phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies, which amounted to 0.8% of GDP in 2023, while expanding support for renovations and electric vehicles (Section 1.5). Family policies could be made more effective by reducing birth grants while improving access to early childcare (Section 1.4). Social policies could make more out of current resources by replacing blanket VAT exemptions with targeted support to vulnerable groups (see below). In addition, the 2023 Economic Survey discusses several avenues for improving spending quality, including through performance budgeting, green budgeting, and more coordinated public procurement. The 2023 Survey also recommends measures to enhance public sector capacity, including the timely disbursement and use of EU funds, for example by drawing on the experience of dedicated project delivery units for “Greece 2.0” to streamline project management and monitoring (Table 1.8 and Table 1.12). Further digitalisation and improved public sector human resource management (discussed below) would also raise public spending efficiency.

Greece has made the digitalisation of its public sector a priority. In 2019, it created the Ministry of Digital Governance (MDG) to lead Greece’s digital transformation, including for its public sector, and facilitate coordination across relevant actors. Greece’s ambitious plans for digitalising public services by 2025 are laid out in its Digital Transformation Book (Box 1.4).

The ongoing implementation of these plans, which go hand-in-hand with reviewing and simplifying processes, is supporting public-sector efficiency and reducing administrative and compliance costs for people and businesses. According to the European Commission’s Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI), Greece achieved the largest increase in digitalising public services from 2021 to 2023 among EU countries, and public services available online for citizens and businesses are now close to the EU average (Figure 1.17, Panel A and B) (EC, 2024[45]). Examples of digitalised and simplified public services include tax audits, online applications for licences for renewable energy projects, and the gov.gr wallet (Box 1.5). Additional efforts, such as improvements in the digital infrastructure among public bodies with the SYZEFXIS II project and more widespread use of e-filing in the judicial system are meant to render public services, including digitalised ones, more efficient.

These achievements notwithstanding, OECD analysis points to several challenges in achieving the digital transformation of the public sector (OECD, 2022[46]). In particular, there is room for better coordination among relevant stakeholders. This would entail clarifying responsibilities across all stages of project implementation within and outside the MDG, and harmonising data collection and defining data ownership to avoid duplicating efforts. Project planning is also challenged by the co-existence of parallel processes varying according to their funding source (OECD, 2022[46]). Establishing a project management office in charge of approving and monitoring digital projects and facilitating progress in case of delays, as done for example in New Zealand, could help improve coordination (OECD, 2022[46]; Artto, 2011[47]).

Several features of the procurement system contribute to lengthy processes and delays. These include legal challenges that increase the risk of lock-ins for digital and ICT projects (OECD, 2022[46]). Overly prescriptive technical specifications, a general tendency towards issuing a small number of large contracts, and a sometimes overly narrow focus on price criteria are making it more difficult for smaller, more agile and innovative suppliers to compete, while increasing incentives for litigation. The use of procurement procedures adapted to digital solutions – such as Dynamic Purchasing Systems and Public Procurement of Innovation remains limited, contrasting for example with positive experiences made in Denmark (SKI, 2024[48]).

Procurement processes are fragmented across different parts of the Ministry of Digital Governance, while procurement capacities vary. Consolidating responsibilities and advancing the use of procurement procedures adapted to the specificities of digital projects could accelerate project implementation. A lack of digital and ICT skills has been constraining project development and implementation. Limited managerial and technical capacities within line ministries are reported to have led to an overload in the Ministry of Digital Governance and user research processes to inform the planning of ICT and digital projects has been rare (OECD, 2022[46]). While ongoing digital training for the public sector, such as the Operational Programme «Digital Transformation 2021-2027» are welcome (see Table 1.8), further measures discussed below would help to bolster public sector capacities.

Greece’s public administration has undergone substantial changes over the previous decade. Reforms notably reduced the number of civil servants and the public-sector wage bill (Nikitas and Vasilopoulou, 2022[49]), which helped to better align the characteristics of Greece’s public-sector workforce with other OECD countries. Relative to the size of its economy, Greece now has fewer civil servants, and the related financial resources are comparable to those of other OECD countries (Figure 1.18). The latest available data also indicate that Greece has many highly educated civil servants, though their share of total public sector employment is somewhat lower compared to other OECD countries (World Bank, 2024[50]).

Attracting and motivating talented civil servants will be key to enhance public sector capacities. Reforms from 2011 until 2015 aimed at simplifying its structure and reducing fiscal costs while linking wages to performance, but also contributed to the compression of the civil service pay structure (Nikitas and Vasilopoulou, 2022[49]). This can make it difficult to offer competitive wages for workers with skills in high demand. Attracting and retaining specialised staff has in fact proven challenging in recent years, and a lack of technical and operational skills, including the capacity to analyse big data from administrative databases, has hampered progress in public sector digitalisation (Spinellis et al., 2022[51]; EC, 2023[52]). The latest reform of the civil service pay scale became effective in 2024 and one of its objectives has been to attract more highly qualified staff (Hellenic Republic, 2023[8]; Hellenic Republic, 2023[33]).

Continuous efforts aim at improving human resource management of Greece’s public workforce. For example, reforms have introduced performance assessments and mobility schemes (Nikitas and Vasilopoulou, 2022[49]; EC, 2023[52]). A bonus system has been introduced for civil servants involved in implementing ministries’ annual action plans, projects included in the Recovery and Resilience Plan “Greece 2.0”, or the achievement of fiscal goals, and this system is set to be expanded. The 2023 Economic Survey of Greece discusses recent reforms affecting the public-sector recruitment process.

Despite these reform efforts and the still sizeable resources devoted to Greece’s civil service, government effectiveness appears low, even when compared to countries with a similar public-sector workforce and wage bill – such as Spain, Slovenia, Austria or Portugal (Figure 1.18) (EC, 2023[52]; EC, 2023[53]; World Bank, 2022[54]). As discussed in several places in this survey, capacity shortages for effective public service delivery plague a number of key areas including the public employment service, energy regulators, or the National Transparency Authority. There may be a case for reallocating civil servants to these areas. At the same time, there may even be a case for reallocating staff resources within broad areas. For example, in healthcare Greece has comparatively many doctors but few nurses, while in the judicial system a comparatively high number of judges is supported by few judicial clerks (EC, 2023[55]; OECD, 2023[43]). Overall, the comparatively weak public sector performance and frequent capacity constraints despite similar overall resources as in other countries suggests potential to use public sector staff resources more effectively.

Ongoing reforms can improve the allocation of staff across the public sector. Greece’s comprehensive human resources management system (HRMS), whose development began during its adjustment programme, is expected to be finalised by 2024 (Nikitas and Vasilopoulou, 2022[49]). This will include completing information on civil servants and job descriptions to better identify staff shortages and improve matching. More experience with performance budgeting and improving data collection will put authorities in a better position to decide where staff is most effective. Greece has been including performance data for all central government bodies since its 2022 budget, while many OECD countries have found implementing full performance-based budgeting to be challenging (OECD, 2019[56]). Job matching within the public sector will also be advanced by the recently expanded Coordination Directorates. Previous assessments showcased grade inflation, with often all employees being rated as high. Greece is currently introducing objective setting which can help to make assessments more informative (EC, 2023[53]; Pissarides et al., 2023[44]).

Strengthening internal mobility would complement efforts to improve staff allocation within the public sector. While previous reforms removed obstacles to internal mobility, Greece is among many OECD countries where internal mobility of civil servants, including at the senior-level, is neither explicitly encouraged nor expected (OECD, 2023[57]). Rewarding mobility, by formally recognising experience at different public bodies as an advantage for applications or as part of performance assessments, could help to foster an internal job market that helps to channel staff to where they are most productive. Greece could also consider setting time-limits for senior-level civil servants in their current ministry, as done for example at the European Commission. This would further encourage mobility and motivate civil servants by enhancing career opportunities for capable candidates (Pissarides et al., 2023[44]) and could build on ongoing efforts to analyse staffing needs for the different public bodies and agencies.

