OECD Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: Thailand

Thailand is located in the centre of mainland Southeast Asia (also known as the Indochinese Peninsula), bordered by Myanmar to the northwest and west, by Lao People’s Democratic Republic to the northeast and east, by Cambodia to the southeast, and by Malaysia to the south. The country is comprised of 76 distinct provinces, covering a surface area of 513,115 km², with Bangkok as its capital and largest city. In 2024, Thailand’s population reached 71.7 million people, speaking Thai as the official language.

Thailand is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy with a civil law system. The Executive is led by a Prime Minister, who is the head of government, and a Cabinet (also known as Council of Ministers). The National Assembly, representing the legislature, is split into two chambers: the lower house (House of Representatives), and the upper house (Senate). Regarding the Judiciary, Thailand has an established court system, comprising of four branches: the Court of Justice, the Court of Administration, the Military Court and the Constitutional Court (OECD, 2021[1]).

As of 2023, Thailand’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stood approximately at USD 458 billion in constant prices, with an annual growth rate of 1.9%, and USD 514 billion in current prices. This is equivalent to a real GDP per capita of USD 6 384 in constant and a PPP-based1 USD 23 422 (World Bank Group, 2023[2]). Thailand ranks 27^th in terms of GDP by nominal value and is the 2^nd largest economy in Southeast Asia, preceded only by Indonesia (OECD, 2023[3]).

Thailand has an economy with strong export-oriented sectors and a significant role for agriculture, which accounts for around 9% of the economy and still employs a large portion of the population. Its economic development has been characterised by a significant shift towards a robust industrial base, making up to 35% of the economy, particularly in automotive manufacturing, electronics, and petrochemicals. Services also play a relevant role, accounting for around 56% of the economy. Tourism is a key sector, contributing significantly towards Thailand’s economic growth and employment, with many millions visiting the country each year (OECD, 2023[3]).

The Thai economy is characterised by high concentration and low levels of competition, with many markets dominated by a few players. For instance, the top 5% of companies control over 85% of the total revenue across the whole economy. This is particularly evident in sectors such as telecommunications, retail, natural gas and electricity sectors. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) remain active in several sectors, at times competing with private enterprises (OECD, 2023[3]).

Since the 1960s, Thailand’s economy has progressed significantly, with active continuous growth until the 2010’s, after which the economic growth started to lose momentum compared to other Southeast Asian countries (OECD, 2024[4]). This momentum was further weakened by the economic impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic. Following the pandemic, Thailand’s economy was heavily affected by the rising cost of energy and food prices, creating a cost-of-living crisis and caused a delay in structural reforms. However, the country experienced a rapid recovery phase, influenced by a strong influx of tourists as Thailand lifted pandemic-related travel restrictions, and an increase in exports and domestic demand. This saw Thailand’s annual growth return to 2.6% in 2022, up from 1.5% in 2021 (OECD, 2023[3]).

Although Thailand had competition-related provisions in its legal framework since the late 1970s,2 discussions on a proper competition act started only in 1991, when the Minister of Commerce established a committee to draft a bill. The Trade Competition Act was only enacted in 19993, establishing the Trade Competition Commission (TCC) as an expert body, albeit not fully independent, with the Ministry of Commerce acting as the TCC’s Chairman. The TCC was in charge of investigating anti-competitive behaviour and bringing cases to courts, as the system was based on criminal enforcement (i.e. all anti‑competitive practices were considered a crime and required adjudication by courts). However, the legislation remained ineffective, as no cases were brought to court, which can be explained, among other reasons, by the inability to achieve the legal standard of proof required to support criminal charges, the lack of expertise of prosecutors and judges, as well as political interference with the TCC (TCCT, 2024[5]; Poapongsakorn, 2002[6]).

In 2014, the Ministry of Commerce began revising the 1999 Trade Competition Act, recognising that it was outdated; inflexible; with long criminal law procedures, requiring a very high standard of proof; as well as a lack of independence of the competition authority, which was integrated in the Ministry of Commerce. A new Trade Competition Act (TCA) was finally enacted in 2017, aiming to improve measures in regulating competition to become more efficient under a flexible and independent agency. The 2017 TCA is currently the main legal instrument on competition law and policy in Thailand, regulating anti‑competitive agreements, abuse of dominance, merger review and unfair trade practices (TCCT, 2024[5]; OECD, 2018[7]).4

The 2017 TCA intended to make the competition authority (renamed the Trade Competition Commission of Thailand – TCCT) a separate entity independent of the government, with its own budget. Moreover, the 2017 TCA aimed at reducing exemptions for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), that were fully excluded from the 1999 act. The TCA also empowered the TCCT to review mergers and impose administrative sanctions on non-hard-core agreements, gun-jumping and unfair trade practices. However, hard-core cartels and abuse of dominance remained under a criminal enforcement regime, meaning that the TCCT can only investigate such practices, which must be adjudicated by courts (Ingen-Housz, 2018[8]; Uremovic, Srirungruang and Taypongsak, 2017[9]; OECD, 2018[7]).

