Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in Australia

The values that drive and guide governments along policy processes, including both policy making and implementation, are as crucial as the results of those policies, in what concerns public trust (Van de Walle and Migchelbrink, 2020[1]; Brezzi et al., 2021[2]; OECD, 2022[3]). Openness, integrity and fairness are interrelated and mutually reliant public governance values. Open governments encourage greater citizen and stakeholder participation in public decision-making and make policy making more transparent to the public. This facilitates accountability and fosters co-operation, mutual respect and dignity to uphold the public interest, advancing integrity and fairness.

Perceptions of fairness, public integrity and government openness are key drivers of trust in Australia, in particular for the civil service and local government.

Australia is a top performer regarding openness, integrity and fairness. However, perceptions of public integrity are the set of public governance measures which Australians seem more sceptical about. In particular, Australians’ perceptions of policy capture represent the only public governance indicator in which Australia does not outperform the OECD average.

This chapter explores Australians’ expectations of government’s integrity, openness and fairness. It provides context with information about current government policies and compares these with good practices across OECD countries.

According to the OECD Recommendation on Open Government, open government refers to a culture of governance that promotes the principles of transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation in support of democracy and inclusive growth (OECD, 2017[4]).

Openness can boost trust when governments operate in the public interest, foster accountability and make it easier for individuals to interact with them (Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2012[5]; OECD, 2022[3]; Bauhr and Grimes, 2014[6]). However, it is also important to consider that other factors, such as cultural values shaping how people evaluate openness initiatives and their impact, could operate as mediators between openness and public trust (Grimmelikhuijsen, Piotrowski and Van Ryzin, 2020[7]).

The OECD Framework on the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions assesses three aspects of governments’ openness. These are: governments’ ability to tell the public about its actions and to provide them with accurate, trustworthy, and pertinent public information; governments’ readiness and ability to consult with stakeholders and the general public; and governments’ reaction and ability to incorporate public input into the formulation of public policies. At the same, the OECD Trust Survey also gauges how citizens contribute to creating an open government culture, by including a set of questions on different aspects of political participation and attitudes.

Overall, results from the 2023 OECD Trust Survey indicate that most people in Australia have a favourable perception of openness and information availability. Further, many Australians feel able to participate and believe they have a say in what the government does. However, Australians seem to demand clearer and more inclusive communication; and most do not get involved in politics much beyond voting. In line with Australia’s acknowledgment about the crucial role of interested, informed, and active citizens for a healthy democracy (Strengthening Democracy Taskforce, 2024[8]), feeling able to participate in politics is positively associated with Australians’ trust in government. Further, Australians’ perceptions about opportunities to voice their opinions in decisions affecting their community have the most significant influence on trust in the local government.

Transparency is key for democratic governance. It opens the machinery of government to the public, making available information on how public institutions work, and consequently allows people to hold them accountable. Simultaneously, people's perceptions and understanding of how institutions function are largely shaped by the information they are exposed to. The current information ecosystem – marked by increasing concerns about the reliability and integrity of information - makes it more and more challenging for people to assess information quality (OECD, 2024[9]; OECD, 2024[10]).

Indeed, results of the 2023 OECD Trust Survey show that most people are satisfied with access to public information but have lower perceptions about communication on reforms and trustworthiness of official statistics. Slightly above the OECD average (67%) and 2021 results (65%), a relatively large majority of Australians (70%) believe they can easily access information about administrative processes (Figure ‎4.1).

The Freedom of Information Act has granted Australians the right to information since 1982, making Australia the second country in the world to enact such legislation. Further, Australia has been a member of the Open Government Partnership for a decade, and the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner has recently launched an innovative dashboard, granting public access to its statistics over the last five years. But in an increasingly challenging information environment (OECD, 2024[9]), making public information available and granting citizens the right to information through access to information laws seem to be insufficient. Similar to their OECD peers (39%), a much smaller share of people in Australia believes the government clearly informs them about the impacts that reforms can have on their lives (46%) (Figure ‎4.2). Further, only around four in ten Australians reported that information and statistics provided by government are easy to find (42%) and understand (40%), and even fewer respondents believe that they allow them to verify whether government keeps its promises (31%), a prerequisite for holding governments accountable. These shares are even lower among women, older respondents, and those with lower levels of education or who reported financial concerns.