The revenue side of government accounts also presents opportunities for improvements. Revising the tax composition can foster economic growth by reducing taxes that are more harmful to growth and inclusiveness (Johansson et al., 2008[58]; Brys et al., 2016[59]). Tax revenue has increased from 33.4% of GDP in 2000 to 41% in 2022, above the OECD average (OECD, 2023[60]) (Figure 1.19, Panel A). Some elements of Greece’s tax system are already well-aligned with growth and other objectives. For example, following recent reforms Greece generates a comparatively large share of its revenues from taxes on immovable property, which support equity and growth. However, despite reductions in recent years, the tax burden on labour remains high, notably social security contributions (Panel B). Further reducing the still relatively large labour income tax wedge could raise employment and career progression, while lowering incentives for self-employment (OECD, 2021[61]). At the same time, the need of meeting fiscal targets and bridging the investment gap will determine the pace at which such measures could be implemented. Broadening tax bases, by strengthening tax compliance and evaluating the numerous tax expenditures, is another key avenue to raise revenues and reduce high statutory tax rates.

Reducing further the tax burden on labour, especially at low incomes, would support investments in skills and improve equity. The combination of a still large tax wedge and high marginal tax rates weighs on labour participation, reduces incentives for workers to invest in human capital, e.g. through training, and makes it more expensive for firms to hire additional workers (Figure 1.20) (OECD, 2018[62]; OECD, 2021[61]). Since 2020, Greece has reduced the tax burden on labour by lowering social security contributions by three percentage points and abolishing the special contribution of 1% for all employees of the public sector, in addition to reducing the personal income tax for low-income earners. Reductions in social security contributions were entirely untargeted, while the experience of other OECD countries, such as France, suggests that such reductions are most effective when targeted towards low-income earners (L’Horty, Martin and Mayer, 2019[63]).

A more progressive taxation of labour income could also foster both the supply of and the demand for skills. One possible reform option could include reducing the high basic allowance in personal income taxes, which is the income threshold from which personal income taxes are due, while simultaneously reducing social security contributions on low incomes. The basic allowance of EUR 10 000 corresponded to 61% of average annual wage earnings in 2022, effectively exempting half of Greek households from personal income taxes (Hellenic Republic, 2023[64]). This narrow base is one of the reasons why Greece raises less personal income tax revenues than other countries, despite higher tax rates above the basic allowance (Figure 1.21). Moreover, in 2024 the government raised the basic allowance for taxpayers with children by another EUR 1000 (Hellenic Republic, 2023[33]).

Reducing the high tax burden on labour would also help to make the tax system more neutral with respect to different sources of income (Brys et al., 2016[65]; Pissarides et al., 2023[44]). Recent OECD analysis finds that for higher income levels Greece’s difference in effective tax rates between wage and capital income is the highest among OECD countries (Hourani et al., 2023[66]). Differences in tax rates by income source can make it beneficial for self-employed workers with higher incomes, notably liberal professionals, to incorporate their business. While incorporation can be advantageous for some, for example to protect personal assets when taking business risks, it incurs additional costs in terms of higher administrative burdens and for compliance. Treating income sources differently can thus encourage businesses to choose legal forms which would be considered too burdensome in the absence of tax advantages.

The medium-term fiscal strategy should also include a revision of special provisions in the tax system. Previous Economic Surveys pointed to the need to simplify the tax system by reducing the use of tax expenditures including tax allowances, credits, exemptions and reduced tax rates. These make the tax system complex and less transparent and some of them may undermine sustainability objectives (OECD, 2023[6]; 2020[67]). Tax expenditures appear relatively high in international comparison, accounting for 6.6% of GDP in 2021 (Redonda, von Haldenwang and Aliu, 2024[68]). This notably includes fossil fuel subsidies (see below), tax allowances for pensioners, personal and family allowances for the personal income tax which cover for example medical care and professional expenses, tax exemptions on capital income, as well as special value added tax provisions (Ministry of Finance, 2023[69]). Greece provides information on direct subsidies as well as tax expenditures in annual tax expenditures report as part of its budget plan. However, these measures are not subject to regular evaluations. Belgium and Portugal, for example, have had positive experiences with establishing dedicated units for monitoring tax benefits and assess their effects with public reports. Mimicking this could provide useful guidance for future tax reforms in Greece.

Significant scope exists to improve the design of the value added tax (VAT). Though the VAT compliance gap has narrowed, it remains among the highest in the EU (Figure 1.22, Panel A) (EC, 2023[70]). The improving but still low level of compliance continues to limit revenues despite high tax rates on consumption: In 2022, Greece imposed the 7^th highest standard VAT rate across OECD countries (Panel B), while the contribution of VAT to public revenues was on par with the OECD average (Chapter 2).

Continuing the government’s efforts to make tax compliance easier can boost collection and improve the business environment. The government has made combatting tax evasion a priority (Hellenic Republic, 2023[8]). Greece is implementing incentives for a wider use of electronic transactions, notably for VAT, and improving information flows to better track and monitor payments. The ongoing codification of tax laws and measures to simplify procedures and interactions with the tax authorities can improve compliance and ease burdens on businesses. Other recent measures include making electronic payments mandatory for real estate transactions; allowing deductions from taxable income for up to EUR 5000 per year for selected expenditures that are paid electronically; facilitating the issuance and monitoring of electronic consignment notes for moving goods within Greece; improving the interconnection of information systems among businesses and the revenue authority so that information from cash registers and electronic payments is transmitted to tax authorities in real time and digitalising tax audits. Building on these measures to further promote digital transactions, limit cash transactions, and rationalise tax expenditures wouldcomplement capacity improvements within the revenue authority.

The effectiveness of the value added tax (VAT) remains also hampered by a wide range of goods and services that are exempt or taxed at reduced rates. The actionable VAT policy gap – i.e. the difference between revenues from applying a uniform VAT rate on taxable goods and total VAT tax liabilities – was the highest among EU countries in 2021 (Figure 1.22, Panel C). Reduced rates cover basic food stuff, cultural goods like books and newspapers, medicine, tourist accommodation, electric heating and natural gas (Hellenic Republic, 2024[16]). At the beginning of the pandemic, Greece also introduced temporary reductions for taxi services, restaurants, gyms, swimming pools, and dance studios (EC, 2023[70]). To support the construction sector, VAT has been suspended on new buildings until the end of 2024 (Hellenic Republic, 2023[8]).

The objective of reduced rates, especially for essential goods, is to make the VAT more progressive and reduce income inequality by offering a larger benefit to low-income groups relative to their income. However, many goods and services that are taxed at a reduced rate do not appear to contribute much to this objective (Barrios et al., 2016[71]). Most of the foregone revenues accrue to wealthier households because of their higher level of consumption (OECD, 2022[72]). For example, reduced rates in tourism and hospitality have brought large benefits notably to wealthier households and business owners (OECD, 2022[72]; Benzarti and Carloni, 2019[73]).

Greece also has room to raise excise taxes on harmful goods. Excise taxes on tobacco could be raised (Figure 1.23), and – like many other EU countries – Greece has yet to introduce special taxes on food that is high in fat, sugar and salt (EC, 2023[74]). Costs from smoking and dietary risks in Greece are high (OECD, 2023[75]). Smoking contributed to 22% of deaths in 2019, compared to 17% in the EU on average. The smoking prevalence among 15-year-olds is now on par with the EU average, but smoking among adults remains high by international comparison. By contrast, dietary risks contribute less to deaths than in other EU countries, but obesity among young people has risen from 22% in 2018 to 28% in 2022 and become a particular health concern. Taxing tobacco and unhealthy food would steer people towards healthier behavior and raise revenues to address health costs. Taxation would complement other policy measures promoting healthier behaviour, such as regulations limiting marketing of unhealthy goods and labelling (UNICEF, 2020[76]). According to the WHO, higher taxes on harmful goods such as tobacco are the most effective way to dissuade consumption and have a progressive effect when accounting for medical expenditures and the impact on working time (WHO, 2021[77]). However, if these taxes are set at very high levels, this may give rise to leakage or strong incentives for illegal imports (EC, 2020[78]).

Looking ahead, a key imperative for Greece will be to achieve stronger economic growth. This will not only allow raising material living standards and accelerating income convergence, but also improve the sustainability of fiscal accounts. Stronger growth can be achieved by strengthening productivity and investment, but also through further increases in employment.

Despite the recent rebound, real GDP growth has been weak during the last two decades, with negative contributions from labour productivity and employment (Figure 1.24). The weakness in labour productivity growth has been explained by weak investment which has led to lower capital stocks per worker. In addition, multi-factor productivity, which measures the efficiency with which production factors are combined, has been stagnant for the past three decades (Chapter 2) (OECD, 2023[6]). In the coming years, the “Greece 2.0” investment push and reforms will strengthen both investment and multi-factor productivity, but in the longer run, an ageing workforce and the transition costs towards a greener economy will increasingly act as a drag on growth, while the benefits from the current reform agenda will fade (Guillemette and Château, 2023[79]). As a result, growth is likely to slow in the late 2020s, according to OECD simulations.