Since the entry into force of the TCA in 2017, the TCCT has issued secondary regulations to enhance the effective application of the TCA, including as regards merger notification and assessment, criteria for determining a dominant position, definition of relevant markets and assessment of market shares, as well as procedures and conditions for settlements.5

The TCA applies to business operators, which are defined as “a vendor, producer for sale, person who places an order or imports products into the Kingdom for sale, buyer for production or resale of goods, or service provider in the business”.6 The TCA defines business as “an operation carried out for benefit of trade in agriculture, industry, commerce, finance, insurance, and services”.7 In this context, although not clearly specified in the TCA, its scope of application seems to cover all economic entities (including legal entities, either for- or not-for-profit, and individuals) engaging in economic activities, as suggested by stakeholders interviewed during the OECD fact-finding mission. However, based on available sources, the notion of a business operator does not seem to cover associations of firms or holding companies engaging in economic activities, which appear to fall outside the scope of the TCA.

Moreover, the TCA explicitly excludes from its scope of application certain operations, including SOEs and regulated sectors under certain circumstances. It is also not clear whether the TCA applies to foreign companies that are not formally established in Thailand, even if their behaviour restricts competition within the national territory. These exclusions limit substantially the scope of application of the TCA and do not align with the OECD Recommendation on Competitive Neutrality (OECD, 2021[10]), according to which the enforcement of competition law should be neutral “so that competing Enterprises are subject to equivalent competition (…) rules, irrespective of their ownership, location or legal form”.

Section 4 of the TCA contains several exemptions, excluding from the scope of application of the law the actions of the following entities:

• central, provincial, and local administrations

• group of farmers, co-operatives, or co-operative groups legally recognised and aimed at benefiting the agricultural profession

• state-owned enterprises, public organisations, or other government agencies, provided that they conduct their undertakings according to the law or resolutions of the Cabinet which are necessary for the benefit of maintaining national security, public interest, the interests of society, or the provision of public utilities

• businesses regulated by other sectoral laws with jurisdiction over competition matters.

The exemption for central, provincial, and local administrations is in line with most competition regimes worldwide, which generally do not apply to state administrative acts. Nevertheless, competition authorities have an important role to play through advocacy efforts to promote competition policy within public policy making process, as further discussed in Chapter 3.

The exemption for agreements between farmers aims at increasing the collective bargaining power of small-scale farmers vis-à-vis strong and powerful economic groups, which are the buyers of their products. This exemption is based on a constitutional provision8 and was introduced in light of the structure of agricultural markets in Thailand, with many small famers and a few powerful buyers.

As mentioned above, the TCA aimed at reducing the scope of exemptions for SOEs, which were fully excluded from the application of the 1999 competition act. According to the current TCA, the exemption only applies if the SOE operates by law or Cabinet resolution for the necessity of national security, public interest, the interests of society or the provision of public utilities. These concepts come from the Thai Constitution, which states that the state should not engage in business activities in competition with the private sector, “except in cases of necessity for the purpose of maintaining the security of the state, preserving common interests, providing public utilities or providing public services”.

There are no guidelines further explaining such concepts or spelling out how the exemption should be applied (OECD, 2020[11]). Accordingly, the interpretation of this provision has been subject to debate. While some argue that it covers all SOEs, others defend that it should be interpreted narrowly (for example, when SOEs do not face competition because private players cannot operate in the market or when the government expressly requires SOEs to engage in anti-competitive practices).

In practice, the TCCT has never assessed any cases related to SOEs, as they consider these entities to be outside the scope of the TCA regardless of whether they compete in the market with private players, as confirmed by stakeholders interviewed during the OECD fact-finding mission.

Exempting SOEs competing with private entities creates an incentive for SOEs to engage in anti-competitive behaviour that can be as harmful as restrictions of competition by private competitors. This may hamper economic efficiency in sectors where competition may currently be unfeasible, but where new entrants could materialise in the longer run (OECD, 2020[11]).

As mentioned above, exempting SOEs from competition law does not align with the OECD Recommendation on Competitive Neutrality and the approach adopted in most jurisdictions, where SOEs are subject to competition law (OECD, 2024[12]).

According to Section 4, paragraph 4, of the TCA, the law does not apply to “businesses that are specifically regulated under other sectoral laws having jurisdiction over competition matters”. In such cases, the relevant sector regulator has the authority to enforce the competition-related provisions in the sectoral law rather than the TCA. The TCCT does not have jurisdiction to enforce the TCA in these sectors but may engage in advocacy initiatives with the sector regulators, such as providing non-binding opinions.