Research carried out in the country found that significant exceptions allowed by the Freedom of Information Act led to a lack of transparency and accountability in policymaking processes. According to the Global Right to Information Ranking, Australia’s legislation does not cover all levels and branches of government, and its score on exceptions is comparatively low because of the large number of documents covered by enactments’ secrecy provisions (Centre for Law and Democracy, 2022[11]). Besides, academic studies underscore the existence of uneven ministerial authority to enforce secrecy conclusive certificates (Henninger, 2017[12]), and that parliamentary departments supporting the House of Representatives and the Senate (Adams, 2014[13]) and deliberative documents (Moon, 2015[14]) are not fully transparent. In addition, experts interviewed for this study also pointed that the number of requests of public information decreased over years, together with partial or full information releases, while the share of refusals to requests increased. They also noted that government institutions should carefully balance and follow strict guidelines to distinguish and protect Australians’ personal data that could be accessed through Freedom of Information’s requests. At the same time, experts also noted that individuals should be able to access information that concerns themselves, even if it reveals certain personal information about others, such as in the case of people who were in out-of-home care as children.

In this regard, it is more and more important for public administrations, in Australia and worldwide, to promote a culture of proactive disclosure of public information and, more importantly, to clearly communicate with the citizens they serve. Effective public communication is a service in and of itself that can build trust in institutions by raising awareness of government actions. It can demonstrate commitment to values such as openness and integrity, and display responsiveness to public concerns. Conversely, if communication is perceived as inaccurate, difficult to understand, biased, or unimportant, it can erode public trust and make institutions appear untrustworthy or unreliable.

The Australian population is very diverse, but this diversity is not always reflected in how government communicates and exchanges with people from different cultures, ethnicities, or who speak different languages. According to the last national census (2021), approximately 3.8% of people identify as Indigenous, 29% were born abroad and 3.4% of the population spoke English not well or not at all (see also Sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 in Chapter 1). Yet, during interviews carried out for this study, experts highlighted that despite there being many programs encouraging and communicating in several languages at the state level and despite the government funding the Special Broadcasting Service, which provides multi-lingual news services in multiple media formats, the federal administration in Australia routinely only communicates in English. This can make it difficult for a considerable share of the population to access public information.

Many experts interviewed for this study associated an increase in political trust in the federal government and the public service in Australia during the COVID-19 pandemic (see Section 1.2.3 in Chapter 1) with the government’s efforts to strengthen openness. For example, institutions provided translations of public health information into multiple languages, which was crucial to ensure that migrant communities and non-English speaking populations received accurate and timely information. Moreover, the Australian Department of Health offered a round-the-clock telephone interpreter service to speak to officials in a language other than English, and included in their website informative videos with messages tailored to communities’ needs in collaboration with community leaders.1 This successful experience could be replicated and extended to useful day-to-day functioning of public administration, similar to what encouraged in New Zealand (Box ‎4.1).

Besides acknowledging that public communication needs to be centred in users (thus the need for plain language and understandability), it is crucial for governments to increasingly engage citizens in communication and tailor audience research while providing messages that resonate with all parts of society (Smillie and Scharfbillig, 2024[15]; OECD, 2021[16]). Experts interviewed for this study noted that many public agencies in Australia only share statements, news or reports on their website, use single messages and single channels, reach a small audience and would therefore need to mature their communication strategies. Conversely, the National Indigenous Australians’ Agency complements long national reports with synthesis reports and community-adapted communication strategies, such as flyers. Further, New Zealand’s communication strategy during the COVID-19 pandemic showcases a successful experience on which Australia could also build. It delivered clear messages, even when sharing scientific evidence, used multiplatform channels, targeted audiences, and was able to adjust and receive feedback from people (Box ‎4.2).

At the same time, worries over the accuracy and integrity of information have increased, and on average, 11% of people across OECD countries identified mis- and disinformation as one of the main three issues facing their country (OECD, 2024[10]). Besides, many people have concerns over the trustworthiness of media. In line with results across OECD countries, only 41% of Australians reported high and moderately high trust in news media (see Figure 2.4 in Chapter 2). Further, when Australians were asked about where they get information on politics, results from the OECD Trust Survey show TV and radio are the most cited sources (similar to results across OECD countries). People's trust in government was found to be related to their information and news consumption habits (Figure ‎4.3), with trust being higher in particular among newspaper readers (OECD, 2024[10]). Trust is particularly low among those who do not follow politics or current affairs.

Australia undertakes important efforts in setting up guardrails against the spread of mis- and dis-information. In Australia, a moderately higher share of people reported using social media (44%) compared to those who get information from newspapers (37%). These results are key if considered that research conducted by the APSC found that 72% of Australians believe that during electoral periods, most people do not understand when information in the media is misleading or fake (Strengthening Democracy Taskforce, 2024[8]). While this is far from inevitable, social media platforms can contribute to creating echo-chambers and promoting polarisation (Cinelli, 2021[18]; Banks et al., 2020[19]). They can also speed up the transmission of damaging and false information, which can incite more radical emotions and mistrust (Klein and Robison, 2019[20]). Australia is among leader countries in efforts to protect people from mis- and disinformation, and this is a collaborative objective involving not only public institutions but also other interested parties. In 2021, the Digital Industry Group Inc. published a Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation to provide safeguards against harms from the spread of false and misleading content on digital platforms (OECD, 2024[9]). This requirement only applies to platforms that voluntary enter into the Code. The Australian government is investing in an evidence-informed approach to media literacy which will be essential to foster societal resilience. This includes the development of Australia’s first National Media Literacy Strategy, co-designed in partnership with the media literacy research sector, education sector and communities, to better equip Australians to critically engage with news and media