Main bottlenecks towards stronger growth include low skills, widespread labour market mismatches and labour shortages, and difficulties of small and young dynamic firms to grow (Chapter 2). Greece's low productivity growth is closely related to an inefficient allocation of resources, both with respect to labour and capital. This is reflected in a high dispersion of the marginal revenues from capital and labour, which suggest that reallocating resources from one sector or firm to another could lead to more output using the same resources. For the factor labour, the main challenge is that many jobs remain trapped in less productive businesses in both the manufacturing and services sectors (Gorodnichenko et al., 2018[80]; Pissarides et al., 2023[44]). The use of capital could become more productive by restructuring the still large amounts of non-performing private debt on the balance sheets of banks and credit servicing firms and putting these resources to more productive use in firms that require new financing to grow (Chapter 2). While Greece has made progress in removing these assets from bank balance sheets and reducing risks for the banking system, further efforts will be required to achieve a more definitive solution and allow these resources to move to other uses, including through restructuring or write-offs and improved restructuring procedures and judicial effectiveness.

Main bottlenecks towards stronger growth include low skills, widespread labour market mismatches and labour shortages, and difficulties of small and young dynamic firms to grow (Chapter 2). Greece's low productivity growth is closely related to an inefficient allocation of resources, both with respect to labour and capital. This is reflected in a high dispersion of the marginal revenues from capital and labour, which suggest that reallocating resources from one sector or firm to another could lead to more output using the same resources. For the factor labour, the main challenge is that many jobs remain trapped in less productive businesses in both the manufacturing and services sectors (Gorodnichenko et al., 2018[80]; Pissarides et al., 2023[44]). The use of capital could become more productive by restructuring the still large amounts of non-performing private debt on the balance sheets of banks and credit servicing firms and putting these resources to more productive use in firms that require new financing to grow (Chapter 2). While Greece has made progress in removing these assets from bank balance sheets and reducing risks for the banking system, further efforts will be required to achieve a more definitive solution and allow these resources to move to other uses, including through restructuring or write-offs and improved restructuring procedures and judicial effectiveness.

Reforms will be needed to address these challenges. The “Greece 2.0” programme, is a key element of these reforms to raise potential growth over the longer term and improve fiscal sustainability (Box 1.3). The effects of these reforms are quantified in an illustrative manner in Table 1.10, labelled as scenario B. According to these simulations, per capita incomes could be up to 3.5% higher by 2060 if these reforms were fully implemented, or 2% higher by 2040.

At the same time, more could be done to lift growth and incomes in the longer terms. In particular, per capita incomes could be raised by another 5.3% by 2060, or 3% by 2040, with the implementation of a combination of policy measures recommended in this Survey (Scenario C in Table 1.10). These include, for one, improvements in the institutional environment, such as leaner administrative processes, more judicial responsiveness and stronger efforts to fight corruption, as described in Section 1.4.3. Another essential element of these additional reforms would be further reductions in regulatory barriers that stand in the way of stronger competition and add unnecessary administrative burdens. Further raising investment in research and development and improvements in the quality of education would also be part of this reform package, in addition to further reductions in labour tax wedges for low-income earners and measures to address labour shortages.

But stronger growth is not the only policy objective for the longer term. Growth will also need to become more inclusive, notably for women, older workers and the long-term unemployed. Further measures to raise labour force participation and employment rates can help in this regard, while at the same time offsetting much of the downward pressures on growth from population ageing (Table 1.10). This requires reforms to raise the labour force participation of women, notably by creating additional childcare places and improving access to childcare (Section 1.4.2). In addition, income opportunities for workers can be boosted through high-quality training programmes, which are particularly effective when targeted to those who need them most (Chapter 2). These should be accompanied by measures to increase the quality of education more widely, notably to reduce the high level of skill mismatches in the Greek labour market (Section 1.4).

Achieving greener and more sustainable growth in line with Greece’s ambitious climate targets will also require further policy action, some of which will need additional financial resources. Greece has substantially increased its capacity to generate energy from renewable resources, but progress needs to step up to meet the needs stemming from the phase out of fossil fuels. Additional efforts should focus cutting the still high levels of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions from transport and buildings and on achieving emission reductions in a cost-effective way through improved price signals and regulations (Section 1.5).

Several of the reforms recommended in this Survey and quantified in Table 1.10 aim at making the Greek labour market more efficient and more inclusive, as both labour shortages and wide-spread skills mismatches have been holding back economic performance. Access to workers and skills is becoming a constraining factor for the expansion of many firms. Employers report growing difficulties in recruiting employees, for example in the construction and ICT sectors. Paradoxically, this coincides with an unemployment rate – including for long-term unemployment – that remains among the highest in the OECD (Figure 1.25, Panel A and B) (OECD, 2024[81]). Even prior to the COVID recovery, Greece had one of the highest degrees of mismatches between workers’ skills and employers’ needs, as discussed in previous OECD Economic Surveys (OECD, 2020[67]; 2023[6]). The recent growth in employment is likely to have amplified skills shortages.

The potential to mobilise more workers and skills remains large, despite improvement from the 2022 “Jobs again” reform and significant EU funding for Active Labour Market Policies (Table 1.11) (OECD, 2024[81]). Overall employment rates remain low across various population groups. Recent employment growth has been concentrated among more highly skilled workers and has lagged for low-skilled workers, especially younger ones (Figure 1.25, Panel C). The high share of long-term unemployed also points to the need to better activate jobseekers and strengthen Active Labour Market Policies (Chapter 2). Moreover, Greece’s large pool of self-employed workers still accounts for more than 30% of employment and comprises many people working at the subsistence level, although many of them likely underreport their incomes (Panel D) (OECD, 2024[81]; IMF, 2024[11]). Raising Greece’s low employment rates among these latter groups and improving the structure of employment will be important to help offset the declining working-age population (Table 1.5).

Strengthening general skills and professional competencies is essential for improving employability, incomes and well-being in Greece. At the level of higher education, Greece performs remarkably well. University enrolment rates are high and rising, and over half of children complete higher levels of education than their parents (Danchev et al., 2023[82]). Participation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education exceeds the OECD average, notably for women, and has been rising.

Secondary, post-secondary and vocational training curriculums could be better aligned with labour market and business needs would improve the labour market outcomes of young graduates (Figure 1.26). Despite an 18% increase in vocational education enrolment over 2019-23, the share of 25–34-year-olds graduating from vocational education still stood at 23%, below the OECD average (OECD, 2023[83]). Greece tends to spend a lower, albeit increasing, share of its educational resources and of GDP on vocational education and training (VET). A number of RRF projects focus on upgrading VET institutions, such as the renovation of all 376 VET laboratory centres (over EUR 110 million). However, some vocational routes are unattractive because they provide poor labour market opportunities for graduates (OECD, 2023[83]; EC, 2023[84]). Reputational issues can also matter as vocational training as at times perceived as a failure to progress to higher education (IOBE, 2021[85]), though Law 4763/2020 increased access to Higher Education for VET graduates. The current design of VET programmes also fails to ensure the development of relevant skills from the employers’ perspective. This is related to the weak engagement of social partners in the design of vocational programmes (IOBE, 2021[85]). Moreover, Vocational High Schools (EPAL), which concentrated 90% of VET students in secondary education in 2018, have a low share of time spent in the workplace (OECD, 2020[86]). However, the roll out of compulsory traineeships in all EPAL schools in 2024, the direct involvement of social partners in the development of 130 new vocational training guides, and the foreseen transfer of the management of the training levy (LAEK) to social partners are steps in the right direction, as well as the planned VET tracking system aiming at measuring the impact of the training on labour market participation.

Greece should build on recent progress with its reform of the national VET system to roll out work-study programmes more broadly. This would make VET more attractive, help students’ transition into working life, and provide more valuable skills to workers and businesses. The 2020 VET reform focused on improving the attractiveness of VET studies and mandated the direct participation of employers and trade unions in the governance Councils, the development of the National VET Strategy, as well as the upgrading of curricula and training guides. In 2021, the Public Employment Service (DYPA) established seven new experimental apprenticeship vocational schools (PEPAS), on top of the 50 apprenticeship vocational schools (EPAS), which combine classroom instruction with apprenticeships. In 2022-23, new vocational training schools (VTS), which also include apprenticeship periods, started operating. Future improvements in VET should focus on strengthening the role of workplace training and close cooperation with employers, including in Vocational High School (EPAL). For example, in Germany, 89% of vocational upper secondary students are enrolled in combined school and work-based programmes (OECD, 2023[87]), with relatively long apprenticeship contracts that facilitate school-to-work transitions (OECD, 2020[86]). Similarly, vocational programmes also attract a large share of upper-secondary students in Switzerland, mostly with combined school-programmes and long work-based experience (OECD, 2020[86]; OECD, 2023[88]).