Nevertheless, the TCA does not specify which sectors are covered by this provision of the TCA. According to information collected by the OECD, including the information provided by the TCCT and stakeholders interviewed during the fact-finding mission, the sectors that are outside the general competition law framework and subject to a special competition regime would be telecommunications, energy, banking and insurance. Nevertheless, it is not possible to exclude the possibility that other sectors may also fall under Section 4, paragraph 4, of the TCA.

Furthermore, the competition provisions in the sector-specific legislations are not consistent, which results in a patchwork of different competition regimes, with different sets of competition rules. As illustrated below, some regimes include only ex-ante merger control (with substantial variations in the powers granted to regulators and the role of competition in the assessment), while others also cover anti-competitive behaviour (with different scopes and possible sanctions).

The National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC) has the power to ensure competition in the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors.9

The NBTC must prevent anti-competitive practices, including abuse of dominance in both the telecommunications and the broadcasting sector. Firms engaging in anti-competitive behaviour are subject to criminal sanctions, which include imprisonment and/or a fine, although their levels vary in each of the sectors.

In the telecommunications sector, sanctions are imprisonment for up to three years and/or a fine of up to THB 600 000 (approximately EUR 15 800). These sanctions should be doubled in case of a repeated violation. In addition, the NBTC has the power to order the stop or correction of the anti-competitive conduct.10

In the broadcasting sector, sanctions are imprisonment for up to three years and/or a fine of up to THB 3 million (approximately EUR 79 300), in addition to a fine of up to THB 30 000 (approximately EUR 790) per day for the period in which the violation continues.11

Mergers involving regulated business operators that meet certain conditions must be notified to the NBTC. Among other elements, the NBTC takes into account the impact of the transaction on competition and may authorise it or impose conditions. However, only in the broadcasting sector the NBTC has the power to block mergers.12

The OECD obtained very limited publicly available information on whether and how the NBTC enforces competition law. The NBTC informed that between 2018 and 2023 it had assessed and approved 11 mergers in the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors. However, the OECD could not evaluate these cases in detail since the decisions were not publicly available and were not shared with the OECD team. The only case with clear information relates to the 2022 merger between True Corporation and DTAC, the second and third largest mobile network operators in Thailand, which held 32% and 22% of the market share, respectively. At first, the NBTC refused to review the transaction but ultimately assessed it due to pressure from consumers and academics. The merger was approved subject to behavioural remedies, such as price caps, independent verification of the cost structures and service pricing by experts (hired by the post-merger entity) for at least five years and a requirement to reserve spectrum for mobile virtual network operators (Aksorngarn, 2024[13]).

During the OECD fact-finding mission, NBTC staff mentioned that there had been no cases of anti‑competitive behaviour.

The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) has the authority to prevent anti-competitive behaviour in the electricity and natural gas sectors.13

The ERC can investigate and impose sanctions on business operators that engage in practices aimed at limiting or restricting competition in the energy market, including behaviour leading to a monopoly. Sanctions include orders to stop or correct the anti-competitive practice and to amend the firms’ licence conditions. Business operators that do not comply with such orders are subject to an administrative fine of up to THB 500 000 (approximately EUR 13 200) per day, in addition to criminal sanctions (imprisonment for up to two years and/or a fine of up to THB 4 million – approximately EUR 105 600).14

Moreover, mergers involving regulated firms that meet specific thresholds must be notified ex-ante to the ERC, which will then review the transaction – considering, among other factors, its impact on competition – and may authorise, authorise with conditions or reject the transaction. However, there are no sanctions for firms that fail to notify a transaction.15

According to information provided by ERC stakeholders interviewed during the OECD fact-finding mission, only a few mergers have been reviewed by the ERC, involving small players with no impact on competition. Nevertheless, the OECD was unable to access these cases, as the decisions were not publicly available and were not shared with the OECD team. ERC staff also mentioned that there had been no anti-competitive behaviour cases.

The Bank of Thailand (BOT) serves as the regulator for the banking sector. All mergers involving financial institutions, regardless of their size, must be notified to the BOT, which must approve the transaction before its implementation. The BOT has the authority to authorise mergers subject to conditions or to reject them.16 There are no explicit rules addressing anti-competitive behaviour.

According to the BOT, the main elements considered when reviewing mergers involving financial institutions are the impact on the financial stability of the system, operational issues (including as regards service channels) and the overall benefits to the system, particularly in relation to consumers. Competition is not a primary concern in the BOT’s assessment, but it may be considered when analysing the benefits to consumers.