Australia is a vibrant democracy that ranks comparatively high in global indexes (see Section 1.1.1 in Chapter 1); and this may be reflected in above-average perceptions of political voice. Almost half of Australians (46%) feel able to participate in politics and believe that people like them have a say in what the government does, compared to 40% and 30%, respectively, on average, across OECD countries (Figure ‎4.4). Levels of political efficacy (feeling able to participate and influence in politics) have historically been relatively high, though they have been declining since 2007. The high levels have been generally explained by the compulsory vote and frequent elections: the three-year mandates for parliamentarians together with a federal structure result in Australians voting approximately once every 18 months (Dassonneville and McAllister, 2021[21]; Cameron et al., 2022[22]).

Despite many Australians feeling able to participate and influence in politics, a still sizeable share of the population feel they lack political voice, which could contribute to political disenchantment. Challenges in terms of political voice seem to be higher for women, older people, those with lower levels of education or who are financially concerned. On average 46% of Australians feel they have a say in what government does, though this share decreases to 39% for women and 31% for those reporting lower levels of education (Figure ‎4.5). Surprisingly and positively, most young people (53%) feel they have a voice. In contrast, a challenging point to note is that Australians who identify themselves as part of a discriminated group feel as able (48%) as other respondents to participate in politics, but not as able to influence politics (37%).

Measures of political voice and perceptions of meaningful engagement from the OECD Trust Survey have improved between 2021 and 2023: in 2023 42% of Australians believe the government would adopt the opinions expressed in a public consultation compared to 36% in 2021. At the local level, in 2023 and well-above the OECD average (41%) a majority of people (51%) think they would have the opportunity to voice their opinion in a decision affecting their local community, while it was only 39% two years earlier (Figure ‎4.6). Perceptions of having opportunities to voice opinions in local matters is the most relevant determinant of trust in local government (see Chapter 2).

These improvements could be linked to a “cyclical trend” that academics and experts interviewed for this study associate with positive impacts of changes of government (Dassonneville and McAllister, 2021[21]) (see also Section 1.1.1 in Chapter 1).

However, key policy initiatives recently put in place at different levels of government aiming to enhance engagement might have also played a role:

• For instance, since 2023 the Australian Public Service has a Charter, Good Practice Guidance and a self-assessment tool of Partnerships and Engagement, supporting public officials and entities in identifying principles and practices to achieve quality external engagement and genuine partnership in policymaking with people, communities, non-government sectors, academia and industry. These tools include specific guidance and frameworks to build authentic partnerships with Australia’s First Nations people.

• In addition, not only at national level, but also most States created “Have your say” platforms. Through these platforms, citizens can register to be part of panels consulted on different policy topics, and access information on policy initiatives that are being developed at the subnational level.

• Local governments’ acts stipulate that councils should engage their communities. A recently implemented research survey of local governments found that on average, councils put in place around thirty engagement processes per year, which range from public meetings to emerging methods, including open space and participatory budgeting (Christensen and McQuestin, 2018[23]).

At the same time, community engagement may facilitate adopting a bottom-up approach and permit co-design projects to grow into different institution-specific devolution experiments tailored to local and/or regional realities (Tremblay and Cowley, 2023[24]), such as citizens’ committees in Victoria (Hendriks, Bolitho and Foulkes, 2013[25]). Finally, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Voice referendum was the first national-level referendum of the century.

However, when analysing reported ways of engagement, almost two in ten Australians (17%) reported not participating in any form of political activity and, with the exception of electoral participation, Australians participate less than their OECD peers in all forms of participation. Comparing results with those of the 2021 OECD Trust Survey, Australians’ participation has also diminished in all forms of engagement surveyed, observing the sharpest decline in the share of people reporting to have signed a petition (from 35 to 19%) (Figure ‎4.7). This change could be interpreted as a sign of improved perceptions about the government. The declining pattern in participation is in line with trends shown by the Australian Election Study (AES), except for online forms of engagement (Cameron and McAllister, 2022[26]).