Better career guidance in secondary education, underpinned by accurate labour market information, will help learners make education choices that match their interests, aptitudes and abilities, and lead to more rewarding employment. Despite widespread evidence of mismatches between the fields of study chosen by students and labour market needs, the Greek guidance system has long been lacking adequate information about employment outcomes, coordination among stakeholders, and a national strategy for school guidance (Cedefop, 2020[89]; Katsikatis, 2021[90]). A mechanism for the identification of labour market needs was established in 2016 and has progressively delivered new data on skill supply and demand, which could feed into the official web portal of educational opportunities meant to guide student choices, which contains information on programmes, labour market outcomes and typical career pathways (eoppep.gr/teens). In addition, two school life counsellors have been required in each secondary education school since 2020, to be designated among teachers and Interdisciplinary Assessment, Counselling and Support Centres (KEDASY) have been created in 2021, and the VET campuses (KEEK) launched in 2024 will have to include a Professional Development and Career Office (GEAS).

Some of the current labour market challenges may even have their roots earlier in the education system. Both education spending and outcomes, as measured by the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), are low compared to most other OECD countries (Figure 1.27). In 2021, Greece invested only 3.7% of its GDP in education, while the OECD average was 5.1% (OECD, 2023[83]). Despite relatively low spending and low PISA scores, Greece’s education system performs reasonably well in some dimensions. Fewer high school students drop out from education than in the OECD average, and the performance gaps of those from disadvantaged backgrounds are less pronounced than in the OECD average (OECD, 2023[91]). Greece has been engaging in several reforms to its education system (OECD, 2018[92]), including the 2021 law on “Schools’ upgrade and teachers’ empowerment” which created incentives to improve teacher career prospects and aimed at rolling out teacher evaluations. The implementation of a revised school curricula in 2024, the decentralisation of textbook selection to teachers, a stronger reliance on permanent teacher positions as opposed to temporary contracts (EC, 2023[93]), as well as the planned OECD policy review of Greece’s educational system to analyse the causes of persistent gaps in educational outcomes, are further steps in the right direction.

Wage developments matter for both growth and inclusiveness. On one hand, wage developments affect the competitiveness and viability of firms, including the large number of SMEs that employed around 83% of the labour force in 2022 in Greece, and typically have low profit margins (Chapter 2). On the other hand, better wages raise material living standards and domestic demand.

Wages have started to rise among workers with skills that are in high demand, such as ICT or construction, after falling or stagnating for over a decade (Bank of Greece, 2024[18]). Recent policy measures have focused on increases in the minimum wage, which began to rise rapidly in 2019, following several years without improvements (Figure 1.28, Panel A). As a result, wages also increased at the lower end of the wage distribution, amid a significant wage compression across low- and high-pay industries (OECD, 2024[94]).

Current government policy objectives include raising the minimum wage towards 950 Euros by 2027, which would imply and increase of 14.5% compared to April 2024. This could raise aggregate wages and productivity, notably by accelerating the shift of labour resources to larger and more efficient companies, as found in Germany (Dustmann et al., 2021[95]). At the same time, such large increases also bear risks for the employment of numerous low-skilled workers and the survival of small firms, especially in light of the weak productivity growth of recent years and of a declining but still large informal sector, estimated at 16% of GDP in 2021 after peaking at 30% in 2013 (IMF, 2024[11]).

Minimum wages can be an important tool to protect the standard of living of low-paid workers, but they also risk disincentivising the hiring of low-skill workers, some of which may effectively be priced out of the labour market. At the level set in most OECD countries, minimum wage increases, even large ones, have had positive effects on low incomes and either no or limited negative effects on employment (Dube, 2019[96]), though the employment effect can be significant for low-wage workers (Neumark and Shirley, 2022[97]). However, the available evidence for Greece is more mixed. Some empirical investigations suggest that minimum wage changes over 2014-17 and 2004-19 were not associated with significant changes in employment and unemployment (Georgiadis, Kaplanis and Monastiriotis, 2018[98]; Andriopoulou and Karakitsios, 2022[99]). Other empirical work, however, suggests that 2004-2013 minimum-wage increases have gone along with employment losses (Kanellopoulos, 2015[100]).

Rising labour costs could hold back future employment increases, which are needed to sustain strong growth. Current labour costs at the minimum wage are already high in international comparison and the planned increases will exacerbate this (Figure 1.28, Panel B). Given the high employment share of SMEs with often low profit margins, attention should be paid to ensuring that increases in labour costs do not deter employers from hiring low-wage workers (Neumark, 2018[101]). High labour costs could also encourage employers to use more precarious forms of employment, such as falsely declaring dependent work as self-employment. Regular evaluations of minimum wage policies are key to minimise these risks (OECD, 2018[102]). One way to counterbalance any potential negative employment effects from a rising minimum wage would be to reduce employer social security contributions for low-wage workers. By contrast, further untargeted reductions of social contributions are less effective and have high fiscal costs.

The process of setting the level of the minimum wage could also be strengthened further. The process involves an independent committee of experts that reports and publishes its opinion on the appropriate wage adjustment to the government, in light of its assessment of the state and prospects of the economy and after consulting with social partners. However, the government is not bound to follow the committee’s advice (OECD, 2020[67]; Eurofound, 2023[103]). Strengthening the role and independence of the minimum wage experts committee, by requiring the government to explain differences between its decisions and the committee’s recommendations, would strengthen the role of the committee and with that the minimum wage setting process (OECD, 2023[6]).

The need to maintain strong employment also has implications for protecting the unemployed. Incentives for a jobless person to take up employment currently appear low (Figure 1.29, Panel A) (OECD, forthcoming[104]) and the tax wedge is relatively high (Chapter 2). In particular, in-kind support targeted via the unemployment register, including travel subsidies and financial support for paying utility bills, further undermines incentives to accept a job offer, especially at a low wage. This support should be shifted towards means-tested income support, so that unemployment is not a necessary condition for accessing these benefits (OECD, 2020[67]).

Additional reform options to strengthen work incentives could include in-work or into-work benefits, such as those recently introduced for unemployed workers. For example, in France, low-wage workers receive a generous in-work benefit on top of their wage. This benefit increases the difference between the net income while in employment and out of employment (OECD, 2023[105]; Carcillo et al., 2019[106]).

A broader reform of the unemployment insurance system also holds potential to strengthen employment incentives and better protect workers from poverty (OECD, forthcoming[104]; 2022[107]) (Figure 1.29Panel A and B). Unemployment benefits are paid at a flat rate, independent of previous earnings and their level is low for a worker who previously earned an average wage, but it is considerably higher for low-income earners (OECD, 2023[105]). Together with the short contribution period required to become eligible for unemployment benefits (5 months), their short duration (12 months) and the loosely defined job-search requirements, the current unemployment benefit system tends to favour rotation on short-term contracts which are detrimental to career progression and productivity growth.

Besides undermining work incentives for those with low prior wages, unemployment benefits fail to provide satisfactory coverage and protection. Only around 50% of workers in standard jobs received any income support following a dismissal (OECD, 2020[108]). This is partly explained by the large share of self-employed and seasonal workers. However, coverage is also particularly low for the long-term unemployed. The maximum duration of the standard unemployment benefits is short, and eligibility to long-term unemployment insurance is limited: it is only available for those who built up – and exhausted – the maximum standard unemployment allowance and it is means-tested based on the previous fiscal year. Benefit levels are not sufficient to protect out-of-work families from poverty (OECD, forthcoming[104]; 2022[107]). A comprehensive reform of unemployment insurance should reinforce the link between previous earnings and benefits and extend benefit durations to prevent jobseekers from sliding too quickly into much less generous minimum-income benefits, while encouraging permanent employment.

Measures to strengthen employment and wages should be well coordinated with measures to reduce poverty and inequalities. The impact of social transfers (excluding pensions) on reducing relative poverty decreased from 24.7% in 2020 to 20.6% in 2021 (vs 37.1% in the EU). The adequacy of the minimum income scheme is below the EU average.