Additionally, the BOT indicated it has jurisdiction over anti-competitive practices within the banking sector but highlighted that its assessment relies on the impact of business behaviour on financial stability and consumers.

BOT stakeholders interviewed by the OECD during the fact-finding mission mentioned that the BOT has only reviewed and approved one merger between small players, with no impact on market concentration. Once again, the OECD could not evaluate this case in detail since the decision was not publicly available and was not shared with the OECD team.

The Office of Insurance Commission (OIC) regulates the insurance sector, including both life and non-life insurance services. All mergers in this sector must be authorised by the OIC before they can be implemented. The OIC can impose remedies to protect the interests of the insured or to ensure the stability of business operations.17 It is unclear whether the OIC has the authority to reject mergers or the role that competition effects play in the assessment of these transactions. There are no explicit rules addressing anti-competitive behaviour. According to data provided by the OIC, seven mergers were reviewed and approved between 2018 and 2023. However, the OECD could not evaluate these cases in detail since the decisions were not publicly available and were not shared with the OECD team. Furthermore, there are no explicit rules addressing anti-competitive behaviour.

The interpretation of Section 4, paragraph 4, of the TCA is also subject to debate. On the one hand, some argue that regulated sectors are only excluded from the scope of the TCA and the TCCT’s jurisdiction if the relevant sector-specific legislation addresses competition to the same extent as the TCA (i.e. provide similar prohibitions) and give regulators powers akin to those granted to the TCCT by the TCA (e.g. to investigate anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance, as well as review mergers, including with the authority to impose remedies and block transactions). If sectoral regulators lack these powers or if the sectoral legislation does not cover all prohibitions included in the TCA, then the TCCT could enforce the TCA in those sectors.

On the other hand, others assert that a sector would be excluded from the scope of the TCA and the TCCT’s jurisdiction if the sector-specific legislation grants the regulator authority over competition matters, regardless of the specific prohibitions included in that legislation or the exact powers conferred to the regulator. This seems to be the prevailing understanding in Thailand, including among the TCCT and regulated sectors.

Therefore, it is unclear even which sectors would fall under a special competition regime and be outside the general competition law framework. It also remains unclear which authority would have jurisdiction in cases involving business operators across different markets (e.g. some under the TCCT’s jurisdiction and others under a sector regulator’s jurisdiction or each regulated by distinct sector regulators). The absence of cases also prevents to understand how the legislation is interpreted, including by courts.

In practice, this scenario results in a gap in enforcement within these regulated sectors, which are particularly concentrated and likely to experience anti-competitive behaviour (OECD, 2023[3]).

During the OECD fact-finding mission, stakeholders confirmed that the competences for enforcing competition law in regulated sectors are unclear. While the TCCT generally considers that it lacks jurisdiction for enforcement in these sectors (only having advocacy powers), there have been a few occasions where the agency has taken action in some of these sectors, in particular merger cases in the banking and insurance sectors.

Stakeholders also mentioned that sector regulators have not been active in enforcing competition‑related provisions. The TCCT has not been involved in such activities, for instance, by being consulted and requested to issue a non-binding opinion to sector regulators.

The TCA applies only to conducts wholly or partially carried out in the territory of Thailand. The TCA is not clear on whether the law is applicable extraterritorially to business practices outside Thailand but that produce effects within the country.

As informed by the TCCT and confirmed during the fact-finding mission, the understanding of the agency is that the TCA is not enforceable against firms located outside Thailand whose behaviour directly affects competition and consumers in domestic markets, since the legislation does not explicitly provide for such an application. For instance, international cartels involving companies not established in Thailand but with effects on the Thai economy would fall outside the scope of the TCA. Likewise, mergers between foreign firms without a branch or subsidiary in Thailand would not be reviewed by the TCCT, even if the companies have sales turnover in Thailand and they might impact competition in the country.

However, Section 58 of the TCA explicitly prohibits anti-competitive agreements between market players located in Thailand and abroad, resulting in significant harm to the Thai economy and consumers, which seems to contradict the TCCT’s interpretation described above. This provision has never been used in practice.

An increasing number of jurisdictions are relying on the domestic effects of behaviour as the trigger for extending jurisdiction extraterritorially. This is particularly relevant in light of the growing interdependence of markets and economies and the fact that business activities increasingly take place across borders, which means that anti-competitive practices often are not limited within the territory of a single jurisdiction (OECD, 2017[14]).