Lower levels of Australians’ political participation are accompanied by an increasing fragmentation of the party system and lower levels of reported partisanship. According to results of the AES, the combined share of votes of the two main political parties in the country has consistently declined over time. In 2022, people’s interest in politics decreased and political partisanship reached record lows, with one in four voters identifying as non-partisan, evidencing a rising and challenging voter detachment (Cameron et al., 2022[22]). Experts interviewed for this study linked the observed paradoxical results in Australia –that is, high levels of trust in government and political voice together with lower levels of political participation except from electoral engagement- to the complexity of Australian institutional features together with increasingly worse evaluations of partisan leaders and less clear party policy programs, which is an obstacle to accountability. It was highlighted that preferential and compulsory voting, three-year term parliaments and the Australian federal structure imply, on the one hand, a highly fragmented distribution of power posing institutional power-sharing constraints for policy makers; and on the other hand, a very complex and demanding system for voters that could lead to participatory fatigue and discontent.

As such, there is a need to improve opportunities and levels of political engagement so they can be aligned with Australians’ perceptions of their ability to participate, influence in politics, and their appetite for direct democracy: a large majority of Australians (81%) believe citizens should vote directly in referendums on specific issues of national importance. Otherwise, challenges of disenchantment and broader scepticism with politics may increase. In this regard, Australia may build on its own positive experiences. For instance, guidance and self-assessment tools on partnership and engagement could be made a requirement for any new national or state policy. States that currently do not have such bodies could also explore the possibility to incorporate advisory bodies representing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in their Parliaments, for instance following the experience of First Nations voice to Parliament in South Australia. They could also replicate experiences such as youth advisory groups. Multiple opportunities for people to participate and be consulted via the “have your say” dedicated spaces in different agencies’ websites could be centralised and organised in a single platform, allowing citizens to have more accessible information and the public administration to compile records and monitor processes (providing summaries, registering who are the ones consulted and how often, etc.). Greece, Italy or the United Kingdom have such single platforms in place.

On the other hand, citizens in Australia are unable to propose legislation, and public institutions encourage a top-down approach to participation, where people can only react or contribute to what is proposed by government. There are very few examples of more regular engagement between people and government officials, and even fewer opportunities for participatory or deliberative democracy. Therefore, to encourage a more regular and meaningful engagement, Australia’s government could put in place new institutional channels that allow people to interact with policymakers more often. Digital channels could be well received by Australians. As mentioned above, recent trends found that they tend to participate more via digital means (Cameron and McAllister, 2022[26]), although this may risk leaving behind population groups who do not have access to digital tools. France’s Agora could serve as a good example. Moreover, Australia’s government could also test and open some policy areas to allow citizens initiatives – encouraging a bottom-up approach to policymaking- or representative deliberative experiences. These experiences involve a randomly selected group of people, representative of the community, formulating collective recommendations for policymakers on complex problems, after dedicating their time to learning and working together through assisted deliberation (OECD, 2020[27]) (Box ‎4.3).

Finally, adding to initiatives enhancing participation opportunities, Australia could also invest in leveraging collective engagement by for instance promoting national dialogues as in Finland (OECD, 2021[28]); and strengthening political parties, as key institutions in contemporary democracies representing collective interests. Participation in parties and collective organisations builds mutual trust, creates a sense of belonging and can make people feel they have a stake in collective endeavours (Parvin, 2018[29]). They could be reinforced, for instance, by promoting more democratic decision-making within parties and candidate selection procedures –such as the open, simultaneous and compulsory primaries carried out in Uruguay or Argentina— or making leaders more accountable toward partisans, via regular gatherings, elections, etc.

Results from the 2023 OECD Trust Survey indicate that Australians' perceptions of openness are quite positive, and they feel able to participate and influence in politics. However, many Australians expect the government to communicate more clearly on reforms and do not engage in politics other than for voting.

Policy actions to improve perceptions of openness and enhance public trust include the following:

• Promoting a culture of proactive disclosure of public information and clearly communicating with the citizens they serve:

  • when information is high-stakes or when the target audience is linguistically diverse, provide information in languages other than English;

  • use plain and clear language;

  • share messages tailored to communities’ needs and target different groups of audiences through identified relevant channels.

• Encouraging a healthy, diverse, and independent media environment enhancing opportunities of public scrutiny and informed decision-making, and investing in evidence-informed approaches to media literacy.

• Enhancing and creating more opportunities for political engagement to align with Australians’ perceptions of their ability to participate in and influence politics, and their appetite for direct democracy.

  • Make guidance and self-assessment tools on partnership and engagement a requirement for any new national or state policy.

  • States that do not have such bodies could explore the possibility to incorporate advisory bodies representing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples into their parliaments.

  • Centralise “Have your say” spaces hosted by different agencies into a single platform, facilitating access and allowing registration and monitoring of processes.

  • Put in place institutional channels that allow people to interact with policy makers more often, and test and open policy areas to allow citizens initiatives or representative deliberative experiences.

  • Boost collective engagement by promoting national dialogues, and strengthening political parties through more democratic decision-making and candidate selection procedures.

