Fertility rates currently average 1.71 across the Asian economies, below the level that ensures population replacement, but well above the OECD average of 1.46 (Table 3.1). The trend to fewer children has been going on since the late 1950s but stopped around the turn of century on average. The fall in fertility rates reflected changes in individuals’ lifestyle preferences, in family formation, and in the constraints of everyday living, such as those driven by labour market insecurity, difficulties in finding suitable housing and unaffordable childcare.

Another effect might come from changes in women’s aspiration regarding partnership and childbearing norms, especially in countries such as Japan and Korea where there is a strong link between marriage and maternity. However, the childbearing patterns of unmarried men and women have also changed. For example, around 60% of births now occur outside of marriage in France with 13 other OECD also above 50%. The average proportion of births outside marriage in OECD countries is now just over 40% of the total.

Since 2004, the fertility rate has fallen by 0.62 on average across the Asian economies with all countries seeing a decrease. The biggest decline in fertility rate was in the Philippines going from 3.53 to 1.90, representing a 46% fall. Across the OECD there was only a decline of 0.20 but the starting point was at a much lower level.

This recent decrease in fertility rates is forecasted to reverse in four economies over the next 20 years, namely China, Hong Kong (China), Singapore and Thailand which will see an average increase of 0.14, though the highest level in 2044 in Thailand will still only be 1.27. For the other countries there will be an average fall of 0.24 and the total fertility level across all 11 economies will fall to 1.61 and is forecasted to fall slightly to 1.58 in 2064. For the OECD the average will decline to 1.51 by 2044, with a low of 0.98 in Korea, with only Australia, France, New Zealand and the United States being above 1.6 among the countries listed.

However, forecast uncertainty is considerable, with the 20th percentile of probabilistic projections for the Asian economies average at only 1.16 and the 80th percentile around the replacement rate at 2.01 for 2064, with the 50th percentile at 1.58 (Figure 3.1). The OECD median is 1.54 with the 20th percentile at 1.17 and the 80th percentile at 1.88, still below the replacement rate.

Low fertility rates have wider social and economic consequences. The old-age to working-age ratio will increase sharply placing additional burdens on the working-age population to finance pay-as-you-go pensions and healthcare for older people. Moreover, the workforce will also age over time and so might be less adaptable to technological change.

The total fertility rate is the number of children that would be born to each woman if she were to live to the end of her child-bearing years and if the likelihood of her giving birth to children at each age was the currently prevailing age‑specific fertility rate. It is generally computed by summing up the age‑specific fertility rates defined over a five‑year interval. A total fertility rate of 2.1 children per women – the replacement level – broadly ensures a stable population size, on the assumptions of no migration flows and unchanged mortality rates.