As mentioned above, the Trade Competition Commission of Thailand (TCCT) is the main competition authority in Thailand. It was created by the TCA in 2017, replacing the former TCC and becoming a government agency with the status of a legal entity, with its own budget, separate from the civil service and not constituting an SOE, reporting to the Ministry of Commerce.18 The TCCT is also accountable to the Office of the Auditor-General of Thailand, which must annually audit TCCT’s expenses and submit its conclusion to the TCC, the Cabinet and Parliament.19

Furthermore, the TCCT must prepare an annual report outlining its main achievements and challenges, which shall be provided to the Cabinet and disseminated to the general public.20

The TCCT has competition enforcement powers, including to review and authorise mergers, conduct investigations of anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance and submit its conclusions to the public prosecutors. Furthermore, it investigates and sanctions unfair trade and gun-jumping practices and promotes competition within Thailand. The TCCT can also issue secondary regulations to ensure the enforcement of the TCA.

Enforcement of competition law is still incipient in Thailand, according to the limited information obtained by the OECD and confirmed by several stakeholders during the OECD fact-finding mission. The OECD was not provided access to recent, reliable statistics on the enforcement activities of the TCCT. It should be noted that the TCCT has not submitted information to the OECD CompStats database since 2023. Moreover, the data provided until the 2022 CompStats (i.e. covering statistics up to 2021) for the OECD CompStats was not entirely consistent with the data provided during the Peer Review. No regular and consistent information on cases is publicly available, for instance on the TCCT’s website or in its annual reports, which does not align with the principles contained in the OECD Recommendation on Transparency and Procedural Fairness in Competition Law Enforcement (OECD, 2021[15]), as will be further discussed in Chapter 2.

The lack of consistent data made it difficult to assess the real level of the enforcement activities in Thailand, and therefore this report mainly focuses on the legal framework.

The TCCT is composed of a Board of Commissioners (Trade Competition Commission – TCC) and a Secretariat (TCCT’s Office), composed of a Secretary-General and various units responsible for administrative support and substantive work, as described below.

The TCC consists of seven members, including the Chairperson, and serves as TCCT’s main decision-making body. Its tasks include:21

• providing public prosecutors with opinions to proceed with criminal cases when TCCT’s investigations indicate the existence of hard-core cartels and abuse of dominance

• imposing administrative sanctions (i.e. in case of non-hard-core agreements, gun jumping, unfair trade practices)

• approving (including subject to conditions) and prohibiting mergers

• proposing recommendations to the Minister of Commerce and the Cabinet with regard to the government’s policies on competition

• assessing, at the request of business operators, whether their behaviour complies with the TCA

• presenting recommendations to government agencies on regulations that restricts competition

• issuing internal regulations related to organisational structure, personnel management, budget and finance of the TCCT.

The internal structure of the TCCT, set by the TCC,22 consists of five units, each with various sub‑units, which provide administrative support to the TCC and the Secretary-General and/or are in charge of competition-related activities.

The Secretary-General reports directly to the Chairperson and acts as the chief executive officer of the TCCT, with broad authority to manage the operations of the agency. This includes the power to assign duties to the various TCCT’s units, manage staff, and oversee the implementation of TCC's decisions.23

The Management and Organisation Unit is composed of five divisions: (i) Secretariat to the Secretary-General, responsible for providing operational support for the TCC and the Secretary-General, such as assigning tasks to relevant departments and handling correspondence and office management; (ii) Board Meetings Division, supporting the Secretary-General in his/her role as the secretary of the TCC meetings; (iii) Finance Division, in charge of finance-related tasks such as treasure and accounting; (iv) Asset and Supply Management Division, responsible for supplies, buildings and security plans; and (v) Human Resources and Organisation Department, dealing with recruitment, evaluation and training of staff, disciplinary actions, labour relations and occupational health.

The Strategic Planning Unit has four divisions: (i) Organisational Strategy Division, in charge of developing the organisational strategy and the annual action plans, managing the annual budget and preparing performance reports; (ii) Competition System Development Division, managing information technology and communication systems; (iii) Communications Division, responsible for managing communication strategies, including public relations and media production; and (iv) Foreign Affairs Division, which handles TCCT’s international affairs, including by engaging in international co-operation.

The Competition and Business Environment Unit is divided into two divisions: (i) Political Affairs Division, responsible for co-ordination with the executive, legislative and judicial branches, for instance by providing opinions and recommendations on public policies to foster competition; and (ii) Information and Public Advocacy Division, in charge of conducting outreach advocacy activities and training.

The Economic Systems and Market Structures Unit is composed of four divisions: (i) Merger Review Division, in charge of reviewing mergers and providing recommendations to the TCC; (ii) Market Structures for Consumer Products Division, responsible for studying and overviewing the structure and functioning of consumer goods markets; (iii) Market Structures for Commodities Division, which studies and overviews the structure and functioning of commodities markets; and (iv) Market Structures for Services Division, in charge of studying and overviewing the structure and functioning of service markets.