Public integrity and public trust are deeply interconnected (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015[30]; Murtin et al., 2018[31]; Van de Walle and Migchelbrink, 2020[32]). Public integrity implies a consistent alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values, principles and norms for upholding and prioritising the public interest over private interests in the public sector (OECD, 2017[33]). Public trust, on its end, refers to the confidence citizens place in public officials and institutions to act in their best interest. Conversely, corruption involves the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, undermining people’s confidence in public institutions (Pellegata and Memoli, 2016[34]).

The OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions reflects on integrity concerning governments’ mandate to use powers and public resources ethically, by upholding high standards of behaviour, committing to fight corruption, and promoting accountability. The OECD Trust Survey gauges integrity by addressing perceptions of bribery, “revolving doors”, policy capture and accountability between different branches of government.

Perceptions of public integrity in Australia are slightly above the OECD average, except for those concerning “policy capture”. Yet, they represent the set of public governance measures in which Australia fares worse, and which have improved least compared to the results of the 2021 OECD Trust Survey (see Figure 2.10 in Chapter 2). Meanwhile, people’s confidence that the government acts in the best interest of society is the most significant driver of trust in the national government in Australia, and Australians’ perceptions of the APS giving honest advice to policymakers is also associated with trust in the civil service.

Experts assess Australia as a country relatively free of corruption and Australians’ perceptions of public integrity are comparatively higher than those among their OECD peers (Figure ‎4.8). Moreover, the government of Australia pursues a pro-integrity culture. For example, it embeds integrity into public institutions, covering a complete range of aspects, from the conduct of individual employees to systems and practices. Accordingly, the Australian Public Service seems to be esteemed by the population. One in two Australians (51%) believe the Australian Public Service will give honest advice to high-level policymakers, while only 21% do not believe so. This could be a result of the long-standing merit-based and apolitical civil service in the country, which has among its key values that employment decisions are based on merit (Public Service Act 1999). Indeed, a culture of integrity cannot be established without a competent and driven civil service that is dedicated to the public interest and providing value for citizens (Charron et al., 2017[35]).

According to expert assessments, the country presents very low levels of corruption, ranking 14th among 180 countries in the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, and timidly recovering from its record-low score in 2021 (Transparency International, n.d.[36]). The Robodebt scheme (see Box ‎4.4) likely contributed to that decline, but since then, Australia has re-built confidence in displaying public integrity. Australia has in place an advanced national integrity system, with key institutions at federal and state level, including the National Anti-Corruption Commission and the Administrative Review Tribunal (Strengthening Democracy Taskforce, 2024[8]). Besides, the Australian anti-corruption legislative framework is quite comprehensive, covering, for example, active and passive bribery of foreign and Commonwealth public officials, attempted corruption, extortion and money laundering as criminal offenses, applying to both individuals and companies (GAN Integrity, 2020[37]).

In addition, although 49% of people surveyed by the 2023 Trust and Satisfaction with Australian Democracy believe that corruption is widespread in Australia’s democratic institutions and processes, when Australians are asked to select which among a range of issues are the most important ones in their country, only one in ten Australians named “corruption”, compared to the average one in five across OECD countries (Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2).

However, a sizeable minority of Australians (36%) still feel public employees are susceptible to bribery (Figure ‎4.9) and only 43% of respondents to the 2023 OECD Trust Survey consider the Australian Public Service looks out for the long-term interests of society, even as elected governments and society change. In line with previous studies, these perceptions are worse among women, older respondents and those who have lower levels of education. Results from a recent survey of a large sample of Australians found that respondents with lower levels of education, who were unemployed or Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people perceived higher levels of corruption, and that perceptions of corruption were associated with diminished levels of perceived legitimacy of public officials (Voce, Morgan and Cubitt, 2024[38]).

Notwithstanding differences in perceptions, it is important to underscore that experience of corruption is still quite low in the country. According to Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer, only 4% of Australians reported to have experienced bribery in the last 12 months, compared to a global average of 40% (Transparency International, 2017[39]). Besides, the way corruption is reported by the media has a key role in public opinion (McAllister, 2014[40]). As such, results of the 2023 OECD Trust Survey may need to be situated in the context of the “Robodebt Scheme” and fielding the survey close to the release of the Royal Commission Report, which may have impacted Australians’ perceptions of public integrity (Box ‎4.4).

As stated, Australia has multiple public integrity frameworks, policies and agencies setting standards of conduct and behaviour, controls and safeguards against integrity risks –including a series of institutional changes and reviews prompted by the Robodebt scheme, and the integrity action plan prepared by the Australian Public Service Taskforce and included in the report “Louder than Words: APS Integrity Action Plan”.

