This chapter provides an overview of the evolution of competition enforcement in all, OECD and non-OECD participating jurisdictions, presenting the aggregated information collected in the CompStats Survey.
OECD Competition Trends 2025
OECD Competition Trends
Abstract
This chapter highlights the time trends of all the metrics included in the CompStats database covering the 9 years from 2015 to 2023 (excluding resources discussed in Chapter 1). It includes figures and tables relating to the questions in the CompStats survey. An excel file with the aggregated information for all CompStats variables is available on the website. These focus primarily on the changes in the overall averages across all jurisdictions as well as highlighting any differences between OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions.
The 2023 OECD CompStats database includes 69 jurisdictions. Figure 2.1 presents the number of participating jurisdictions by OECD membership and region. The complete list of jurisdictions in each region is included in the Annex, together with the lists of the competition authorities that provided data in each jurisdiction.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
The chapter includes the following sections:
Snapshot
Cartel Enforcement
Abuse of Dominance Enforcement
Mergers
Market Studies
The following infographic presents a snapshot of competition enforcement and market studies activity in 2023, including annual growth rates of the most relevant indicators.
Note: Data based on the jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for each of the variables for 2022 and 2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
As cartel infringement decisions usually lag a few years behind the number of cartel investigations, the decline in cartel infringement decisions (see Figure 2.3) following the overall decrease in investigation numbers from 2016 is not surprising. One of the clearer trends in the last two years has been the significant increase in leniency applications recovering from the steep fall in 2020. This increase was observed in most jurisdictions with particularly strong growth in OECD members. Leniency applications remain much less used in non-OECD jurisdictions. Following the recent uptick in leniency applications, the number of investigations in infringement decisions may also follow this upward trend in the coming years.
Competition authorities continue to impose fines in cartel and abuse of dominance cases, although the total fines imposed decreased compared to 2022. In 2023, around EUR 2.9 billion were imposed between cartels and abuses of dominance, which represents a 13.5% nominal decrease with respect to the EUR 3.4 billion fines imposed in 2022. The average fine per cartel case in 2023 was EUR 9 341 104, which was lower than the average in 2022 (EUR 11 383 630), while the average fine per abuse of dominance case in 2023 was EUR 15 096 197, higher than the average for 2022 (EUR 5 603 632).
Bid rigging, which in most jurisdictions is a violation per se, remains to be one of the most common hard-core cartels sanctioned in 2023, representing 44% of the total cartel infringement decisions (from 39% in 2022). Together with administrative fines, director disqualification and bidder exclusion are forms of debarment sanctions that competition authorities and other relevant agencies in the jurisdictions (such as judicial bodies and contracting authorities) are using to punish cartelists. Recent OECD research found that director disqualification as a sanction for competition infringements exists in 23 jurisdictions and it has started to be applied relatively recently. As for bidder exclusion, over 25 jurisdictions apply this sanction, typically for bid rigging practices, and it has been used for a longer period (OECD, 2022[9]).
The relevance of enforcement against bid rigging is also reflected in the distribution of cartel infringements by industry, where construction was the most common one and saw one of the largest increases. Other relevant industries were retail trade and mining, oil and gas. The top five ranking of industries remain unchanged as a whole, but there were position shifts within this grouping (Figure 2.13).
Looking at the manner in which cases are concluded, settlements in cartel cases and commitments in abuse of dominance cases appear to be decreasing recently both in absolute and relative terms (see Figure 2.4, Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.16). However, this may be a temporary trend as their adoption is expanding across more jurisdictions. Jurisdictions such as Austria, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Japan, and Türkiye have recently included these tools into their competition law frameworks.1 Ireland, for instance, is in the process of implementation and opened in August 2024 a public consultation in this regard. In Europe, the transposition of the European Competition Network Plus (ECN+) Directive has facilitated the greater spread of such procedures, and transposition of the directive into national law will result in greater harmonisation of enforcement mechanisms across EU member states. The increase in the number of jurisdictions adopting frameworks for early termination of proceeding indicates growing interest, despite the overall reduction in absolute usage. This could simply be a time delay in cases feeding into the data, and it will be a trend worth monitoring in future editions of this report.