The Investigation Unit has three divisions: (i) Fact-Finding Division, handling complaints and gathering suspicions of anti-competitive and unfair trade practices, as well as conducting investigations to support TCC’s decisions; (ii) Fact-Finding by IT Division, which applies technology-led tools to investigate anti-competitive and unfair trade behaviour, including through data collection and monitoring mechanisms; and (iii) Investigation Development and Assessment Division, in charge of developing and evaluating the overall TCCT’s investigative performance, for instance by carrying out investigation-related training programmes.

The Legal Affairs Unit comprises two divisions: (i) Measures and Contracts Division, which drafts and revises regulations related to the enforcement of the TCA, as well as handles legal documents and contracts for the functioning of the TCCT; and (ii) Case Management Division, providing legal advice on criminal and administrative cases and managing judicial proceedings related to the enforcement of the TCA.

In addition to the various units described above, the TCC can also appoint sub-committees to conduct specific tasks, such as drafting internal regulations, conducting market studies or preparing advocacy opinions.24 In particular, a sub-committee of inquiry must be designated to investigate anti-competitive behaviour in each criminal case and also the most complicated administrative cases, as further discussed in section 2.3.2. Such sub-committees have the powers to investigate and inquire about competition violations and must provide the TCC with an opinion to substantiate its decisions. The sub‑committees of inquiry are composed of at least one TCCT official (usually from the Investigation Unit, though there is no clear regulatory guidance on this) and persons outside the TCCT with knowledge and experience related to criminal cases, including a current or former public prosecutor, policeman and government officer with expertise in competition and related topics.25

The internal structure of the TCCT is highly complex and fragmentated, lacking clarity regarding the tasks assigned to each unit and division. Indeed, the description of each unit and division above suggests significant overlaps between various areas (e.g. at least three divisions are in charge of training activities). The existence of a variety of sub-committees makes the division of work even more complex and unclear, as they are often tasked with functions already managed by other TCCT units. Moreover, the fact that non-TCCT staff take part in these sub-committees, particularly those responsible for investigations, may jeopardise the agency’s independence and impartiality.

As reported in section ‎1.4.1, the TCC is composed of seven members, including a Chairperson, a Deputy Chairperson and five Commissioners. They are appointed for a four-year term, which may be renewed once. Staggered rotations of Commissioners every two years allow for partial renewals and continuity within the Board.26

TCC’s members are appointed by the Prime Minister from a list chosen in a selection process and approved by the Cabinet.27 The selection process is conducted by a Selection Committee, composed of nine members, from both the government and the business community.28 The Selection Committee opens a call for applications and propose a list of suitable candidates fulfilling the minimum eligibility requirements to the Minister of Commerce, who submits the selected names to the Cabinet. Then, the Cabinet approves the names to fill the positions and submits them to the Prime Minister for appointment. The timeframe, procedures, conditions, and other rules for the selection process are prescribed in a ministerial regulation.29

Members of the TCC are required to meet several eligibility requirements. In particular, they must: (i) have at least ten years of experience in law, economics, finance, accounting, industry, business administration, consumer protection or other fields which benefit competition regulation; (ii) be a Thai national; (iii) be between 40 and 70 years old; (iv) not be affiliated with any political party; (v) be mentally healthy; (vi) not have been declared in bankruptcy due to corruption; (vii) not have been declared incapacitated; (viii) not have been criminally convicted; (ix) not have been fired or dismissed from public office or private employment due to corruption; (x) not be a Justice in the Constitutional Court, an Election Commissioner, an Ombudsman, a National Anti-Corruption Commissioner, an Auditor General Commissioner or a National Human Rights Commissioner; (xi) not hold a position in a business entity, be partner or own more than 5% of shares in any company; (xii) not hold a position as a civil servant, official or employee in national or local administration; and (xiii) not hold a position in an institution or association related to business operations. 30

During the OECD fact-finding mission, various stakeholders expressed concerns that the open eligibility condition related to previous experience does not ensure TCC’s members to have enough expertise in competition law and often commissioners have not shown interest or made sufficient effort to improve their understanding of competition matters. Some stakeholders also criticised the lack of transparency in the selection process. This departs from the OECD Recommendation on Transparency and Procedural Fairness in Competition Law Enforcement (OECD, 2021[15]), which calls for jurisdictions to “ensure that competition law enforcement is independent, impartial and professional”.

On the other hand, several requirements appear to be unjustified and could unnecessarily restrict the list of potential candidates, especially those with competition expertise. For instance, it is unclear why candidates must be of a minimum age if there is already a 10-year experience requirement. Similarly, limiting most active professionals from the private and public sectors may make it challenging to find suitably qualified candidates. In practice, almost only retired civil servants are eligible to become TCC’s members, as confirmed by stakeholders interviewed by the OECD.