Despite recent progress, the administration of benefits remains fragmented with benefits operating under many different payment platforms, which are planned to be merged into a single payment platform in 2024. To the extent that this reduces benefit duplication and makes social benefit delivery more efficient, it could lead to much-needed improvements in public spending efficiency (Section 1.3), while at the same time rendering support more accessible for the most vulnerable. At the same time, the take up of the minimum income (GMI) is low (World Bank, 2019[109]). A first step to reduce complexity would be to align equivalence scales across social transfer programmes (OECD, 2020[67]). Further could include establishing a one-stop shop application within the public employment system as done in Austria, simplifying the eligibility criteria, and using data-linking to identify eligible non-applicants (OECD, 2020[110]).

Greece significantly reduced employment gaps to OECD countries across the wider population in recent years. Employment gains were particularly strong for women, amounting to a 7.7 percentage points increase in the employment rate of women aged 25 to 54 years from January 2019 to 2024 (Figure 1.6). The incorporation of more women into the labour market helped assuage large and growing labour shortages (Chapter 2) and contributed to higher and more widely shared growth.

Despite this progress, there is significant scope to further improve opportunities for women. The gap in employment rates between men and women remains large and the female labour force participation rate is among the lowest in the OECD (Figure 1.30, Panel B). Women also tend to work fewer hours than men (Figure 1.30, Panel C), and continue to earn lower wages (Figure 1.30, Panel A), though when compared to the OECD average these latter differences are less pronounced. Overall, OECD simulations suggest that Greece could achieve large gains from further closing gender gaps in the labour market, amounting to around a quarter of a percentage point in additional GDP growth every year until 2060 (Figure 1.30, Panel D). Activating women could bring additional gains for management quality (Chapter 2), both by drawing on a larger pool of managerial talent, and by raising gender diversity among firm management, which has been associated with better firm performance across OECD countries (Criscuolo et al., 2021[111]).

More is needed to make quality childcare available to more women. Per capita public spending on daycare and other in-kind benefits, though increasing, remained among the lowest in the EU in 2021 (Figure 1.31, Panel C). By contrast, per capita spending on birth grants was among the highest (Figure 1.31, Panel B). Evidence from OECD countries suggests such grants have only a limited impact on raising births, while policies improving the work-family balance – including childcare – have been found to be effective (Thevenon and Gauthier, 2011[112]). Shifting public spending to more daycare and in-kind benefits would help to address difficulties in finding qualified staff, notably by improving working conditions, including training for teachers and caretakers (EC, 2023[53]; EC, 2023[113]).

Reducing the gender gap in parental leave would help to further address constraints on women entering the workforce and gaining experience. Greece introduced measures to make it easier for men to take parental leave, for example with an electronic platform to complete administrative arrangements. It could additionally strengthen incentives, for example by providing bonuses if fathers take their leave, following the examples of Finland, Germany and Italy. Going further, it may join other countries such as Spain in aligning both parents’ leave entitlements. Strengthening awareness campaigns such as Greece’s “Share” project and its establishment of equality labels for companies adopting corporate gender equality policies would also help to counter stereotypes and increase the uptake of childcare services (Carcillo and Valfort, 2020[114]).

Strong institutions are key to foster long-term economic growth. Continuing the efforts to control corruption is important to improve the business environment. Corruption distorts competition, damages investor confidence and diverts the use of public resources from the public interest, besides fostering a sense of mistrust towards public institutions (Gruendler and Potrafke, 2019[115]). While corruption perceptions have improved markedly over the last decade, they remain higher than in most OECD countries (Figure 1.32). Greece ranked 59^th in the Corruption Perception index in 2023, indicating an improvement by 35 places since 2012, ranking 6th lowest among OECD countries. However, according to the EU’s Special Eurobarometer, 97% of respondents in 2023 considered corruption to be widespread in Greece, the highest share among EU countries. Personal experience of citizens with corruption is also relatively high, with 13% reporting to have witnessed corruption in the past 12 months, the third highest share among EU countries (EC, 2023[116]).

Greece has taken several steps to strengthen its capacities to tackle corruption in recent years (Table 1.13). The framework appears now better than the OECD average in several areas, including for managing integrity risks and conflicts-of-interest, regulating lobbying and conducting independent internal audits (OECD, 2024[117]), while its system of tax transparency and anti-money laundering measures is on par with most OECD countries (Figure 1.33).

In 2019, the National Transparency Authority (NTA) was established to streamline anti-corruption policies. The NTA oversees the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Action Plan (NACAP) for 2022-2025 (OECD, 2024[117]). According to Group of States Against Corruption, implementation of the previous NACAP, for the period from 2018 until 2021, progressed well (GRECO, 2022[118]). This was despite many unfilled positions. In 2023, 103 out of a total 503 post were unoccupied (EC, 2023[55]). Filling the remaining positions would strengthen its capacity further and support implementation of the current NACAP.

Among recent measures are new rules to regulate lobbying. A 2021 law regulates contacts between high-level members of the executive and legislative branches and lobbyists and mandated a transparency register. The implementation of the transparency register has been slow, however. After becoming operational in December 2022, it contained 14 entries by mid-2023, which was deemed insufficient by the Rule of Law report (EC, 2023[55]). The NTA expected to raise entries to about 40 to 50 lobbyists by the end of 2023 through awareness raising campaign (EC, 2023[55]), while by January 2024 there were 17 entries (National Transparency Authority, 2024[119]). The EU’s transparency register had 12418 registrants in July 2023 (European Parliament, 2023[120]). Additionally strengthening penalties when failing to register may be needed. Rules to register could also be extended beyond professional lobbyists to further improve transparency on actors and interests influencing government policies who are not explicitly paid for doing so (GRECO, 2022[118]). Several OECD countries require – in addition to paid lobbyists – trade associations, NGOs, foundations, think tanks, and research centres to participate in transparency requirements (OECD, 2021[121]).

Greece has also strengthened whistleblower protection, transposing the 2019 EU Directive on protecting whistleblowers who report breaches of EU law in 2022 (European Parliament, 2023[122]). The law mandates internal reporting channels in every public entity and established the NTA as external reporting channel. The external reporting channel became fully operational in August 2023 and by December 2023 had received 55 reports, out of which 11 were under examination (National Transparency Authority, 2024[119]). In 2024, the OECD Working Group on Bribery recognised that Greece fully implemented its recommendation on the protection of whistleblowers reporting on foreign bribery (OECD, 2024[123]). However, the OECD Working Group expressed concerns about outstanding measures to prevent foreign bribery through control and supervision, as well as about the effectiveness and enforcement of penalties for natural persons for foreign bribery offences (OECD, 2024[123]).

Current legislation on whistleblower protection could be further expanded to better promote the reporting of “illegal, unethical or dangerous” activities (OECD, 2019[124]; Banisar, 2011[125]). In addition to reporting on breaches of EU law or bribery and corruption, this includes reporting information on breaches of national law, serious violations of codes of conduct, gross waste or mismanagement, abuse of authority, and dangers to public health or safety (OECD, 2019[124]). The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) highlighted the need to adopt a broad concept of misconduct in Greece, covering for example ethical breaches and to strengthen the protection of whistleblowers within the police (GRECO, 2022[118]). Civil society organisations also criticised the 2022 whistleblower law for not covering breaches of national law (EC, 2023[55]) and the limited scope on disclosures that are protected (Vouliwatch, 2022[126]). Broad definitions of misconduct on which reporting is protected are common across OECD countries, about 80% of OECD countries, such as Australia and the United Kingdom (Box 1.6), protect disclosure on reporting a serious breach of codes of conduct (OECD, 2016[127]).

Awareness-raising campaigns and fostering trust in protection will be important to make whistleblower protection effective in detecting corruption. In 2023, 38% of Greek respondents cited lack of protection as among the main reasons not to report corruption, and 32% believed that reporting would get them into trouble with the police or authorities, compared to 28% and 19% respectively in the EU on average (EC, 2023[116]). OECD recommendations for Greece to encourage participation and foster trust in whistleblower protection include, among others, granting honorific and monetary rewards to whistleblowers in the public sector, continuing the design and implementation of awareness-raising campaigns and events in collaboration with civil society organisations (OECD, 2019[124]).