Despite efforts, institutional challenges remain, including those related to co-ordination in a federal country. According to the OECD’s Anticorruption and Integrity Outlook, though Australia’s strategic framework establishes objectives for mitigating public integrity risks in public financial management, internal control and risk management, there is no central co-ordination function responsible for implementation, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation, nor an action plan in force (OECD, 2024[42]). In addition, a recent study of public services, focusing in particular on codes of conduct/acceptable behaviour across the APS revealed a substantial inconsistency between jurisdictions and a lack of available or accessible data related to compliance (Moon et al., 2023[43]). Further, experts interviewed for this study signalled that while there are instances in which the Commonwealth integrity agencies can exchange with state and territory counterparts, for example, through regular meetings that take place three times a year or joint investigations, there may be data or referral gaps. As such, there is a need to strengthen efforts to ensure co-operation on integrity issues by investing in data collection and governance, both horizontally between federal integrity agencies and vertically with the States/Territories.

In addition, despite Australia's crucial efforts in training high-level and middle managers to become integrity leaders in the public administration, experts interviewed for this study highlighted relevant challenges concerning the environment of public officials’ psychological safety, which may be related to negative impacts and lessons learned from the Robodebt scheme. Psychological safety is key for promoting a culture of integrity and a precondition for openness and transparency within an organisation; and can help support creative decision making. According to the OECD Public Integrity Handbook, a safe environment can be created and maintained in a variety of ways. For instance, managers and leaders can admit mistakes openly and use the lessons learned to improve future initiatives, and they can encourage staff to share ideas, including in more informal settings such as over lunch or coffee (OECD, 2020[44]).

Considering the above, Australia has piloted the “ADDRESS” model to respond to psychosocial hazards, consisting of guides and supporting resources to step through the identify, assess, control and review process within the APS. In this regard, Canada’s initiatives could serve as example. Beyond developing a National Standard for Psychological Health and Safety in the Workplace, the government of Canada assesses and monitors psychosocial factors affecting psychological health and safety in the workplace through the Public Service Employee Survey, with the goal of identifying and addressing areas for improvement (see Box ‎4.5).

Although perceptions of overt and legally addressed types of corruption, such as bribery, are not widespread or experienced among Australians, they identify worrisome and broader integrity challenges. A majority of people believe that the government is run for a few big interests (Cameron et al., 2022[22]) and perceive ‘elite’ interests to have privileged influence over policies, potentially leading to policy and regulatory capture (Kirby and Webbe, 2019[46]). Foreign interference and attempts to improperly influence decisions have also recently exposed new challenges and increased existing risks of undue influence (Strengthening Democracy Taskforce, 2024[8]).

According to results of the 2023 OECD Trust Survey, more than four in ten Australians (44%) doubt that a policy maker would refuse an offer of a well-paid job in the private sector in exchange for a political favour, slightly below the average across OECD countries (49%) (Figure ‎4.10). These results align to the fact that Australia has regulations establishing cooling-off periods for Ministers and members of cabinet, but they do not cover members of legislative bodies or lobbyists (OECD, 2021[47]). Indeed, according to OECD’s Public Integrity Indicators, Australia has a comprehensive regulatory framework that defines and describes how to manage conflict-of-interest situations at various levels of government and includes proportional sanctions for breaches of conflict-of-interest provisions (OECD, 2024[42]). However, experts from Transparency International found that these regulations cover different levels of government unevenly and stipulate very short cooling-off periods (Transparency International Australia, 2021[48]). A recent assessment performed by the government identified that only around half of the Commonwealth agencies have formal policies on post-employment conflict of interest, and many lack mechanisms to monitor compliance (APS Integrity Taskforce, 2024[49]). In this regard, and following a risk-based approach, the APS’s reform agenda aims to supplement current measures and ensure they are balanced and implemented more consistently across the public service. It also envisions that new measures will set clear expectations for managing the employee separation process, and the conduct of any high-risk activities in agencies, following separation of individuals where they or their new employer may engage with government (APSC, 2024[50]).

Further, only 41% believe that Australian Government institutions act according to the best interest of society and just a quarter (25%) of people in Australia find it likely that the government would refuse a corporation’s demand that would benefit its industry but could be harmful to society as a whole. This is below the average across OECD countries (30%) and represents the only public governance perception indicator in which Australia does not outperform the OECD. In addition, it is interesting to highlight that when carrying out a more granular analysis of people’s perceptions of public governance indicators driving trust by different population groups, Australians’ perceptions of policy capture seem to be most negatively impacted by social media consumption. In general, those who reported a high use of social media have higher levels of trust (except for trust in others and trust in the police) and depict more positive perceptions of government competence, openness or fairness. But only 18% of them believe the government would refuse a policy in favour of private interests, compared to 33% of Australians who reported not to use social media (Figure ‎4.11). This could be related to widespread communication about recent scandals covered by media, such as the PwC case -including allegations of conflict of interests and dissemination of government data by private consultancy firms employed by the government-, or Robodebt itself, as well as resonates with experts interviewed for this study, who underscored many people started to increasingly share negative views on the functioning of integrity institutions through social networks.