The TCC operates as an independent body and its members can only be dismissed from office under the conditions set out in the TCA: (i) end of term; (ii) death; (iii) resignation during a term; (iv) the Cabinet decides to remove a member of TCC if he/she fails to fulfil his/her duties or engages in misconduct; (v) lack of eligibility requirements mentioned above.31

The TCA does not specify the procedures for dismissals. Stakeholders interviewed during the OECD fact-finding mission mentioned that the wording of item “iv” above is ambiguous and vague. This might undermine the TCC’s independence. In practice, however, no TCC member has ever been dismissed based on items “iv” and “v” above.

The Secretary-General is appointed by the TCC’s Chairman, subject to the TCC’s approval, for a four-year term and can be reappointed for a second term.32 The selection of the Secretary-General follows a process open to any interested party, in accordance with the procedures and requirements prescribed by the TCC and the TCA.33 Eligibility requirements also apply to the selection of the Secretary-General, particularly the need to have expertise in law, economics, finance accounting, industry, business administration, consumer protection or other related fields.34

The Secretary-General can only be dismissed in the following cases: (i) death; (ii) voluntary resignation; (iii) lack of eligibility requirements; (iv) conflict of interest; and (v) the TCC decides to remove he/she due to failing to fulfil his/her duties or misconduct.35 The TCA does not establish the procedures that must be followed for dismissing the Secretary-General.

TCC’s members and the Secretary-General are subject to a cooling off period of two years, during which they cannot take any position in any limited company, public limited company or any other businesses which is a party in a matter being considered by the TCC.36

Technical personnel at lower management level are selected by a selection committee according to the procedures and criteria set by the TCC. The selected candidates are formally approved by the TCC before being officially appointed by the Secretary-General.37

The TCA contains a provision related to conflicts of interest only for the Secretary-General.38 Nevertheless, the Code of Ethics for TCCT staff, including TCC’s members, imposes an obligation to avoid conflicts of interest.39 Neither the TCA nor the Code of Ethics provides for specific procedures for declaring or managing such conflicts. This departs from the OECD Recommendation on Transparency and Procedural Fairness in Competition Law Enforcement (OECD, 2021[15]), according to which jurisdictions should “ensure that competition law enforcement is independent, impartial and professional, by: (…) c) having clear and transparent rules to prevent, identify and address any material conflicts of interest of competition authority and court officials involved in competition law enforcement”.

The TCCT is mainly funded by the state budget. Every year, the Organisational Strategy Division consolidates the budget proposals presented by each TCCT division and submits to the TCC for approval. Then, the TCCT proposes an annual budget to the Cabinet, which submits the Annual Expense Budget to the Parliament for approval. The members of Parliament may change the draft budget.40

The TCCT also receives funds from merger filing fees, fees for assessing requests from business operators regarding compliance with the TCA (Section 59) and fees for copying or certifying a copy of certain TCC orders, which are kept by the TCCT’s budget.41 On the other hand, the administrative fines imposed by the TCCT on economic players are not kept by the agency and must be transferred to the state budget.42

In 2024, the TCCT’s budget was THB 219 314 200 (equivalent to EUR 5 790 552).43 Figure ‎1.2 shows the budget allocated to the TCCT between 2018 and 2024. As it can be seen, the nominal budget has decreased since 2019, with an increase in 2024.

TCCT’s budget is considerably low for international and regional standards. Figure ‎1.3 below compares the budget per million GDP of the TCCT with certain groups of jurisdictions that provided data to the OECD CompStats Database,44 in particular (i) OECD jurisdictions; (ii) non-OECD jurisdictions; (iii) jurisdictions in the Asia-Pacific region; (iv) jurisdictions with GDP similar to Thailand; and (v) jurisdictions with population similar to Thailand. TCCT’s budget appears well below when compared to any of the indicated groups.

When adjusting budget by PPP, the conclusion remains the same. The TCCT has lower budget per million GDP compared to the different reference groups.

During the OECD fact-finding mission, stakeholders mentioned that the TCCT has struggled to boost its funds in light of overall budget constraints. The budget proposal submitted by the TCCT to the Cabinet is often reduced by the Parliament. For instance, for 2024 the Parliament only approved around 50% of the budget proposed by the TCCT. This appears to be part of a government-wide policy to reduce budget across various government agencies. The TCCT has been actively advocating before the Parliament for increased budget.

Although the TCCT’s budget can be complemented by funds from fees (namely merger filing fees), in practice such funds account for only a very limited fraction of TCCT’s budget. This means that the TCCT’s budget mainly relies on the state budget.

In addition to salary expenses, TCCT’s budget is spent on operational resources, such as office space and IT equipment, as well as specific programmes or projects. During the OECD fact-finding mission, TCCT staff mentioned that the agency faces challenges related to digital forensics, software and hardware systems. However, the OECD could not get more information on what these challenges are.