Achieving higher material living standards while meeting Greece’s climate objectives will require a faster decoupling of growth from greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Over the last two decades, GHG emissions declined more rapidly than the OECD and EU averages (Figure 1.34, Panels A and C). These large emission cuts reflect both a decline in GHG emission intensity on par with OECD and EU economies (Figure 1.34, Panel D), as well as the fact that economy contracted by about one fifth since the beginning of the financial crisis. In 2022, Greece’s emission intensity remained close to the OECD average, but significantly above the European average (Figure 1.34, Panel B).

As discussed in the 2023 Economic Survey, Greece has committed to ambitious climate targets (OECD, 2023[6]). Greece notably aims at cutting GHG emissions by 55% compared to 1990 levels by 2030, corresponding to reducing emissions by 29% from 2021 levels, and reaching net zero by 2050 (Table 1.14). Coal for electricity generation is planned to be phased out after 2028 or earlier (EC, 2023[4]).

The updated National Energy and Climate plan envisages a rapid energy transition to meet Greece’s climate goals for 2030 and beyond. As in many OECD countries, this will be challenging to achieve. Energy use accounted for about 70% total emissions in 2021 (Figure 1.35, Panel A). Transport and buildings are the two largest energy consuming sectors, accounting for almost two thirds of energy use in 2021 (Figure 1.35, Panel B). While electrification is more advanced for buildings, it remains particularly low for transport (Figure 1.35, Panel D). Cutting these emissions entails, first, continuing to rapidly expand the energy production from renewable sources. Greece aims to raise the share of renewables in electricity generation from 46% in 2022 to 80% in 2030. Second, it entails adapting energy use to benefit from the increased energy supply from renewable sources, which requires further progress in electrification. Still close to two thirds of energy were consumed as fossil fuels in 2021 (Panel A). Focusing on electrification of transport and buildings (Ministry of Environment and Energy, 2023[129]), Greece plans to double the share of gross final energy consumption from renewable sources to 44% in 2030 – more than the 39.2% implied by EU rules.

Achieving a swift energy transition would bring various benefits for Greece in addition to contributing to global efforts to limit climate change. For a country that is highly dependent on imported energy like Greece, a rapid transition would enhance energy security. In 2020, Greece met 81% of its energy needs through energy imports (mostly natural gas and oil), compared to an EU average of 57% (Eurostat, 2022[130]). Greece was particularly dependent on gas imports from Russia with 41% of its gas supply in 2021 coming from Russia via pipelines. The share decreased to less than 20% in mid-2023 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as liquified natural gas imports expanded rapidly (IEA, 2023[131]).

Transforming Greece’s energy supply and improving energy-efficiency would also increase resilience against future energy crises. Households and firms have proven highly vulnerable to the recent spikes in energy prices (OECD, 2023[6]). Already before the energy crisis, in 2020, 17% of households struggled to keep their homes adequately warm, compared to 7.5% in the EU on average. Greece dedicated EUR 9 billion (4% of 2023 GDP) to supporting households and businesses against high energy prices between September 2021 and November 2022. This corresponds to nearly two-thirds of Recovery and Resilience Funds dedicated to the green transition from 2022 until 2026.

A well-designed policy mix combining both cross-cutting and sector-specific measures can help speed up the energy transition (Table 1.15) (OECD, 2023[6]). Elements of such a policy mix discussed below include harmonising and raising effective carbon prices – while compensating vulnerable groups – to achieve cost-effective emission reductions across sectors; removing remaining obstacles to the expansion of renewable sources; and combining financial support with more stringent environmental regulation to steer and support households and businesses in electrifying and using energy more efficiently. Adaptation policies will need to complement these mitigation efforts to contain the impact of a warming climate on people and businesses, as evidenced by recent wildfires and floods.

Greece’s main carbon pricing instrument is the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), in which Greece participates as an EU member. The current ETS covers large facilities in the energy industry and manufacturing. Greece does not impose an explicit carbon price outside the ETS, but more than 90% of energy-related CO₂ emissions are covered either implicitly through fossil fuel excise taxes or the ETS, and average emission prices are high in international comparison. There are, however, large differences in the cost of CO₂ emissions across users. For example, CO₂ emitted by road transport is four- to twenty-fold as expensive as CO₂ emitted from other uses, while CO₂ emissions from gasoline are twice as expensive as those from diesel (OECD, 2023[6]).

From 2027 onwards, a new EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS2) will have a wider sectoral coverage and raise effective emission prices mainly in buildings, transport and smaller industry. This will contribute to harmonising emission prices notably by raising still low emission prices for buildings (OECD, 2023[6]). Implementing ETS2 will pose some challenges to households, businesses, and the public sector. Regulated fuel suppliers will need to monitor and report emissions starting in 2025 and later purchase allowances in auctions. Allowances will be capped to reduce emissions by 42% by 2030 compared to 2005 levels. Although the carbon price is expected to be initially lower than in the traditional ETS system, the two systems may be merged in 2030. The government may have to partly compensate vulnerable groups from rising energy costs (EC, 2024[132]), while encouraging energy savings through new targeted income support independent of the level and type of energy consumed (Table 1.15) (OECD, 2023[6]; Blake, Bulman and Joumard, forthcoming[133]).

The introduction of ETS2 also provides an opportunity to revise fuel excise taxes and phase out fossil fuel subsidies to harmonise and raise effective carbon prices (Table 1.15). A common minimum price applied to all sources of GHG emissions would achieve emission cuts at lower costs. Fossil fuel subsidies are particularly high in Greece and amounted to EUR 1.9 billion in 2020 (0.8% of 2023 GDP) (IEA, 2023[131]). They notably include reduced excise taxes on diesel used for heating, heating allowances for households, benefits for pensioners and employees of the Public Power Utility (PPC), as well as for oil heating. Benefits are also available for electricity generation in remote areas and islands not yet connected to the mainland electricity grid, with the objective of aligning energy costs with those in the mainland. As electricity connections to islands and remote areas are expanded, these subsidies should be gradually withdrawn. A general strategy should develop a detailed list of subsidies and taxes, including expenditures for tax exemptions, on fossil fuels to plan their phase-out. This would also complement ongoing efforts to develop green budgeting tools, which includes `green tagging’ expenditures. Phasing out fossil fuel subsidies may require additional support for vulnerable households given high levels of energy poverty, such as further targeted subsidies to energy renovations or partly compensating vulnerable households for rising energy costs. Despite EU requirements, the updated National Energy and Climate plan does not include a list of fossil fuel subsides, nor specific plans to reduce them (EC, 2023[4]).

Greece is making rapid progress with the expansion of renewable energy sources. Energy produced from renewable sources met 23% of final energy consumption in 2022, up from 10% in 2010, which brings Greece close to the EU average (Figure 1.36, Panel A). This sizeable increase mostly reflected growing electricity generation from renewable sources – notably from solar photovoltaics and wind (Panel B) (IEA, 2023[131]).

Meeting the 2030 target for electricity generation from renewable sources requires further accelerating the pace of the renewable expansion (Figure 1.36, Panel B). Greece aims to nearly double the share of electricity generated from renewable sources, with an increase of about 40 percentage points. Renewable sources are projected to account for nearly all electricity – 96% to 98% – from 2035 onwards (Ministry of Environment and Energy, 2023[129]). Rising demand from economic growth and increased electrification of energy use mean that generation capacity must increase overall (IEA, 2023[131]). Greece plans to more than double generation capacity from renewable sources from 12 GW in 2021 to 27.3 GW in 2030, and to increase sixfold to 72 GW in 2050. Storage capacities are expected to increase from 0.7 GW in 2021 to 5.3 GW in 2030 and 24.8 GW in 2050 (Ministry of Environment and Energy, 2023[129]; IEA, 2023[131]).

A mix of policies will support this expansion. Financial support has been adapted to assure a pricing mechanism that encourages investments in renewable sources (Busch et al., 2023[134]). Since 2022, most support has been provided through auctions awarding contracts-for-difference (CFD) (IEA, 2023[131]). CFDs provide subsidies if market prices fall below a bid price but require recipients to repay excess profits if market prices are above the bid price. This is expected to add 4.2 GW until 2025, or 19% of 2021 total electricity generation capacity. Previously, support has been provided through feed-in-tariffs (FIT) and feed-in premiums (FIP), which can entail greater fiscal costs compared to CFDs. FITs and FIPs still provide limited financing mostly for smaller scale and innovative renewable energy projects, including for offshore wind farms expected to add 2 GW of capacity by 2030 (9% of 2021 total generation capacity). Greece also provides subsidies and tax breaks to cover 30-65% of investment costs for specific renewable electricity projects, such as small hydro plants or biomass co-generation plants. To subsidise storage, Greece provides grants for 0.9 GW of new storage capacity (4% of 2021 total generation capacity) until 2025.