In part given high levels of market concentration in the country (OECD, 2023[51]) and the potentially harmful impact of market concentration on democratic governance (OECD, 2024[52]) (see Section 1.2.2 in Chapter 1), Australia could consider reinforcing its regulations addressing the role of money in politics in order to prevent private interests improperly sway the decision-making process away from the public interest, using personal connections or privileged positions to influence policies. On the one hand, Australia could ensure all public institutions develop and have in place policies on post-employment conflict of interest. Further, the public service could support the legislative to extend current regulations on lobbying, stipulating that transparency requirements cover the legislative and judiciary branches, as well as other actors than consultant lobbyists, such as think tanks, companies or trade associations (OECD, 2021[47]).

Additionally, experts interviewed for this study highlighted that Australians have increasing concerns about political donations. As per OECD’s Public Integrity Indicators, for instance, Australia neither has in place regulations to ban contributions from foreign states or enterprises, nor ceilings to electoral campaign expenses, nor thresholds for personal contributions to candidates’ campaigns. Therefore, it could be relevant to consider extending disclosure requirements to private contributions, banning donations from government contractors and requesting that disclosure is made in real-time, so that citizens are able to access information in a timely manner (Browne and Walters, 2023[53]). This recommendation aligns with Australia’s commitment to “transparent political donations and truth in political advertising” included in the Third National Action Plan under the Open Government Partnership. The United States’ regulations on transparency and access to information on political finance could serve as a relevant example (Box ‎4.6).

The system of checks and balances between branches of government is one of the fundamental tenets of democracy. It guarantees that various viewpoints are represented in decision making and safeguards established institutions from any attempt to abuse their authority, making clear that no one person or institution governs alone.

Despite Australians concerns and mentioned integrity challenges, above the average across OECD countries, 46% of respondents to the 2023 OECD Trust Survey in Australia perceive that the federal parliament would effectively hold the federal government accountable for their policies and behaviour, showcasing a strong democratic resilience in the country (Figure ‎4.12).

Australians’ perceptions of public integrity are slightly above the OECD average, with the exception of those on policy capture. However, perceptions of integrity in Australia present the lowest scores among other public governance indicators, and are crucial drivers of trust in government.

Policy actions to improve perceptions of integrity and strengthen public trust include the following:

• Ensuring and strengthening co-operation on integrity issues by investing in data collection and governance, both horizontally among federal integrity agencies, and vertically with the States/Territories.

• Maintaining a safe work environment in public administration

  • Determine how to address psychological health and safety;

  • Set and monitor standards that allow for identifying challenges.

• Ensuring all public institutions develop and implement policies on post-employment conflict of interest.

• Supporting the legislative branch in the extension of current regulations on lobbying, stipulating that transparency requirements cover the legislative and judiciary branches, and other actors than consultant lobbyists, such as think tanks, companies or trade associations.

• Expanding disclosure requirements to private contributions regardless of amounts, banning donations from government contractors and request that disclosure is made in real-time.

Perceptions of fairness are crucial for public trust and people’s evaluations on public governance. On the one hand, when people perceive that there is a lack of fairness in government’s outcomes, seeing distributive unfairness widespread inequality, this may lead to sharp divisions in society and fuel social discontent, eroding the social fabric and public trust and potentially support for democratic ideals (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005[54]; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002[55]; Schnaudt, Hahn and Heppner, 2021[56]). On the other hand, procedural fairness such as impartiality and fairness in policymaking and exercise of power may have a key positive impact on governance’s evaluations and can even offset the previous negative relationship (Saxton, 2021[57]).

The OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions gauges fairness considering two key aspects of governance: providing consistent treatment to people and business regardless of their background and identity, and ensuring costs and benefits of public policies are distributed equally among all societal members.

Overall, Australians' perceptions of fairness are the highest out of the main public governance drivers of trust. Yet, one in five Australians describe themselves as a member of a group that is discriminated against in the country, and the Robodebt scheme put in the focus of the public agenda how administrative procedures could harm individuals who are economically and socially marginalised (Mann, 2019[58]). Improving the perception of fairness of treatment in distribution of government benefits would have a large positive impact on trust in government in Australia. Similarly, ensuring intergenerational interests are balanced in policymaking could have a significant impact on trust in the federal government and the Parliament.

Fairness, egalitarianism, and equal opportunity are prominent principles in the way Australians conceptualise Australianness in economic, cultural, and societal terms (Plage et al., 2016[59]). In addition, experts' assessments rank Australia above the OECD average in the Egalitarian Democracy Index2. The Australian welfare system has been in place for more than a century and has enlarged its reach over time (Herscovitch and Stanton, 2008[60]). Besides, the OECD Better Life Index highlights that Australia does well in several well-being categories when compared to other nations. In terms of income, employment, education, health, social ties, civic involvement, environmental quality, and life happiness, Australia performs better than the OECD average. For example, on a scale of 0 to 10, Australians rated their overall level of contentment with life at 7.1, which is higher than the OECD average of 6.7 (OECD, 2024[61]).