In 2024, the TCCT had 127 staff members, in addition to the high-level positions. However, just over half of the employees (i.e. 75) work on competition (i.e. competition enforcement and advocacy) and unfair trade practices, while the rest is assigned to administrative support, as shown in the table below. Among the staff working on competition and unfair trade-related activities, only 34 are assigned to enforcement (i.e. Merger Review Division, Fact-Finding Division, Fact-Finding by IT Division and Case Management Division), with the remainder focusing on advocacy activities. It should be mentioned that these 34 staff members working on enforcement are responsible for both competition and unfair trade practices. As the TCCT has been focusing on unfair trade practices over competition enforcement,45 in practice less than one quarter of all TCCT employees are indeed working on the core activity of the agency (i.e. merger control and anti-competitive behaviour).

The number of employees allocated to competition-related activities at the TCCT is significantly lower than in other comparable jurisdictions. The contrast is even more pronounced when considering only TCCT staff involved in competition enforcement. Figure ‎1.5 compares the number of competition staff per million inhabitants in Thailand with: (i) OECD jurisdictions; (ii) non-OECD jurisdictions; (iii) jurisdictions in the Asia-Pacific region; (iv) jurisdictions with GDP similar to Thailand; and (v) jurisdictions with population similar to Thailand.

The TCCT has its own rules concerning selection, pay, promotion and dismissal of its employees. Salaries at the TCCT are higher than those of government civil servants in order to offset the absence of government benefits (e.g. pension and medical coverage for parents).

During the OECD fact-finding mission, stakeholders expressed the need for the TCCT to hire more technical staff, particularly to be allocated on competition enforcement. When the TCCT was established in 2017, it was expected to have around 200 employees, but budget restraints allowed for only around 100 employees. Since then, the number of personnel has increased to approximately 130, and the TCCT has been trying to further increase this number.

Although the TCCT has more flexibility to hire new staff members due to its own internal rules, in practice the number of staff must be increased gradually to ensure that it is covered by the budget (including considering the budget fluctuations experienced in recent years, as mentioned above). The TCCT also mentioned that recruiting new staff is challenging, especially to ensure they have competition‑related knowledge. Turnover of employees is also an issue, with many technical staff leaving the agency to work in other government bodies or in the private sector. Nevertheless, the TCCT mentioned they did not have the number of turnover of employees. The TCC does not have a clear staff retention strategy.

Furthermore, stakeholders expressed concerns that a large part of the TCCT personnel has little to no expertise and experience in competition matters. 45% of all TCCT’s staff have university education in either law or economics (25% and 20%, respectively). For staff working on competition and unfair trade‑related activities, this percentage increases to 65% (37% and 28% having university education in law and economics, respectively). Additionally, 44% of TCCT’s staff hold a Masters, while 4% hold a PhD.

The TCC is in charge of determining plans, strategies and guidelines on management of the TCCT.46

According to the TCCT, there is a 4-year plan identifying the agency’s priorities. The current version covers the period from 2024 to 2027 and was being developed by the TCCT in consultation with the public at the time of writing. The TCCT mentioned that the plan was considering various elements, including: competition-related context, both domestically and globally; previous operational statistics and assessments; international indicators; gap analysis; stakeholder expectations; and internal analysis. However, the OECD was not provided with any document related to this process or additional elements (such as the operational statistics mentioned). In addition, previous 4-year plans were not publicly available and were not shared with the OECD team.

Based on the 4-year plan, the TCCT sets its key performance indicators (KPIs) annually, establishing what the agency needs to achieve based on its legal mission. Nevertheless, the TCCT indicated that its KPIs were not publicly available and could not be shared with the OECD team.

Once again, the fact that the 4-year plans and annual KPIs are not publicly available departs from the principles of the OECD Recommendation on Transparency and Procedural Fairness in Competition Law Enforcement (OECD, 2021[15]).

Furthermore, the TCCT stated that the TCA does not allow for setting priorities regarding enforcement and advocacy actions, for instance as regards the complaints received. This means that the authority is required to investigate, at least preliminary, all complaints and cannot reject them based on priority grounds.

In many jurisdictions, competition authorities can decide which cases will be investigated and which cases can be dropped based on pre-established priorities. The level of discretion enjoyed by competition authorities in setting priorities varies from one jurisdiction to another. Similarly, the criteria used by competition authorities to set priorities diverge and may include the nature of the case, its geographic impact, the relevance of the evidence, the importance of the sector affected by the infringement and the size of the market. Competition authorities often involve third parties (e.g. business and consumer groups, as well as other government agencies) when setting their priorities and make them public (OECD, 2015[16]).