Despite all these positive initiatives, there is room to assure investors about long-term funding for the energy transition. Financial support for renewable energy projects are mainly funded through the Special Account for Renewable Energy Sources. Revenues from the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), and from excess profits, which some energy producers are obliged to repay in case of high electricity prices, are major financing sources for this account. During the energy crisis, Greece reallocated most ETS revenues – 74% - from the Special Account to finance energy subsidies for consumers and businesses, which was only partly compensated for by higher revenues from excess profits (IEA, 2023[131]). The EU requires that 50% of ETS revenues are spend on the energy transition. The allocation of ETS revenues is decided annually, and Greece has not transposed EU spending requirements of ETS revenues into national law, giving the government discretion to use EU ETS revenues for short-term needs unrelated to the energy transition.

Licensing procedures have been simplified to reduce delays in the implementation of renewable energy projects (IEA, 2023[131]). This is expected to decrease processing time from five to two years. In 2020, Greece abolished requirements for licenses for generation for renewable energy projects and replaced them with certificates that require less documentation and can be applied for via an online platform. The energy regulator must grant certificates within 20 days if all requirements are met. In 2022, Greece changed the procedures for obtaining grid connection for renewable projects by abolishing requirements to apply for a provisional offer. Projects can now directly apply for a final offer. Grid operators have clearly defined deadlines to process applications, not exceeding 14 months if all conditions are met. The law also requires creating a one-stop-shop for all licenses and permits (PSAPE), which has yet to be implemented.

Reducing remaining delays in obtaining licenses and permits would help investments in renewable energy projects grow further. Reports suggest that limited public sector capacity often leads to delays (EC, 2023[53]). The energy regulator has a key role for licensing energy market participants, but it is not clear whether it has the capacity to process applications quickly. In 2021, it employed only half of its budgeted staff, likely reflecting difficulties to offer competitive salaries (IEA, 2023[131]). Moreover, reforms did not address environmental licenses, which can require permissions from multiple authorities and delay projects by several years (IEA, 2023[131]). Timely implementation of the planned one-stop shop would help simplify and accelerate procedures, including for environmental licenses. In addition, identifying priority locations for developing renewable energy projects based on environmental impact assessments and in consultation with stakeholders would increase chances that more applications can be processed quickly and successfully.

Limited grid capacity remained a bottleneck for expanding electricity production from renewable sources in recent years. In 2021, about half of planned capacity from solar photovoltaic could not be installed because of insufficient grid capacity (IEA, 2023[131]). Meanwhile, from 2019 until 2023 operators tripled investments into the grid to EUR 1.2 billion in 2023 (0.5% of 2023 GDP). They are planning additional investments of at least EUR 450 million (0.2% of 2023 GDP) by 2027, of which EUR 100 million are funded through Greece’s Recovery and Resilience Plan. In addition, a 2022 law aims to improve the allocation of new projects to existing grid capacities. Grid operators are required to reject applications in areas with insufficient capacity, while providing publicly available updates on free capacity at substations every three months. The law also allows renewable energy developers to build private grids connecting projects with consumers, independently of obtaining a grid connection offer. Monitoring evolving investment needs as capacity is being added to the grid will be critical to reduce and avoid future bottlenecks (Table 1.15).

Electrifying transport will be difficult in most OECD countries, but it may be particularly challenging in Greece. In 2021, transport accounted for 22% of total GHG emissions and 36% of final energy consumption (Figure 1.35, Panel A and B). As discussed in the 2023 Economic Survey, Greece relies more intensively on cars than other EU countries, both in terms of having more cars per capita and a larger share of passenger and freight transport using roads. At the same time, it spends limited resources on buying new cars, reflecting limited household budgets for vehicle purchase (Figure 1.37, Panel A) (OECD, 2023[6]). When accounting for its slow fleet renewal, Greece lags most other EU countries in shifting to zero-emission cars, although the take-up is gathering pace (Figure 1.37, Panel B). Despite these challenges, sizeable emission cuts in transport can be achieved both by using available resources to shift to zero emission cars more effectively and by making public transport more attractive (OECD, 2023[6]; Leidecker et al., 2022[135]).

Greece aims to achieve a share of 30% of zero emission vehicles (battery-electric vehicles) among new registrations by 2030 (Ministry of Environment and Energy, 2023[129]). This will likely require stepping up current efforts. To promote the take-up of zero emission cars, Greece offers purchase subsidies of up to EUR 8 000 in addition to a range of tax benefits for registration and ownership. This is complemented by an additional EUR 1 000 if a car older than 10 years is scrapped or the buyer is less than 29 years old (ACEA, 2023[136]). Additional measures included in the Recovery and Resilience Plan aim at electrifying transport by replacing 2 000 old taxis and 250 busses with electric ones (Hellenic Republic, 2023[137]). These measures are welcome and highly cost-effective. However, they will have a limited impact on electrifying transport. For example, taxis accounted for just 0.2% of passenger kilometers travelled on land in 2019 (Leidecker et al., 2022[135]).

Targeting and expanding subsidies for zero emission cars could help accelerate the greening of the vehicle fleet, especially when subsidies are made contingent on scrapping old vehicles. Similarly, subsidies could be restricted to smaller EVs, as people who buy larger vehicles are probably more willing to shift to EVs even without a subsidy.

To make EVs more attractive, the charging network needs to densify. Greece targets to have 12 000 charging points in 2025 and 25 000 in 2030 (IEA, 2023[131]). By September 2023, it had about 4000 publicly available charging points installed, and provided subsidies for an additional 8 000 charging points focused on strategic urban and suburban locations (Hellenic Republic, 2023[137]; Ministry of Environment and Energy, 2023[129]). An online platform that will show all publicly accessible charging points is currently being developed. Additional efforts may be needed. An EIB study from 2021 suggested about 13 000 charging points may be needed by 2025 to support EV roll out, growing between 40 000 to 100 000 charging points by 2030 (Ministry of Environment and Energy, 2023[129]).

Complementing purchase subsidies and a denser charging network with tighter restrictions on using fossil-fueled cars could make them more effective. Greece also provides subsidies for 8 000 publicly accessible charging points, focusing on strategic urban and suburban locations (Hellenic Republic, 2023[137]).Some cities, such as Athens and Thessaloniki, already impose restrictions on cars, for example to reduce congestion or pollution (OECD, 2023[6]). Measures to exempt electric vehicles from these restrictions and granting them free parking are welcome. Expanding restrictions based on vehicle emissions, for example through road pricing, congestion charges, priority lanes, or emission-free zones in cities where other transport modes are readily available, would add to the benefits of zero emission cars (Table 1.15). Several cities are planning to introduce or tighten restrictions to allow only zero or near-zero emission cars (e.g. battery or plug-in hybrid electric vehicle) to enter certain areas. These include Copenhagen, Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris, London, Berlin, Montreal and Seattle, while some cities – such as Rotterdam, Shenzhen, and Luoyang – are focusing on zero-emission zones for freight vehicles (ICCT, 2022[139]).

Greece is taking several measures to improve public transport that support a shift away from cars. Investments worth EUR 3.6 billion (1.6% of 2023 GDP) are expanding and upgrading the metro system in Athens and Thessaloniki (Hellenic Republic, 2023[137]). Several ongoing projects, totaling EUR 4.375 billion (2% of 2023 GDP) until 2027, are expanding and upgrading Greece’s railway network. In January 2024, Greece announced plans to merge several state-owned enterprises that oversee railway infrastructure maintenance and development to improve their performance. These measures are welcome and can help to reduce emissions as well as high levels of congestion (OECD, 2023[6]).

More investments may be needed, notably in the railway system. A well-developed railway system will be key to provide alternatives to cars for travels outside of urban areas, which in 2019 accounted for more than two thirds of passenger kilometers travelled on land (Leidecker et al., 2022[135]). However, the railway network is among the least dense in the OECD and existing lines are used less frequently compared to other OECD countries, while quality perceptions of the railway system have been weak (OECD, 2023[6]). This likely reflects a lack of public investment in the past when – following the economic crisis – generally low levels of infrastructure investments for inland transport were predominantly focused on road transport (Figure 1.38) (ITF, 2022[140]; OECD, 2023[6]).