Turning to mergers, the section shows that overall notification activity is back down in line with the longer-term average after a 25% drop in notifications following the spike in notifications in 2021 (Figure 2.21). However the rate of intervention appears to have increased, with the proportion of mergers cleared with remedies at its highest share since the survey began (Figure 2.30) and a sharp increase in withdrawn mergers in some jurisdictions in 2023 (Figure 2.29).
Market studies continue to be undertaken across a broad range of jurisdictions and there appears to have been a particular focus in 2023 on retail trade. This was the sector with the most concluded market studies followed by the information sector, which covers all inquiries and studies carried out in digital markets.
This section highlights the trends in cartel enforcement in the period 2015-2023. It includes charts showing how the number of investigations and decisions have evolved over time. It then provides further details on the genesis of the investigations (for example, the extent authorities have been relying on leniency applications) and the outcomes such as changes in fines, settlements and criminal sanctions. In addition, it examines the composition of cases by industry and the proportion of cases that related to bid-rigging.
Note: Data based on the 52 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel investigations for nine years. For 2023, for the sample of jurisdictions who provided details on the sources of their investigations, total cartel investigations are the sum between investigations started after a complaint and investigations started by the authority’s own initiative. This figure does not present information from the United States competition authorities.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 62 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel decisions for nine years. This variable corresponds to Question 2.1. in the survey which asked about the number of cartel infringements.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 47 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel cases in which settlements or plea bargain procedures for settling infringement cases were used for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 47 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel decisions and for cartel cases in which settlements or plea bargain procedures for settling infringement cases were used for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 47 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for leniency applications for nine years. This figure does not present information from the United States competition authorities.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 63 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data on cartel decisions and bid-rigging cartel infringement decisions for the years 2021-2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 52 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel dawn raids for nine years.
This figure does not present information from the United States competition authorities.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 61 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel fines for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 61 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for companies fined in cartels for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 44 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data or cartel cases in which fines on individuals were
imposed for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 28 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for cartel fines for nine years. Please note, this only reports the figures at the aggregate level, for all jurisdictions, due to a low data availability for non-OECD jurisdictions.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Decisions by industry were classified according to two‑digit NAICS codes. Their correspondence with the legends in this graph is as follows: 11 – agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 21 – mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, 22 – utilities, 23 – construction, 31-33 – manufacturing, 42 – wholesale trade, 44-45 – retail trade, 48-49 – transportation and warehousing, 51 – information, 52 – finance and insurance, 53 – real estate and rental and leasing, 54 – professional, scientific, and technical enterprises, 55 – management of companies and enterprises, 56 – administrative and support and waste management and remediation services, 61 – educational services, 62 – health care and social assistance, 71 – arts, entertainment, and recreation, 72 – accommodation and food services, 81 – other services (except public administration), 92 – public administration. Data based on the 38 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for 2021-2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Decisions by industry were classified according to two‑digit NAICS codes. Their correspondence with the legends in this graph is as follows: 11 – agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 21 – mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, 22 – utilities, 23 – construction, 31-33 – manufacturing, 42 – wholesale trade, 44-45 – retail trade, 48-49 – transportation and warehousing, 51 – information, 52 – finance and insurance, 53 – real estate and rental and leasing, 54 – professional, scientific, and technical enterprises, 55 – management of companies and enterprises, 56 – administrative and support and waste management and remediation services, 61 – educational services, 62 – health care and social assistance, 71 – arts, entertainment, and recreation, 72 – accommodation and food services, 81 – other services (except public administration), 92 – public administration. Data based on the 38 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for 2021-2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
This section highlights the trends in authorities’ activity relating to abuse of dominance cases (“AoD”). It shows the trend in the number of investigations and decisions over time. It also highlights the extent to which dawn raids were used, as they remain uncommon for unilateral conduct investigations. It presents detailed numbers on how cases were concluded in terms of the number of cases where commitments were accepted, the value of fines and the sectors the cases occurred in.