According to the 2023 OECD Trust Survey, a majority of Australians (55%) perceive that public officials will treat people equally regardless of their income level, gender identity, sexual orientation, ethnicity or country of origin, compared to 45%, on average, across the OECD. An even larger share of respondents (64%) believe their applications for government benefits or services would be treated fairly, 12 percentage points above the OECD average (52%) (Figure ‎4.13). These are positive results, not only because they show an increase compared to results of the 2021 OECD Trust Survey, but also because Australians’ perceptions of fairness of treatment in distribution of government benefits have a significant and positive impact on trust in the federal government.

Despite general positive results, it is relevant to disaggregate figures by population groups. Women, Australians who reported lower education levels or to have financial concerns have lower perceptions of fairness (Figure ‎4.14). This can represent a certain overlap with vulnerable population groups that were particularly impacted by the Robodebt scheme (Braithwaite, 2020[41]). In addition, according to experts interviewed for this study, the pandemic could have also impacted perceptions of these groups of people. In particular, the reduction of income support payments following the pandemic may have damaged trust among individuals who may have perceived the reduced payments as a sign that there was a lack of political will to address that their needs, leading to even more disenchantment than existed prior to the temporary increase.

Australia is a diverse society, with indigenous heritage and broad immigration, and which has benefited much from public support for multiculturalism (see Section 1.1.2 in Chapter 1). Nevertheless, financial stress, economic inequality, and perceived unfair personal, social, economic, and health results of COVID-19 in immigrant communities (O’Donnell, 2023[62]) can threaten perceptions of fairness. Besides, after reaching the National Agreement on Closing the Gap in 2020, to tackle the inequality experienced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, many indicators have recently worsened (ICESCR, 2023[63]) (see Section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3).

As such, and though above the average across OECD countries, less than half of Australians (48%) believe that it is likely that the federal parliament adequately balances the needs of different regions and groups in society, while one-third of the population (30%) think it is unlikely (Figure ‎4.15). Furthermore, experts interviewed for this study underscored that communities were increasingly disengaged and felt they lack power in decision making, identifying this as a main challenge to the Australian democracy. At the same time, 38% of Australians expressed that government help for Indigenous Australians has not gone far enough (Cameron and McAllister, 2022[26]).

There have been considerable improvements in women’s representation in the Australian Public Service and representative institutions, but there are still challenges in achieving representation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. For instance, in 2023, women represented 60.4% of the service workforce and 55% of the total senior leadership group in the APS. The Australian government has enhanced gender analytic capabilities throughout the Commonwealth and implemented gender-responsive budgeting (ICESCR, 2023[63]). In 2024, women represented 56% of federal parliamentarians, and as of 30 June 2024, women held 54.4% of government board positions. The Boosting First Nations employment initiative aims to increase representation and strengthen cultural safety for First Nations people in the APS. Significant gains are being made through the Senior Executive Service (SES) 100 initiative, which will increase First Nations leaders in the APS from 54 to 100 by mid-2025. This is an important step towards achieving the Australian Government’s target of 5% for First Nations employment in the APS by 2030. As at June 2024, 3.4% of staff in the APS are First Nations, slightly below their share in the Australian population (3.8%, see Chapter 1). Moreover, despite the fact that as of August 2024, 4.4% of federal parliamentarians are Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, they do not represent specific Indigenous parties, and to the outcome of the Voice referendum posed a setback in First Nations’ voice in policymaking.

In this regard, some of the initiatives put in place in New Zealand to collect data and ensure diverse representation, both in public sector and politics could serve as good examples for Australia to keep on enhancing strategies and policies in place. Expanding data in this way should build on the principle of Indigenous Data Sovereignty, which acknowledges the right of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to autonomously decide about data collected, accessed and used, ensuring they reflect Indigenous priorities, values, cultures, worldviews and diversity (Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, 2024[64]). At the same time, as underscored by Australian public officials, and following 2021 Census’ reports, which evidenced an undercount of 17.4% concerning Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, the national census needs to increase accuracy and ensure respondents are able to complete questionnaires.

Australians' perceptions of fairness are the highest among the main public governance drivers of trust, yet diminished social cohesion, lack of representativeness and feelings of discrimination among Australians highlight increasing challenges. Policy actions to improve fairness and strengthen public trust include the following:

• Collecting and showcasing data disaggregated and according to relevance criteria that can be useful for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, which may help to better target policies, tackle inequalities and vulnerabilities.

• Policies aimed at mitigating perceived socioeconomic vulnerabilities and inequalities could be crucial in closing trust gaps among population groups.

• Promote initiatives to keep on promoting and ensuring diverse representation, both in public sector and politics.

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