Making public transport more seamless will be key to improve its attractiveness. Across OECD countries, time lost when switching public transport modes, or public transport not covering the entire journey, contributes to cars often remaining the preferred choice (OECD, 2023[6]). Promoting mobility-as-a-service and integrated ticketing – i.e. offering a wide range of transport services through a single, digital customer interface and shared transport modes such as on-demand taxi-buses to cover the last kilometre can make public transport more convenient. Better incorporating transit in urban development will be crucial to bring public transport terminals closer to where people live, work and shop (ITF, 2022[141]; ITF, 2021[142]).

Greece, like most OECD countries, has sizeable potential for saving energy and cutting emissions from renovating buildings. Due to its warm climate, GHG emissions from buildings account for only 8% of total emissions, compared to 10% in the OECD average or 14% in the EU average. Meanwhile, Greece’s building stock is old and often lacks proper insulation, and many buildings rely on fossil fuels for heating. Compared to OECD countries in similar climate zones, Greece consumes more energy and produces more emissions from buildings (OECD, 2023[6]). With buildings accounting for 28% of total energy use, the largest energy user after transport, adapting energy use in buildings will be important for achieving the energy transition.

While deep renovations are often considered to be cost-effective in reaching very high levels of energy efficiency (IEA, 2023[131]), these require large upfront investments and are probably more difficult to achieve in Greece than in other OECD countries. Average costs for deep renovations of EUR 30 000 in Greece were equivalent to three times the annual median income in 2022 (BPIE, 2020[143]), and investment in buildings has been low since 2008 (Figure 1.39, Panel A), pointing to limited financial resources. Many households would require extensive support, while fiscal space is limited. At the same time, emission reductions from deep renovations for heating – as well as for cooling, which consumes 50 times less energy than heating – tend to be lower in warmer regions (Figure 1.39, Panel B) (MoEE, 2018[144]). Reaching net zero emissions from buildings would require a stronger focus on replacing fossil fuels for heating and cooling systems.

Greece should expand renovations while focusing on phasing out fossil fuels and improving the energy-efficiency of those buildings with the highest energy needs. Plans for upgrading 43% of all dwellings by 2050 will be insufficient to achieve EU targets for building emissions, calling for additional efforts (EC, 2023[4]). At the same time, the actual pace of renovations is slower than planned, with about 47 000 renovations per year compared to a NECPR target of 80 000 per year by 2030 (Ministry of Environment and Energy, 2023[129]). Focusing public support for renovations, such as through the Savings at Home Programme, on colder regions and on vulnerable households affected by energy poverty would be most effective, but the programme could do more to promote deep renovations where these are the most cost-effective solution. Current limits on loan and grant support imply that opting for deep renovations still imposes large costs on households, and the choice often falls on shallow but potentially less effective renovations, particularly in the case of low-income households. Greece could consider making some financial support contingent on committing to a renovation roadmap and combining grant and loan components to support low-income households with the higher costs of deep renovations. This could be complemented with stricter regulatory measures, such as a timeline for the complete phase-out of fossil fuels in buildings, or a gradual tightening of minimum energy consumption standards for all existing buildings. Such regulatory measures could encourage more investments in energy renovations, including in new heating and cooling systems (Table 1.15) (OECD, 2023[6]).

As a Mediterranean country, Greece is particularly vulnerable to a warming climate (OECD, 2023[6]). Average temperatures in Greece already increased by more than in most other OECD countries (Figure 1.40, Panel A). Risks for damages from forest fires and floods are higher than elsewhere (Panels B and C), having grown more frequent and severe in recent years (OECD, 2023[6]). In September 2023, the region of Thessaly was hit by Storm Daniel with unprecedented rainfall, which led to catastrophic floods costing at least 15 lives and causing economic damages of more than EUR 2 billion (1% of 2023 GDP) (HVA, 2023[145]). Additional impacts of climate change, discussed in the 2023 Economic Survey, include more frequent heat waves, changing precipitation and seasonal patterns as well as coastline erosion.

This is posing long-term economic challenges for firms and workers to adapt, notably in agriculture and tourism (OECD, 2023[6]). Besides imposing immediate costs on people and businesses, these hazards have important knock-on effects on the economy: Storm Daniel slowed down GDP growth in the second half of 2023 as it severed transport links between northern and southern Greece. Compensating damages from extreme weather events also implies fiscal contingencies that will make it more difficult to achieve sustainable public finances (OECD, 2023[6]; Sutherland et al., 2024[147]).

Policies can reduce the costs of extreme weather events for people and businesses by reducing vulnerabilities and facilitating remedial measures when damages occur. Evidence suggests that adaptation measures have high benefit-cost ratios (Sutherland et al., 2024[147]). However, owing to economic and behavioural barriers – such as externalities, lack of information, or moral hazard – adaptation is often insufficient. A mix of policies – including public investments and steering behaviour through better information, economic incentives and regulations – can address these barriers (Table 1.15) (Sutherland et al., 2024[147]).

Investing in protective and resilient infrastructure can reduce damages from extreme weather events (OECD, 2023[6]). A first report on the floods in Thessaly finds that improvements in flood defense and other related infrastructure could largely reduce the impact of future inundations (HVA, 2023[145]). Greece’s Recovery and Resilience Plan includes several welcome measures which will improve the resilience of its electricity network, adapt the built environment to warmer temperatures, and improve the efficiency of the water system (OECD, 2023[6]). Swiftly identifying additional investments and implementing these will be crucial to reduce damages from future extreme weather events. Identifying remaining investment needs entails swiftly finalising Regional Adaptation Action Plans and concluding the ongoing revision of Greece’s National Adaptation Strategy.

Greece is improving access to information and emergency response to reduce exposure and better protect people (OECD, 2023[6]). In late 2021, it created the Ministry of Climate Crisis and Civil Protection to coordinate civil protection. The Ministry also acts as a contact point for information on self-protection and risk maps. Several initiatives are aiming to improve data collection and disseminating information to stakeholders. Meanwhile, investments to upgrade emergency equipment are progressing, for example with investments of EUR 220 million (0.1% of 2023 GDP) to buy new fire engines, aircraft, and rescue vehicles (EIB, 2024[148]).

Broad insurance coverage against climate risks can lessen the macroeconomic impact of disasters. Like many other OECD countries, Greece partially compensates private losses after disasters have occurred, which implies rising fiscal costs as weather events grow more extreme (OECD, 2023[6]). Formalising risk sharing by promoting insurance can limit fiscal contingencies. By providing payouts, insurers diminish uncertainty and bolster overall spending in rebuilding efforts, thereby speeding up the recovery after a natural disaster (Sutherland et al., 2024[147]). If correctly priced, insurance policies can also lead to changes in behaviour and risk reduction. In Greece, insurance coverage for damages from extreme weather events remains comparatively low (OECD, 2023[6]). In 2023, only about 15% of homes were covered by property insurance (EAEE, 2023[149]). Meanwhile, insurance costs are relatively high – despite a large number of national and international competitors – likely reflecting limited risk pooling because of the low coverage (OECD, 2023[6]).

Greece is taking measures to formalise risk sharing, including by promoting insurance coverage, and raise financial buffers as natural disasters are becoming more frequent and severe. Greece increased its permanent reserve for compensating damages by EUR 300 million to EUR 600 million annually (0.3% of 2023 GDP), financed by a permanent tourism surcharge (Hellenic Republic, 2023[64]), to anticipate future fiscal pressures. In addition, in line with recommendations from the 2023 Economic Survey (Table 1.15), businesses with annual turnover above EUR 2 million are required to get insurance from 2024 onwards, while smaller businesses and households are encouraged to take up insurance through a discount on their property tax liabilities. Annual fiscal costs for the latter measure are estimated at EUR 26 million (0.01% of 2023 GDP) (Hellenic Republic, 2023[33]).

These measures are welcome and should be expanded further to cover households and smaller firms. The low insurance coverage among households and large number of small firms below the threshold requiring property insurance implies that large fiscal contingencies will likely remain. To promote coverage among these groups, Greece could strengthen financial incentives, notably for low-income households, and follow other OECD countries in making property insurance mandatory more broadly (Sutherland et al., 2024[147]; OECD, 2023[6]). For example, Switzerland mandates building insurance against natural catastrophes in most of its cantons, while private insurers in France must include insurance against flood risk in property insurance policies. Such mandatory insurance should be carefully designed to assure affordability also for low-income households, considering public support for example through re-insurance, and monitoring insurance markets to assure competitive pricing (OECD, 2023[6]).

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