Note: Data based on the 58 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for abuse of dominance investigations for nine years. This variable corresponds to Question 3.1. in the survey which asked about the number of abuse of dominance infringements.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 62 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for abuse of dominance decisions for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 58 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for abuse of dominance decisions and abuse of dominance decisions with commitments respectively, for 2021-2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 46 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for abuse of dominance dawn raids for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Decisions by industry were classified according to two‑digit NAICS codes. Their correspondence with the legends in this graph is as follows: 11 – agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 21 – mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, 22 – utilities, 23 – construction, 31-33 – manufacturing, 42 – wholesale trade, 44-45 – retail trade, 48-49 – transportation and warehousing, 51 – information, 52 – finance and insurance, 53 – real estate and rental and leasing, 54 – professional, scientific, and technical enterprises, 55 – management of companies and enterprises, 56 – administrative and support and waste management and remediation services, 61 – educational services, 62 – health care and social assistance, 71 – arts, entertainment, and recreation, 72 – accommodation and food services, 81 – other services (except public administration), 92 – public administration. Data based on the 19 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for 2021-2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Decisions by industry were classified according to two‑digit NAICS codes. Their correspondence with the legends in this graph is as follows: 11 – agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 21 – mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, 22 – utilities, 23 – construction, 31-33 – manufacturing, 42 – wholesale trade, 44-45 – retail trade, 48-49 – transportation and warehousing, 51 – information, 52 – finance and insurance, 53 – real estate and rental and leasing, 54 – professional, scientific, and technical enterprises, 55 – management of companies and enterprises, 56 – administrative and support and waste management and remediation services, 61 – educational services, 62 – health care and social assistance, 71 – arts, entertainment, and recreation, 72 – accommodation and food services, 81 – other services (except public administration), 92 – public administration. Data based on the19 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided comparable data for 2021-2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 60 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for fines imposed in AoD cases for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 57 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for companied fined in AoD cases for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
This section sets out charts and tables demonstrating the latest trends in merger activity. It is the only section that presents jurisdiction-level information. It shows the changes in merger notifications and decisions and highlights differences between OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions.
The section also presents charts on the level of interventions across different jurisdictions, showing how the resolution of cases has evolved over time. It presents number of mergers challenged or prohibited, as well as withdrawn by the merging parties.
Note: Data based on the 61 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger notifications for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 61 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger notifications for 2022 and 2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 38 OECD jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger notifications for 2022 and 2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 23 non-OECD jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger notifications for 2022 and 2023.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 56 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger notifications and decisions for nine years. The intervention rate is the share of mergers approved with remedies, prohibited or challenged over total merger decisions.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 61 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger decisions by type for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 60 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger decisions by type for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 38 OECD jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger decisions, by type for 2023. Classifications on whether a regime has a single or two-phase regime are done according to what is provided for in the merger laws.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 26 non-OECD jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger decisions by type for 2023. Classifications on whether a regime has a single or two-phase regime are done according to what is provided for in the merger laws. * Second phase refers to the mergers where an extension certificate for the review of the merger is issued.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 60 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger prohibitions for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 59 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for withdrawn merger notifications for nine years. The increase in the 2023 figure is driven by one jurisdiction, France.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Data based on the 61 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data for merger decisions for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
This section shows the level of market studies activity across OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions and the trend over time. It also shows the sectors where a sample of these studies were carried out in 2023.
Note: Data based on the 61 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided data on market studies for nine years.
Source: OECD CompStats database.
Note: Market studies by industry were classified according to two‑digit NAICS codes. Their correspondence with the legends in this graph is as follows: 11 – agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, 21 – mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction, 22 – utilities, 23 – construction, 31-33 – manufacturing, 42 – wholesale trade, 44-45 – retail trade, 48-49 – transportation and warehousing, 51 – information, 52 – finance and insurance, 53 – real estate and rental and leasing, 54 – professional, scientific, and technical enterprises, 55 – management of companies and enterprises, 56 – administrative and support and waste management and remediation services, 61 – educational services, 62 – health care and social assistance, 71 – arts, entertainment, and recreation, 72 – accommodation and food services, 81 – other services (except public administration), 92 – public administration. Data based on the 40 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database that provided detailed data on the industry of market study for 2023 or provided detailed information of market studies on their annual reports to the OECD.
Source: OECD CompStats database and OECD Annual Reports on Competition Policy Developments.
← 1. For example, Luxembourg introduced a settlement procedure for cartels in 2021, as did Slovenia in 2023. The Dominican Republic also established procedures for commitments and settlements in 2021.